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iii FOREWORD 
This monographic study of the small firm in dominant-group industries 
is a condensed presentation of an analysis originally submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of doctor of philosophy at 
the University of California (Berkeley). Although certain of the chapters, 
notably those on the butter and flour milling industries, and the general 
theoretical discussion, have been substantially shortened, it  is hoped that 
the manuscript as a whole has been strengthened as a result of a painstaking 
abbreviation process. 
The study represents a good many years of investigation into the small 
business problem, years in which my indebtedness to others has been great. 
Among those, mention should be made of Professors J. M. Clark and Paul 
Brissenden at Columbia University, who first encouraged me to undertake 
research into the problems of the small firm. Acknowledgment is also due 
those at the University of California who had an important part in shaping 
the present project. The late Professor Leo Rogin directed the initial stages 
of this investigation. Subsequently, Professor Joe S. Bain devoted many 
hours to a careful critique of every aspect of the manuscript as it moved 
toward completion. Others who made significant contributions were Pro­
fessors Robert Brady, William Fellner, and Henry E. Erdman. 
iv I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION AND INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS 
Widespread contemporary discussion of the problems of small enter­
prise has already penetrated the sphere of public policy, and, following the 
usual historical sequence, is currently beginning to cause a stir in academic 
circles. Attention to the special status of the small concern has generally been 
oriented toward the modern predicament of what is more popularly termed 
our "free enterprise system." Our awareness of that predicament was 
immeasurably sharpened during the harsh years of the early 1930's, and 
it was precisely this impetus which gave rise to a reconsideration of our 
traditional conceptions of the role played by the small entrepreneur. The 
great depression placed entrepreneurship on trial, and in the quest for 
explanations of its apparent delinquency, we probed widely and deeply into 
our economic organism. More searching questions than formerly came to 
be asked regarding the economic evolution of our industrial markets. 
The competitive status of the smaller producer, in modern industry, to 
which the present work is primarily devoted, is understandable only in the 
setting of the general pattern of industry. Hence, the advances in certain 
aspects of the general theory of business enterprise in recent years are 
pertinent to the problem here under consideration. 
Central to the economic setting of small enterprise is the developing 
concentration of production and centralization of  control. This  is  the 
overriding secular factor of economic history which has induced the wide­
spread reconsideration of conventional theories of monopoly and competition 
so characteristic of economic analysis over the last two decades. The work 
of describing the growth of concentration, begun so well by Berle and 
Means with the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
in 1933,1 was carried forward by the Federal Government through the 
National Resources Committee's Structure of the American Economy,2 
the investigations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, and the 
Congressional committees on small business. Although the facts of increasing 
concentration and centralization have been questioned by some, the signifi­
cant controversy revolves around the implications of such facts for the 
functioning of industry and for the theory of business enterprise. 
More specifically, the dominance of the large corporation in so many 
of our industrial markets has brought into sharper focus the problem of the 
place of the smaller producer in such markets. A closer scrutiny of the 
1 Berle, A. A., and Means, G. C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York:
MacMillan, 1933. 
2 U.  S.,  National Resources Committee, The Structure of the American Economy, Part I,
Washington: June, 1939. 
1 2  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
competitive relations of large and small concerns, as they evolve through 
time, suggests the need to re-examine Alfred Marshall's forecast that large, 
long-established firms would typically reach a period of senility and make 
way for newer, smaller, and more progressive business organizations. 
Empirical studies of our contemporary industries reveal the persistence 
of certain markets where the scale of organization is small and producers 
are numerous ; we also find very many markets in which a fringe of lesser 
enterprises continue to coexist alongside a dominant group of large firms. 
To the extent that anything approaching formal theorizing has been attempted 
with respect to these smaller concerns, there has been a strong tendency to 
fall back upon our traditional doctrines of pure and perfect competition. 
Since these doctrines presuppose atomistic markets, they have seemed to 
many quite appropriate to describe the business behavior of the smaller 
firms in both types of industrial structure to which we have just referred. 
The small firm is one among many ;  it is of such size that it  is ruled by 
external market conditions, and cannot "administer" such conditions ; and 
its business decisions are arrived at independently, i.e., without consideration 
for the reactions of  rivals. The identification of small enterprise with 
atomistically competitive behavior, and a frequent corollary linking large 
enterprise with monopolistic behavior, is to be found not only in numerous 
popular periodicals but also in the work of the Congressional small business 
committees, in much of our judicial antitrust theory, and in many con­
temporary works in the field of industrial organization, such as A. R. Burn's 
Decline of Competition' and Corwin Edwards' Maintaining Competition.' 
On the other hand, the identification of concentration with monopoly, 
and of small enterprise with competition as the opposite of monopoly, is 
rejected by some leading theorists. In this group falls the theory of mon­
opolistic competition. The dichotomy is blunted by the assertion that mon­
opoly obviously encompasses more than a single seller (or buyer), that it 
is pervasive in the system, and that it  is best thought of as a form of 
competition. Burns' thesis of declining competition is therefore deplored. 
Declare Dennison and Galbraith,5 "monopoly is not the antithesis of com­
petition ; the two can and do exist side by side  .  .  ." Another writer adds, 
"It would be a mistake .  .  .  to identify big business with monopoly, little 
business with competition."6 A basically similar approach is found in E. A. G. 
Robinson's Structure of Competitive Industry.' 
The question raised by this controversy is not yet resolved. One difficulty 
is the lack of adequate empirical study, a want which efforts along the lines 
of the present investigation hope to satisfy. 
3 New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936.
4 New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949.
5 Dennison, H. S., and Galbraith, V. K., Modern Competition and Business Policy, New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1938, p. 29.
6 Wilcox, Clair, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 21,
Washington, 1940, p. 307.
7 Cambridge: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1931. 3  INTRODUCTION 
On the theoretical plane, however, some progress has been made. There 
has been a reaction against the doctrine of chaos implicit in the theory of 
monopolistic competition, pointed out so sharply by Stackelberg.8 It has 
been difficult to rest content in the face of the trenchant remark of a prac­
titioner that "neither the theory of market phenomena which are found 
nowhere nor that of market phenomena which are found everywhere can 
give the courts a satisfactory basis for work .  .  . "9  One of the criticisms of 
the doctrine of monopolistic competitions which led to fruitful results was 
that it failed to deal at all satisfactorily with oligopoly. Although challenged 
by some,1° we have achieved some measure of general agreement that "the 
dominant market of modern capitalism is not one made up of many sellers 
offering either uniform or differentiated products. Rather it is a market of 
few sellers, i.e., oligopoly .  .  .  the counterpart of few buyers associated with 
many or few sellers is also a common phenomenon .  .  ."11 Furthermore, it is 
also widely agreed that oligopoly and oligopsony may give market results very 
similar to those associated with monopoly.12 
If oligopoly is today predominant, if economic evolution has therefore 
been shown to be in the direction of oligopoly, then this provides an im­
portant clue to the changing status of the small or independent enterprise. 
It would seem fruitful to relate the problem of the small producer to in­
cipient,  emerging, or dominant oligopoly in particular industries. Small 
enterprise will, first of all, have to be defined so as to place it in its proper 
position with respect to oligopolistic enterprise. Such attempt is made in a 
preliminary way in this chapter and is expanded in the case studies and the 
concluding chapter. 
The apparent paradox involved in an approach to small enterprise that 
emphasizes the role of oligopoly may be dispelled by recognizing certain 
strategic factors. Concentration of production and centralization of private 
controls over production13 have been important developments affecting the 
competitive conditions under which the smaller producer must operate. Since 
these developments have transformed many industries with more or less 
atomistic structures into markets in which fewness predominates, the resi­
dual small competitors in such cases confront new problems in the struggle 
8 Stackelberg, H., Marktform and Gleichgewicht, Vienna and Berlin, 1934.
9 Corwin Edwards in American Economic Association, Proceedings, May, 1948, p. 203.
10 Cf. review of Bain, J. S., Pricing, Distribution and Employment, by George Stigler, American
Economic Review, December, 1948, p. 915.
11 Galbraith,  J.  K., "Monopoly and the Concentration of Economic Power," in A Survey of
Contemporary Economics (Edit. by H. S. Ellis), Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1948, p.  101. 
12 CF., e.g., "Supplement: Papers, Relating to the Temporary National Economics Committee,"
American Economic Review, June, 1942, pp. 24-25.
13 Concentration of production is  of' course not the same thing as centralization of control. Cf.,
e.g., the concept of control presented in the Structure of the American Economy, part I  (U. S.
National Resources Committee, Washington: 1939),  p.  153. This study will be concerned primarily
With the former rather than the latter. One great gap in the presentation is the matter of control
of fabricating enterprise by financial concerns. The U. S. Department of Justice has declared that
"practically every important industry shows the  effect  of the investment banker's inclination  to 
merge and combine competing companies  .  .  ." (United States versus Economic Concentration and
Monopoly, House Committee on Small Business, Washington, 1947,  p.  38). The great obstacle to
adequate treatment of this problem is the lack of information. 4  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
for market opportunity. Furthermore, since the business policies of the 
few leading concerns will typically dominate the given industry, the fringe 
of lesser enterprises will find that such policies will vitally shape their own 
behavior patterns. Hence it becomes necessary to examine the group inter­
relations  between the dominant few and the  small-firm  fringe. Most 
oligopoly theory has dealt with the relations among oligopolists. It is believed 
that extension of oligopoly theory to deal with group interrelations between 
the dominant few and the small-firm peripherythe central objective of the 
present studymay prove worthwhile.14 
In order to examine these group interrelations in a manner which will 
give the fullest possible consideration to their dynamic and variegated forms 
of behavior, the historical method will be essential. Both in the case studies 
and the general summary discussion of the final chapter, the group inter­
relations between the leaders and the lesser enterprises are analysed as they 
evolve over time. As might be expected, such interrelationships do not remain 
fixed as an industry develops, stagnates, or declines ;  consequently, it  is 
necessary to delineate the phases of market evolution and to distinguish 
the shifts in competitive status between the two groups from phase to phase. 
2. CONTEMPORY THEORY AND THE SMALL FIRM 
The use of our standard theoretical tools to accomplish the task thus 
outlined is severely restricted by two characteristics of those tools :  (1) 
their static nature, and (2) their preoccupation with price. With regard to 
the first aspect, it requires but a glance at the development of competitive 
behavior in any one of our industries to recognize the dynamic character of 
the data. The emphasis upon static models in conventional theory seriously 
impairs its usefulness to describe those many functionally-changing situa­
tions in which the small business problem emerges. With regard to the 
second aspect, it must be recognized at the outset that we will be concerned 
on the level of market behavior not only with price results but with nonprice 
results. Price results are undoubtedly strategic in affecting the competitive 
interrelationships between firms in a given industry. But nonprice results, 
such as relative market shares of member firms over time, profitability, rate 
of utilization of capacity, service competition and product variation, may 
be equally important. Furthermore, the attempt must be made to relate 
market structure  (e.g., number and size of distribution of enterprises, 
importance of overhead and variable costs, character of industries selling 
to and/or buying from the given industry, etc.) to market results, and this 
requires investigation of these environmental determinants lying behind such 
results. A stress on price in contemporary literature in the field of business 
policy is not necessarily to be condemned ; but it is believed to have slowed 
14 For an outstanding contribution  to  this  so-far  neglected  aspect  of  oligopoly theory,  cf.,
Nicholls, Wm. H. Imperfect Competition within Agricultural Industries, Ames: Iowa State College
Press, 1941, especially Chapter 8. 5  INTRODUCTION 
the rate of advance in those aspects of enterprise economics which are more 
particularly useful for the problem of the small concern in manufacturing. 
The historical approach taken in the case studies included may be 
justified not only on the general grounds that it leads to better understanding 
of economic phenomena, but also that it may reveal differences in the status 
and policy of the small firm under historically differing market contexts. 
The individualism of the autonomous enterprise may lead to quite different 
results in self-regulating atomistic industries than it would in markets where 
at least some of the firm members have achieved an important degree of 
jurisdiction over economic conditions. 
A review of contemporary literature in the field of small business 
reveals that not only is the existing body of knowledge on the subject dis­
tressingly incomplete, but, also, almost no progress has been made insofar 
as the formation of a systematic theory is concerned. In particular, a system­
atic treatment of the changing competitive position of the small firm in 
industry has not so far been undertaken. 
The problem of definition has plagued analysts since interest in the 
subject was first raised to a high point during the early 1930's. It has not 
yet been satisfactorily solved. The majority of writers have approached the 
matter largely from the quantitative point of view. Following this line 
of attack, it was early recognized that any classification of large and small 
firms based on such criteria as assets, sales, or number of employees would 
have to use different measures for manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing. 
However, these failed to prove satisfactory because, in the breakdowns 
within these three, it was obvious that what was quantitatively large in one 
line would be small or medium-sized in another.15 Present thinking of this 
school recognizes that the concept of small must be related to some portion 
of a total (capacity, sales, etc.) for a given commodity, industry, or line 
of trade. Thus there can be no over-all size class that accurately delimits 
small enterprise. 
A more functional approach has just begun to emerge in recent years. 
This approach acknowledges certain widely typical characteristics of the 
small concern, certain qualitative features which, together with a measure 
of size appropriate to a given industry, provide a much more adequate con­
ceptual framework than could the size approach alone. Kaplan points out, 
for example, that 
In studying the problems that go with smallness, we must take account of 
characteristics other than those of size, whether physical or financial. Small 
business means, typically, an identity of management and ownership, an absence 
of specialized staff for separate functions and of facilities designed specifically 
15 Such review cannot be undertaken here. The literature is vast. Four studies come to mind 
as particularly worthy of note: U. S. Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 17,
Problems of Small Business, Washington: Government Printing Office,  1941; Weissman, Rudolph,
Small Business and Venture Capital, New York: Harpers, 1945; Steindl, Joseph, Small and Big
Business, Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1947; and Kaplan, A. D. H., Small Business: Its Place and
Problems, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. 6  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
for research and analysis, inability to finance itself by floating securities or to 
secure its funds through sources such as investment bankers, a personal re­
lationship between owners and employees and customers, the affiliation of the 
firm with a local community, and chief dependence for its market on the local 
area. These factors, when present in combination, make small business recog­
nizable as such even when its volume of business is substantial.16 
This functional approach is quite new in the field. It is the one which will 
be emphasized in delimiting the small-firm segment of the industries discussed 
below. It is believed attempts to define small enterprise purely quantitatively 
will be caught on the horns of a dilemma at the outset. 
As a tentative working definition of small enterprise, the following may 
be suggested. A SMALL ENTERPRISE in an industry is one which accounts 
for a distinctly minor proportion of the total output or capacity. "Minor," 
in this connection, means that no other firm or firms in the market will 
typically change their general market behavior, out of consideration for 
the reaction of such firm, from what that behavior would be were such 
small firm not in the market. Furthermore, since the small enterprise is a 
distinctly minor factor it is likely to make its business decisions with but 
little consideration for their effects upon rivalsat least smaller rivals. 
In this sense, small enterprise is independent enterprise, i.e., its actions are 
comparatively autonomous. 
THE SMALL ENTERPRISE SEGMENT of an industry, which also contains 
a few large leading firms, is that group of small firms which together account 
for less than some critical percentage of the total output or capacity. 
"Critical percentage" will vary widely from industry to industry, and over 
time, but in general, a critical percentage would be that proportion of the 
total which is accounted for by those leading enterprises (sometimes called 
the "dominant group") whose policies usually determine the chief char­
acteristics of market results in the industry. 
The significance of small size as thus defined becomes meaningful, 
however, only in connection with certain competitive features associated 
with smallness, which we term the functional aspects of small enterprise. 
These functional aspects will emerge in the case histories, and will be 
developed more fully in the concluding chapter. 
3. NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study attempts to do several things : 
1. To clarify the concept of small enterprise. 
2. To discover the empirical status of the small firm in the four selected 
industries, particularly with respect to interfirm competition. 
16 Op. cit.,  p.  17. Thurman Arnold once defined small enterprise as that type of business which
could not afford to maintain a lobby in Washington. (Cf. Weismann, R. L., Small Business and
Venture Capital, op. cit., p. 134.) 7  INTRODUCTION 
3. To discover to what extent evidence in the selected industries enlarges 
upon or conflicts with conclusions about small business arrived at by 
other investigators. 
4. To discover any new relationships which may deepen our present 
understanding of the competitive status of small enterprise. 
5. To construct a set of working hypotheses that may contribute to the 
formation of a systematic theory of the small firm in modern 
industry. The aim of such a theory would be to appraise the relative 
competitive strength of small business in American manufacturing, 
its prospects for survival, and the influence of small enterprise upon 
market behavior and results. From the purely theoretical viewpoint, 
the major objective is to integrate the analysis of the small firm 
into the growing body of doctrine regarding oligopoly. 
The most important objective is, of course, the fifth. The other four, 
although worthwhile in themselves, are, in a vital sense, contributors to the 
main task of constructing a more generalized theory than exists at present. 
The central working hypothesis of the present study is as follows : the 
archetype of industrial structure is an industry with a core of oligopoly 
leaders alongside a fringe of smaller producers. Such structures, often 
termed "dominant-group industries," provide the empirical reference for the 
basic theoretical categories used throughout :  the small enterprise segment 
on the one hand, the few larger sellers (or buyers), which account for 
an important percentage of total output, on the other hand. Using this 
basic classification the analysis revolves around an examination of the com­
petitive relationships between these two segments. 
The small-firm segment may be composed of a relatively small number 
of concerns which would be considered large in some industries. But in 
any given industry, these enterprises are comparatively small when con­
trasted with those making up the leading core. As a group, the small-enterprise 
sector must he conceived of in an evolutionary sense :  its numbers, the size 
of its individual components, and its competitive status with respect to the 
larger firms  all are likely to alter with time. 
Industrial markets are seen, according to the approach used here, not 
merely as a congeries of rival sellers or buyers but rather as possessed of 
two strata of enterprises, each differing in size and in typical policy. 
The study further hypothesizes that the small-firm segment and the 
large-firm segment (the "oligopolistic core") pursue, in general, different 
and conflicting business policies. The large-firm group increasingly pur­
sues, as the industry evolves toward relative market saturation, a policy of 
cooperation and stabilization of market conditions. The small-firm segment 
generally follows a policy of disruption and destruction with respect to any 
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ways, it rejects its typical role and cooperates with a stabilization policy 
(often under duress) coming from the oligopolistic core. The basic conflict 
between the two segments is obviously an intergroup conflict, rather than the 
simple interfirm competition assumed to exist in the theories of perfect 
competition and monopolistic competition. Hence it has been thought ad­
visable to use a little different terminology at some points in the analysis. 
Thus, we refer to a "competitive cleavage" between the small-firm segment 
and the oligopolistic segment. The two sectors are said to be "differentiated 
competitively,"17 and since the hypothesis works with two basic sectors in 
each market, the term "bilateral differentiation" is often employed. Older 
connotations of the word "competition" do not cover the kind of interfirm 
relationship which is formalized in the working hypothesis of this study, and 
semantic difficulties might readily develop were the attempt made to force 
the new concept into the old mold. 
From the aspect of industrial structure, it will be seen that the working 
hypothesis used herein has drawn upon a well-known market category : 
oligopoly with a "quasi-competitive" fringe. The problem of small enterprise 
is presumed to be peculiarly connected with the growth of industrial oligopoly, 
in general ; and oligopoly, with a small-firm fringe, is considered to be the 
particular market structure which, among all other classes of market structure, 
best reveals the changing status of the small manufacturer. 
From the aspect of business policy, the working hypothesis makes its 
greatest claim to innovation. Through its bilateral classification, the hypothesis 
states that modern industries develop within themselves two broad types of 
business policy :  cooperation, and something closely approximated by the 
term "destructive competition." These two policies are roughly identified 
with a leading core of large firms and a more economically subordinate 
(in terms of total output, financial resources, etc.) group of small enter­
prises. These two policies develop side by side as the industry evolves. They 
come into conflict with each other at strategic points in the struggle for 
market opportunity. The changes in the balance of economic power behind 
these two policies spells out the competitive status of the smaller producers 
for any given period in the history of a market. The more pressing the 
need for sales in particular markets, as in the case of industries with saturated 
markets, heavy overhead charges, and excess capacity, the more intense is 
likely to be the intergroup conflict between the two segments of the market. 
In this case the "problems" of the small firm will be the most acute. 
Industrial structure and policy are interrelated. It was the historical 
transformation in the structure of markets, associated with such things 
as the growth of large sunk costs, the great size of the American national 
market, and the spread of the corporate form of business that brought with 
17 Not to be confused with differentiated products. Of course, product differentiation, if present,
may affect the conditions of intergroup competition. 9  INTRODUCTION 
it modern industrial concentration. The growth of markets dominated by a 
few large concerns made more feasible business policies of cooperation and 
stabilization. The latter were superimposed upon, and came into conflict 
with, whatever remained of earlier more atomistic structures and "destruc­
tively" competitive policies. The modern representative of the earlier factors 
is the small firm. This is the essential relation between structures and policy 
so far as small enterprise is concerned. 
The working hypothesis is not to be thought of in too rigid terms, 
however. It is recognized that as a generalization it is subject to numerous 
exceptions and modifications. Industry is much too diverse and changing 
to provide us with pure principles that allow no exceptions. If we can be 
correct in the bulk of the cases illustrative of a given problem area, then we 
can ask little more. Indeed, several aspects of the case studies included 
here could not be considered consistent with the central theorems just out­
lined. But it is believed that, despite these particular exceptions, the studies 
below, as well as the weight of other industrial evidence, are broadly con­
sistent with the working hypothesis. 
So much for a preliminary statement of the hypothesis. Further elab­
orations and testing must await the detailed analysis to follow. 
Despite the many difficulties confronting the small enterprise, in its 
efforts to secure a share of the market, the facts of industrial history indicate 
that small business possesses a remarkable power to survive however compli­
cated may be the conditions of its existence. The number of small firms in 
American manufacturing may have declined somewhat over the last two or 
three decades, but certain factors seem to be at work which tend to produce 
replacements for those who disappear, and to generate new areas of op­
portunity for the small entrepreneur. The matter has been treated by a few 
writers. To them we are indebted for a number of hypotheses designed to 
explain small-firm survival. Among the more important explanations are : 
the persistence in many industries of crude technique ;  the existence of 
many industries producing a single component of a complex commodity, a 
specialty product or a product subject to changes in fashion, and of industries 
competing directly with household work ; the continued importance of local 
markets ; various other market imperfections, including product differentia­
tion; the rate of growth of business savings in the larger firms of a given 
industry ; the desire of dominant oligopoly groups to maintain a fringe of 
small rivals as a facade ; and governmental aid. The significance of these 
various hypotheses will be tested in the case studies. A general appraisal 
will be made in the concluding chapter. 
4. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The concern here is not with solutions, but, to paraphrase Wesley 
Mitchell, with "the problem and its setting." This deliberate limitation is 10  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
not set in order to escape the responsibility for economic policy but rather 
emanates from the conviction that a certain amount of intellectual specializa­
tion is warranted, particularly where it is felt that investigation to date has, 
for the most part, relegated to the background, certain aspects essential to 
working out appropriate solutions. 
The aspects of the small enterprise problem herein examined are pri­
marily those involved in the internal relations of industrythe interfirm 
relationships of historically changing markets. These aspects have been 
unfortunately neglected in most of the studies of small enterprise. The 
present treatment has to do with the parameters of economic opportunity 
for small capital : opportunity to enter business, to retain a certain proportion 
of total business done, and to make independent autonomous decisions re­
garding the determination of price, output, plant expansion, and so on. 
The theory of small enterprise will have to be shaped out of the ma­
terials furnished by industrial evolution in the secular period. At least two 
decades are covered by each case study. Three of the studies embrace the 
entire 20th century up to World War II. The flour milling investigation 
naturally goes back to the last quarter of the 19th century. It was not felt 
necessary for present purposes to trace earlier origins. 
It  is generally agreed that if small enterprise occupies any special 
status in the business community the manifestations of such status vary widely 
from industry to industry. The industries selected for study clearly reveal 
this characteristic, although similarity in the forms of the small business 
problem is by no means lacking. At the same time, these four industries are 
themselves representative of rather widely differing productive types. Pro­
ducers'  goods, consumers'  goods,  differing  durability,  varying degrees 
of market concentration, differences in proportions of value added by manu­
facture to total value of product, divergence in sensitivity of price to changes 
in the general levelthese, and many other strategic industrial characteristics, 
are represented in the four market types under investigation. Two are 
agricultural processing industries, usually thought to be "strongholds" of the 
small firm. 
Each industry treated in the study points up some one major aspect of 
the problem at hand. The creamery butter industry illustrates in a general 
case the manner in which small and large concerns become differentiated 
competitively. The small creamery drops behind in the rivalry for  raw 
material supplies, for the efficient exploitation of the available technology, 
and for control over the major marketing channels. This industry justifies 
first position in the list of our case studies precisely because it is  one in 
which interfirm differentiation has not gone as far as in the other three 
analyzed. Also, it might be expected that the economic disparities between 
small and large firms would be less likely to appear to any significant degree 
in a many-firm industry engaged in the "first processing" of an agricultural 11  INTRODUCTION 
raw material. Yet, differences in the ability of "centralized" and "local" 
creameries to take advantage of market opportunities emerge very clearly. 
They appear early in the growth of the modern factory butter industry. They 
are to be found in almost every important aspect of market activity. If bilateral 
segmentation is so important in the creamery butter industry, where it might 
least be expected to be found, its general industrial significance for the small 
enterprise problem should thereby be enhanced. 
The flour milling industry is primarily a study of the kind of com­
petitive relationships between a group of leading producers and a multitude 
of lesser firms which bring about very high mortality among the latter. 
High mortality, it  is recognized, is a result of competitive differentiation, 
or alternatively put, a form of differentiation. But the general numerical 
decline of the small firm in the important American manufacturing industries 
heightens the significance of this particular form of differentiation, and, 
it  is believed, warrants the emphasis given to it in the present study. The 
flour milling industry stands out as one in which the mass elimination of 
lesser competitors occurred on a scale almost unrivalled in the entire field 
of manufacture in the 20th century. 
A neglected aspect of our enterprise system, and of the small firm 
problem in particular, is the matter of new business entry, mentioned above. 
The automobile industry provides the empirical framework for an analysis 
of the transformation of a market from one in which business births exceed 
deaths, to one in which the effective appearance of competing firms and 
products practically ceases. Here again, it is observed that the competitive 
chasm between the leading core (of three firms), and the surrounding 
lesser enterprises in a modern mass-production industry, provides evidence 
of the conditions which prevent the free participation of large numbers of 
small entrepreneurs in the economic rewards provided by such a market. 
It is noteworthy that the frustration of new business entry in this market 
is  not primarily the result of so-called  "artificial"  barriers constructed 
by established leaders. 
Small firms often become economically dependent appendages of the 
leading concerns in a given industry, or in related industries. A certain 
degree of dependency is found in the case of numerous suppliers, as well as 
distributors, of the automobile industry. But the glass container industry 
offers one of the most striking illustrations of dependent enterprise in the 
history of American manufacturing. 
Each industry analysed in the study furnishes us, therefore, with at 
least one outstanding aspect of the small enterprise problem in manufacturing. 
It will be seen that these are not industry studies in the conventional 
sense. They are not designed to portray all aspects of each market, to cover 
all stages in its evolution, or to be particularly "timely." What is considered 12  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
important in the welter of historical material, will, in all cases, depend upon 
relevance to the problem. 
It is believed that in focussing attention upon industrial differentiation, 
mortality, new entry and dependency, the present study will highlight four 
of the most important factors affecting the status and prospects of the small 
manufacturer. Furthermore, by treating these relationships in connection 
with the presence of an oligopoly group, it is hoped that the discussion of 
the problem of small enterprise is thereby placed in a significant and realistic 
framework. Oligopoly theory has for the most part endeavored to disclose 
the competitive relations among member oligopolists. It is here proposed to 
investigate the intergroup relationships between oligopoly cores and small-
firm peripheries. II
 
DIFFERENTIATION IN MARKET OPPORTUNITY: 
CREAMERY BUTTER INDUSTRY 
1.	  ORIGINS OF FACTORY BUTTER PRODUCTION 
Production of butter in factories (creameries) in the United States is 
a 20th century industry. As late as 1890, out of a total production of about 
a billion and a quarter pounds, less than two hundred million pounds were 
processed in factories.' Not until World War I did factory output exceed 
farm output. 
Prior to the 20th century the simplicity of butter processing, the 
scattered distribution of the raw material, and the absence of a practical 
factory technology acted to inhibit the growth of off-the-farm production. 
However, the technical basis for a factory system was established around 
the last decade of the 19th century. In the manufacturing process proper, 
the new technique was built largely upon a machine for the centrifugal 
separation of cream, the Babcock tester for the fat content of whole milk, 
and later, the combined churn and butterworker. These developments were 
themselves stimulated by the adoption, early in this century, of "starters" for 
hastening the ripening of cream, and of improved plant refrigeration ap­
paratus. 
During the entire period under review the factory system has remained 
basically unchanged. Technical progress has been largely through elaboration 
of existing equipment. 
Rapid urbanization between 1900 and 1920, with development of better 
transportation, including refrigerator transport, had profound repercussions 
within the creamery butter industry. The geographical market was trans­
formed from local to national, creating transportation, storage, and selling 
organizations. The latter changes were of utmost importance to the local 
creamery, since they raised the marketing function to a position of decisive 
significance. 
But alongside of, and somewhat prior to, the growth to dominance of 
the marketing organization,  certain  basic  differences  in creamery type 
occurred in the processing phase of the industry.' 
Plant size and location were profoundly influenced by the wide dis­
persion and high perishableness of the raw material, which is whole milk 
or cream. The earlier phase of the history of butter production in the 20th 
century is shaped largely by these two factors, superimposed upon expansion 
1 Wiest, E., The Butter Industry in the United States, New York: Columbia University Press,
1916, p.  38. 
2 Processing consists of pasteurization  (omitted by many smaller creameries in earlier years),
ripening  or  souring  of  the  cream,  churning,  washing,  salting,  working,  packing,  refrigeration.
Butter contains,  in addition to the butterfat raw material, an "overrun" of about 20 per cent,
consisting of water, salt, and various substances other than fat. 
13 14  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
of the market for factory output at the expense of farm output. The industry 
was comprised of a very large number of plants (and firms), ranging from 
about 5,300 in 1900 to approximately 4,300 in 1914.3 
The creamery at this stage of evolution tended to remain very much a 
local enterprise, with strong economic ties to the dairy farmer, or cream­
ery "patron." The raw material producer dominated the processing function. 
This fact was represented in the prevalence of the local producers' co­
operative form of business organization. 
The market environment in the butter industry was highly conducive to 
the existence of a large number of small plants, particularly during the 
early decades. There were several reasons for this.  In the  first  place, 
the industry has enjoyed expanding output ever since its inception. The 
growth-rate of physical output did not slow until the fourth decade of the 
present century. In the second place, these substantial market expansion 
rates contributed to profitable operations for most of the many firms oc­
cupying the industry during the early period. In the third place, there 
were no artificial barriers to entry,  i.e.,  barriers set up by established 
concerns to keep out newcomers. Finally, there were few natural economic 
barriers that might have inhibited the influx of fresh enterprises. The 
investment required, for example, was small. Although average investment 
per plant increased from $5,746 in 1904 to $13,688 in 1914, neither sum 
could be said to represent a serious block to entry. According to a study 
made in 1924, one of the largest creameries in Minnesota possessed a plant 
whose building was valued at only $23,000, and the equipment at $13,000.4 
2. PROCUREMENT OF RAW MATERIAL 
Necessity for keeping the milk or cream in a fresh condition, coupled 
with its weight and bulkiness, made for substantial haulage costs in the 
industry. Although processing methods proper allowed considerable increases 
in plant scale, the technical and economic difficulties associated with raw 
material procurement were a powerful restrictive force on plant expansion. 
Each creamery in the early years served a substantial number of patrons in 
a given geographical space. This area was subsequently extended by the 
larger butter producing and marketing organizations, but the limits of the 
procurement region have contributed to the maintenance up to the present 
time of numerous small establishments and firms. 
Nevertheless, it was in the impact of factory technology upon the dy­
namics of procurement that the first important competitive differentiation 
between firms on the basis of size occurred. The rapidly expanding demand 
stimulated a race for sources of supply. This competitive race was no longer 
3 Figure for 1900  is from Wiest, op.  cit.,  p.  42; for 1914, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, Washington: U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1925, p. 750.
4 Black,  J.  D., and Guthrie, E.  S., Economic Aspects of Creamery Organization, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Experiment Station, Technical Bulletin No. 26, December, 1924,  p.  97. 15  DIFFERENTIATION IN MARKET OPPORTUNITY 
associated with an increase in the number of creameries after 1900, for the 
United States as a whole. But total investment, in the manufacturing process 
proper, increased approximately 100 per cent over the 10-year period 1904­
1914f rom $30,080,419 to $59,625,448.5 The increase was undoubtedly the 
result in part of the upward price trend, but it also sprang from the ex­
tension of milk and cream gathering facilities and enlargement of the 
plant scale. 
Until the turn of the century, growth of the nascent factory system 
was stunted by the whole-milk method of gathering, under which the farmer 
typically hauled milk every day or two to the creamery, where the cream was 
separated by gravity. This arrangement was costly and time-consuming for 
the farmer, necessitating an extremely narrow patron-radius, with a conse­
quent small-scale creamery. However, the invention and adoption of the hand 
separator for use on the farm made it possible for the farmer to deliver 
the less bulky cream, thereby enlarging the patron-radius of the creamery. 
The hand separator therefore permitted an increase in the size of creameries. 
The hand separator nevertheless did not bring about the elimination of 
the whole-milk gathering system, because another innovation, the centrifugal 
separator, made the skim station feasible ; and it was the skim station net­
work which brought about the initial differentiation of producers into large 
and small. By laying the basis for much larger butter processing plants, 
the skim station made available economies of scale to those concerns pos­
sessing the larger chains of skim stations. Furthermore, in its later trans­
formation, it became not only a concentration point for the collection of 
cream and reduction of whole milk, but also a sales outlet for related food­
stuffs and supplies, thus becoming a strategic weapon of the larger creamery 
organization in the competition for raw materials. 
Once the major technical problems of processing and procurement were 
on the way to solution, creamery plant expansion was very rapid. For the 
country as a whole, average output per establishment rose from 53,329 pounds 
per year in 1900 to 130,622 pounds in 1910.6 Value of products per plant 
rose from $22,640 in 1904 to $55,872 in 1914. Plant expansion continued 
to be substantial up to the depression of the early 1930's, after which it 
levelled off.  In Minnesota, the trend is  illustrated in the following:7 
Total number  Pounds of  Pounds per 
Year  of creameries  butter made  creamery 
1912  864  116,051,878  134,320 
1928  856  273,396,822  319,400 
1938  856  301,771,668  352,537 
5 U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Milk and Milk Products, 1914-1918, Washington :
Government Printing Office, June 6, 1921, p. 67.
6 Wiest, op cit., p. 42.
7 Minnesota  State  Agriculture  Dairy and Food Commissioner,  Bulletin  of  Information  on 
Creameries, etc., St. Paul: 1945, p. 8. 16  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
The increase of plant scale was itself a function of superior organiza­
tion of supply. It must be borne in mind in this connection that approximately 
90 per cent of the total costs of production of a creamery are made up of 
raw material costs.8 Out of a total value of products of $243,379,000 in 
1914, the value added by manufacture amounted to only $30,832,000.9 Ob­
viously, both the assurance of a supply of the chief raw materialbutter­
fatand the price paid for it, are of decisive importance in this industry. 
3. DIFFERENTIATION OF FIRMS : CENTRALIZER AND LOCAL 
Attacks on the problem of widening the procurement area brought 
a new type of creamery organization into existence soon after the turn of 
the centurythe "centralizer." 
This type does not obtain its supply of raw material from one community only, 
but may gather it from a radius of as much as 500 miles. Local (cooperative 
or otherwise) creameries usually produce on the average from 50,000 pounds 
to approximately 1,000,000 pounds a year, whereas the centralizers produce from 
200,000 pounds to more than 21,000,000 pounds per annum. Among the large 
centralizers that produce between 10,000,000 and 21,000,000 pounds are the 
Beatrice Creamery Co., the Fox River Creamery Co. (absorbed by the Beatrice 
Creamery  Co.),  the  Blue Valley Creamery  Co.,  the  California  Central 
Creameries, and the Fairmont Creamery Co. 
The firms mentioned in the report of the Federal Trade Commission (from 
which the above is cited)10 were at that time primarily butter-producing 
organizations. In addition to these, Swift, Armour, Cudahy, and other meat 
packers entered the butter industry as centralizers in the first decade of the 
century, as both producers and marketers. 
Construction of the raw material gathering system involved vigorous 
competition between the local creamery and the centralizer. In Iowa : 
.  .  .  the hand separator, together with the centralizing creamery system, were 
responsible for marked changes within the dairy industry. The farmer began to 
feel more independent of his local creamery and many would bring their cream to 
the railroad stations and ship to almost any creamery within the state or
neighboring state. Many of the smaller local plants were unable to meet the 
competition from the larger creameries and creameries in the state were reduced 
from 811 plants in 1898 to 398 in 1919.11 
This absolute decline in the number of plants was not necessarily the 
typical net effect of the advance of the centralizer in this period. The Iowa 
data may seem to suggest that it was. It is entirely possible that, in the statis­
tics of other states, and in the Census, some local skim stations and concen­
tration points were carried on the records as creameries. An apparently more 
representative type of change was either the transformation of local cream­
eries into centralizer concentration points, or direct absorption of the former 
U. S. Tariff Commission, Butter: Report to the President of the United States, Washington,
1926, p.  19. 
9 U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Washington: 1925, 
p.  750. 
10 U. S., FTC, Report on Milk and Milk Products, 1914-1918, op. cit., p. 68.
11 Iowa Department of Agriculture, Dairy and Food Division, Annual Report, 1945, op. cit., pp. 
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by the latter. On the basis of the Federal Trade Commission's study of the 
industry in 1921, it seems that the centralizer system of cream gathering at 
concentration points "had its origin in the discontinued creamery.  .  .  .  The 
former small decentralized creameries evolved into buying points in order to 
enable the parent company to retain the volume of cream formerly manufac­
tured into butter at these points." 12 
Since the centralizer system of production could exist only on the basis 
of a dependable supply of butterfat, maintenance of a network of cream 
gathering stations was decisive. Expansion of the local creamery was also 
predicated upon such facilities. The alternatives for the local enterprise were 
either to rely upon the vagaries of the contractual station agent (independent 
buyer), or to forego expansion and confront the centralizer as outlet for its 
butter. Consequently, the evolution of the cream stations depicts rather well 
the interfirm relationships of the industry's processing phase : 
The operation of  concentrating points  apparently has been continued  or 
abandoned according to their competitive value. Such points threaten the ex­
istence of weak competitors for two reasons :  First, butterfat prices may be 
forced to a point unprofitable to the small creamery ;  or second, because of 
the high prices the small creamery becomes unable to secure a profitable supply 
of butterfat. The concentration point is reported to have been responsible for 
the collapse of many small creameries. Local price differences or discriminations 
are alleged in numerous complaints, in cases throughout the United States, 
to be the causes of the failure and reorganization or retirement from business 
of many small creameries.13 
Although the cream station has been used, to some extent, by the local cream­
ery, and more so by the independent cream buyer, it has, in the main, been a 
competitive instrument of the centralizer. 
The analysis thus far reveals that technological improvements in the 
creamery butter industry laid the groundwork by the beginning of the 20th 
century for a significant change in the production organization of the indus­
try. The local creamery, as distinguished from the centralizer, therefore 
emerges in the 20th century as "small enterprise." On the basis of this 
initial, twofold classification of firms in the butter industry, it is now possible 
to develop the relationship of the local creamery to the rest of the industry, 
i.e., to the centralizer. In so doing the concept of interfirm differentiation 
will be elaborated. 
The rise of the centralizers produced a significant gap in the array of 
plant sizes in the industry. The trade recognizes two other types of creamery 
organization :  the cooperative, and the individual. Both are significantly 
smaller than the centralizer plant. 
An individual creamery is a private partnership, proprietorship, or in 
some few cases, a corporation, whose butterfat is processed directly from 
12 1.f.  S., Federal Trade Commission, Report on Milk and Milk Products, 1914-1918, op.  cit., 
p. 100.
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the farmer without the intermediary use of concentration points. It  is a 
"local" creamery. Most cooperative creameries are also local, although some 
few are not, i.e., are operated on the centralizer principle of procurement, 
notably in Nebraska. 
The gap in plant size as between creameries of different types may be 
measured in physical output terms. In Minnesota, a state dominated by the 
cooperative form of business organization, the average annual output of the 
local creamery (cooperative and individual) was 123,364 pounds of butter in 
1911, whereas for centralizers it was 807,534 pounds." Segregated data for 
all three types of creamery are available for 1914:" 
Centralizer :  881,611 
Individual :  81,680 
Cooperative :  119,098 
With growth of the industry, average annual production in pounds in­
creased for all three types, but the gap between the three types remained. 
The averages for 1942, for example, were :" 
Centralizer :  1,726,267 
Individual :  323,370 
Cooperative :  378,374 
Centralizer output as a proportion of total factory production expanded 
rapidly during the first two decades of the present century. Thereafter the 
proportion of centralizer output to the total declined. Reasons for this de 
cline in ratio of centralizer production to total production will be discussed 
below. 
It can hence be concluded that the era of centralizer penetration on the 
production level, so far as plant-output analysis suggests, covered roughly 
the years from 1900 to 1925. Thereafter centralizer penetration took the 
form of marketing control. Yet, as will be pointed out later in more detail, 
the spread of control over marketing by the centralizers in the later phase 
of evolution was possible only on the basis of the foundations laid in the 
earlier decades. 
4.	  DIFFERENTIATION AND THE QUALITY OF CREAM 
Technical and economic problems connected with quality of butterfat 
furnished an additional area of competitive conflict between the local creamery 
and the centralizer. Limitations on centralizer plant size stemmed in great 
part from the time-in-transit of milk and cream and the associated technical 
problems of refrigeration, coupled with the effect on the final product of 
the condition of the raw material when it reached the creamery. Centralizers 
14 Anderson, M. J., Development of the Dairy Products Industry in Minnesota, Minnesota Dairy
and Food Dept., Bull. No. 52, Minneapolis, Oct. 15, 1913, pp. 11-12.
15 Computed from Minnesota State Dairy and Food Department, Minnesota Creameries, Cheese,
Ice Cream, and Canning Factories, St. Paul, Minn., 1916, p.  9. 
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were not able to achieve a satisfactory solution to this difficulty. Although 
conditions on the farm itself are important, problems of transport have been 
most vexing. 
So long as the local creamery faced the centralizer as a competitive 
producer, it had a powerful weapon in its favorsuperior freshness of its 
cream. The local creamery has usually been the militant advocate of quality 
improvement and grading standards in the industry. It was partly on the 
basis of a product differentiation program emphasizing quality factors that 
Land O'Lakes built its great cooperative marketing organization of local 
cooperative producers. 
On the other hand, greater uniformity of centralizer butter gives it an 
advantage in the market over the local creamery. The Creamery Journal for 
December, 1946, stated that : 
.  .. butter composition is still a matter that seems to bother too many creameries, 
especially the smaller ones. Such plants as a rule either turn out butter with
too much fat or not enough. They do not seem to he able to hit a happy 
medium and stick to it. Often the salt runs much higher than the percentage 
aimed at ;  other times it  is the moisture which is higher than safety would 
permit.17 
An additional factor favoring the centralized concern is  its ability to 
make several different grades of butter, where the local factory may be 
equipped to turn out only one grade. 
The local creamery exploited to the limit the superiority of its butter 
quality and its direct-gathering methods during the early years of the in­
dustry. Furthermore, it organized, in alliance with the farmer, an active 
opposition against the centralizers in the legislative field. In the great dairy 
states the farmer and the local creamery were instrumental in winning 
legislation inimical (in intent, at least) to the growth of centralizers. For 
example, requirements for use of the Minnesota State Brand on butter, in 
1916, prohibited the use of neutralizers, making it compulsory for creameries 
using the Brand to receive only sweet cream testing less than .2 per cent 
acid.18 
Despite these advantages on the side of the local creamery, it was not 
possible to prevent the advance of the centralizer system with its extensive 
cream-station network, continued use of neutralizers, and uniform quality of 
product. 
5.	  PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE RAW MATERIAL MARKET 
Necessity of an assured supply of butterfat has already been pointed 
out. The structure of the price competition associated with this imperative 
is quite complex, and the intensity of the competition was very great in the 
early decades. Price discrimination in the cream market during this period 
17 p.  20.
 
18 Minnesota Creameries, Cheese, Ice Cream and Canning Factories, op.  cit.,  p.  51.
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has been mentioned above. In characterizing the price situation in this 
market, during the years 1914-1918, with especial reference to the Missouri 
Valley, the Federal Trade Commission declared that, 
.  .  .  every concern apparently has made variations in its prices unjustified by 
freight differences. Price differences have probably been made at one time or 
another, aggressively or defensively, by nearly every centralizer in the Missouri 
Valley. The basis of these price differences appears to be found principally in 
the competition between large and small creameries and in the competition 
between different methods of buying cream .  .  .19 
What the Commission had in mind is price discrimination in the pur­
chase of butterfat. The local creamery concerns often sharply denounced 
the centralizers for practising such price discrimination. 
Discrimination took two chief forms : payment of different prices for 
the same grade of cream in different localities ; and, what is essentially the 
same phenomenon, from a different aspect, payment of superior grade prices 
for inferior grade raw material in the same locality. 
The question of centralizer discrimination in the cream market was 
vigorously debated in the editorials of the Dairy Record as late as the 
NRA years. The price of butterfat appears in quite different perspective to 
the local, especially the cooperative, creamery, on the one hand, and the 
centralizer, on the other. In the procurement of raw material by the co­
operative creamery we have a form of quasi-integration, since the farmer 
and the manufacturer are conjoined in a single dairy enterprise. The cen­
tralizer, on the other hand, confronts the farmer simply as a buyer of his 
raw material. As an instrument of an organized farm group, the cooperative 
creamery gains from price rises in butter within a certain range which will 
not direct consumer demand toward the substitution of oleomargarine. But 
such a creamery, being primarily an outlet for its participating members' 
butterfat,  is not motivated to reduce butterfat costs. Hence it  functions 
differently from the centralizer. 
The Dairy Record indicates that the small creamery in the 1930's was 
still  fearful of discrimination, intimating that smaller processors favored 
price stabilization. This is similar to the attitude of small business in con­
nection with its support of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
6.	  COMPARATIVE COSTS : CENTRALIZERS AND LOCALS 
Economies of centralizer manufacturing methods to date do not seem 
to have been sufficiently superior to local creamery techniques to achieve 
dominance for that system in the processing stage of the butter industry. If it 
could achieve such differential production economies, it might use them to 
price the local creamery out of the cream market. This result could possibly 
be accomplished through an appropriate combination of ever-more-efficient 
processing methods with the centralizer procurement technique. On the other 
19 Report on Milk and Milk Products, op. cit.,  p. 103. 21  DIFFERENTIATION IN MARKET OPPORTUNITY 
hand, it might be accomplished (or greatly implemented) also from the 
finished-product side. The price paid to patrons of a cooperative creamery, 
given procurement and manufacturing costs, is a function of the price of 
butter. Hence, the centralizers might engross the market over a period 
through a policy of underselling the locals in the finished-product market, 
and outbidding them in the raw material market. This would require drastic­
ally lower total creamery conversion costs in centralizers than in competing 
local creameries. In a processing indusry, such as butter, where all conver­
sion costs (including return on investment) make up only about 10 per cent 
of the manufacturer's price of the product, it would obviously be extremely 
difficult to reduce costs enough to out-price the smaller firms in this way. 
The general situation with regard to the relative costs of local and 
centralizer creameries is that the smallest local units were at a clear disad­
vantage so far as conversion costs are concerned. Medium and large local 
firms suffered no such decided disadvantages as compared to the centralizers. 
This factor could not make possible any significant growth in centralizer 
control over the market at the expense of the multitude of efficient local 
creameries. On the other hand, the centralizers did acquire a decided advant­
age over cooperative and individual creameries with regard to the price paid 
for butterfat. 
Exploitation of their superior position in the butterfat market, coupled 
with processing costs at least as low as those of efficient local creameries, 
gave the centralizers a differential advantage on balance. Their total costs, 
inclusive of butterfat, were lower (generally speaking) than were the costs 
of locals of all sizes, taken collectively. So long as the local creamery re­
mained an organization dedicated so largely to the protection of the dairy 
farmer's cream price, it could not overcome this competitive inferiority. 
However, it was rather in the field of marketing that the real subordi­
nation of the local creamery occurred. 
7. MARKETING : EARLY DIFFERENTIATION IN STRUCTURE 
A small firm processing a perishable, widely-scattered agricultural raw 
material is subject to special difficulties in achieving seller independence. By 
the nature of the situation, such a firm must either create its own marketing 
organization or expose itself to buyers who are few in number and more 
powerful than itself. 
As E. A. G. Robinson points out, the expenditure required to create 
a sales organization may be so large as to be prohibitive, thus preventing 
the small firm from ever reaching the optimum technical and managerial 
scale.2° The individual local creamery failed to develop its own separate 
marketing organization. During the early years it sought a solution in the 
20 The Structure of Competitive Industry, London: Nisbet & Co., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1931, 
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wholesaler and the organized butter exchange ; and later, in the surrender 
of its distributive functions, either to the marketing cooperative or to one 
or the other of three factorscentralizer, chain grocer, or large independent 
wholesaler. None of these changes left the local creamery in a position of 
equality as compared with the buyer. What emerged was rather a mild form 
of seller dependence. 
The small size of the local butter manufacturer, producing for a large 
market,2' resulted in specialization in the distribution of local creamery 
butter and the creation of wholesaling organizations that were comparatively 
large-scale. This type of relationship characteristically produces seller de­
pendence. The buyer has superiority in bargaining as a result of the unim­
portance of purchases from any particular manufacturer, the monopoly of 
market knowledge, jobber or retail connections, and possession of strategic 
supplies of trade credit. 
A further and related source of weakness of the local processor was 
the lack of storage facilities. The nondurable nature of the product pre­
sents the alternative of costly storage equipment or immediate disposal of 
output. Few local processors have the volume to warrant, or resources to 
produce, such facilities for themselves. The control of store warehouses or 
the funds to finance holdings therefore were important facilities affecting 
the seller status of these small firms. 
During the earlier period of the industry's history, before the engross­
ment of distribution by large-scale and laterally-integrated marketing con­
cerns, the local creamery operated in a structure in which indirect market­
ing was predominant. Nicholls outlines the movement of butter as : creamery 
wholesale  receiver  jobberretailerconsumer. However, he points out 
that the wholesaling and jobbing functions had already begun to  fuse 
by 1918.22 This was undoubtedly the channel through which the great bulk 
of local firms disposed of their output at that time. Under the contract system 
prevailing at that time, the seller assumed the risk of price fluctuations. "He 
is merely guaranteed a price based upon a quotation ; a quotation which is 
yet to be established  .  ." 23 The relationship was definitely contractual, and 
its formal character was institutionalized through the creation of the butter 
exchanges. This assumption of risk by the creamery amounted to an un­
favorable alteration in its economic position. 
A secondary marketing channel already used during the early years by 
the local creameries was the centralizers. At this time, the centralizers, 
except for the packers, were still largely straight butter processors, utilizing 
21 About 86 per cent of the total make of local creameries in the Middle West is shipped out of
the area of production (Quintus, P. E., and Stitts, T. G., Butter Marketing by Cooperative Cream­
eries in the Middle West, U. S. Farm Credit Administration. Bulletin No. 36, June, 1939, p.  6).
22 Nicholls, W. H., Postwar Developments in  the Marketing of Butter, Iowa State College,
Agric. Exp. Sta., Research Bull. No. 250, Feb., 1939, p.  324. 
23 Quintus,  P.  E.,  "Wholesale  Butter  Prices and Premiums", Journal of Farm Economics,
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wholesalers or jobbers in addition to agents, or their own distributive outlets." 
Nevertheless, the centralizers as a group had already begun to construct the 
marketing pattern that increasingly engrossed the local creamery market in 
the ensuing years. In a Federal injunction against the Elgin butter board as 
early as 1914 it was charged that the centralizers were large buyers of butter 
produced by small creameries throughout the Middle West. 
8.	  LOCALS, CENTRALIZERS, AND THE MARKETING FUNCTION 
The centralizer sector of the industry exhibited industrial policies similar 
to those practised in other industries. A prerequisite to its continued expan­
sion was the engrossment of adequate supply areas and sources. For its 
processing operations this meant the creation of a patron area. For its later 
augmented marketing operations,  it also required the attachment of local 
processors to its supply system. In its relation to the procurement of whole 
milk and cream, the centralizer system resembled the dynamics of other pro­
cessing and agricultural raw-material-using industries, keeping pace with 
the general trend, as succinctly described by Gras :25 
The movement toward obtaining control of raw materials by manufacturing 
concerns had begun in the earlier period but reached its highest point in 1897­
1920. Manufacturing concerns did not attempt to control agriculture ;  tradition 
and problems of finance and management made such control impractical, if not 
impossible, while the existence of a high degree of competition in the agri­
cultural market made it unnecessary. 
The challenge of an expanding national market, coupled with the nec­
essity to dispose of a standardized output in volume, led the centralizers to 
an increasing extent into marketing activities. The enlargement of their 
operations in this sphere was encouraged by the presence of the numerous 
small local processors who were weak in bargaining position and lacked 
distributive facilities of their own. Nicholls points out that the movement 
toward large-scale cooperative marketing stemmed partly from causes similar 
to those which we have shown were motivating the centralizers. 26 Volume 
sales were made possible, in the case of the cooperative distributor, primarily 
through bringing together the output of many small creameries, rather than 
from the operations of one or a few large manufacturing units. The cen­
tralizers as distributors had both sources at their disposal. The cooperative 
creameries, on the other hand, were trying to avoid the alternative of selling 
through centralizer and other buyers in an oligopsonistic position. 
By the end of what we have called the early period, i.e., by around 
1920, the market structure of the butter industry was still far from con­
ducive to the realization of a policy of "stabilized" prices, costs, and profits. 
24 FTC, Report on Milk and Milk Products, op.  cit.,  p.  72.  Cf.  also Nicholls, Post-war De­
velopments, etc.,  op.  cit.,  p.  324. The agent operated on a commission basis for the centralizer, in
contrast to the contract system of the wholesaler.
25 Gras, N.  S.  B., and Larson, H. M:, Casebook in American Business History, New York:
Crofts, 1939, p. 731 f.
26 Postwar Developments, etc., op. cit., p. 360. (Quoting Laughlin and Stitts.) 24  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
Although this aim continued to underlie centralizer policy, and was em­
braced by the dominant cooperative marketing organization, certain other 
developments, primarily entrance of food distributing chains, introduced 
powerful disturbing elements. The chief method with which the centralizers 
and the large-scale cooperative distributors experimented in an attempt to 
prevent this disturbance, from the price aspect at least, was public interven­
tion in the form of guaranteed price-supports. To understand the outcome 
for the local creamery it will be necessary to trace the evolution of structure 
and policy since the beginning of the  1920's, particularly in regard to 
marketing. 
The recent period of the industry's development is marked by the 
growth of large-scale marketing, the cessation of the increase of plant scale 
in the processing unit, and the persistence of the gap in plant sizes of local 
and centralizer creameries. 
9.	  COOPERATIVE MARKETING AND THE SMALL CREAMERY 
Cooperative marketing in the butter industry set out originally to over­
come the marketing difficulties of the local creamery without exploiting the 
weak bargaining position of the local firm, and without infringing upon its 
enterprise autonomy. 
The volume of creamery butter marketed through cooperative sales 
agencies increased at an extremely rapid rate from 1920, when it stood at 
approximately 7 million pounds, or .8 per cent of all creamery butter sold, 
to 1926, when such agencies distributed about 114 million pounds, or 8 per 
cent of total marketings in the United States. Thereafter increase was slower, 
reaching a secular peak volume of 173 million pounds in 1931, which was 
10.4 per cent of the U. S. total. Subsequently, the figures ranged around 10 
per cent of all creamery butter sold.27 
In the butter industry, cooperative selling agencies have never been 
numerous. What occurred was rather the creation of a small number of rel­
atively large cooperatives. This may be partly due to the fact that the develop­
ment came relatively late in the modern history of the industry, when the 
centralizers and others had already created a vast network of distributive 
facilities. In any case, the Farm Credit Administration reported only 7 such 
agencies in 1934. Of these, Land O'Lakes, a federated capital stock coop­
erative, has been by far the largest in the country, distributing over 100 
million pounds of butter alone in 1930, its all-time peak year.28 
The Minnesota Cooperative Dairies Association, from which Land 
O'Lakes stemmed, was formed by 130 cooperative creameries to operate as 
27 U. S. Federal Trade Commission, Agricultural Income Inquiry, Part I, Washington: Govern.
ment Printing Office,  1938,  p.  694. Note that the data are for cooperative sales agencies only. If
cooperative creameries are included, approximately 36 per cent of all creamery butter manufactured
would be accounted for.  (Cf. Nicholls, Postwar Developments, etc.,  op.  cit.,  p.  355.)
28 U.	  S.,  Temporary National  Economic  Committee,  Large-scale  Organization  in  the Food 
Industries. Research Monograph No. 35, Washington, 1940, p. 33. 25  DIFFERENTIATION IN MARKET OPPORTUNITY 
a commission house at New York. According to the Federal Trade Com­
mission, the organization "was brought about through fear that local cream­
eries would be driven off the market by the private centralizers  .  .  ." 29 
The Association in 1921 reorganized its operations under the name of the 
Minnesota Cooperative Creameries Association  (Inc.)  to act as a sales 
and service firm for its 345 members through emphasis upon high-quality 
butter, low freight rates, demand creation, and higher prices for butter and 
butterfat. The policy was therefore extremely effective in attracting the local 
creameries during that period. An important element in the program was to 
provide storage facilities hitherto not possessed by the local creamery, so 
a price structure for high quality butter might be supported. At this stage 
Land O'Lakes policy was closely identified with the problems of the local 
creamery. Its great emphasis upon the 93-score, sweet-cream, Land O'Lakes 
brand (1 score above New York extras) tied up the marketing cooperative 
with the premium system, fusing the latter with a definite local creamery 
program of product differentiation through national advertising. The whole 
program was implemented by a corps of field men, and the sale by Land 
O'Lakes to member creameries and patrons of a diversified line of improved 
dairy equipment and other supplies. 
The product differentiation efforts of the cooperative sales organization, 
based on alleged uniform high-quality features, brought it into direct opposi­
tion to the centralizers. It succeeded in getting Federal cooperation in de­
veloping an extensive program of grading at the source. Certificates were 
adopted stating that each one-pound package was 93-score or better. This 
system was exploited widely in the cooperative's advertising program, elicit­
ing sharp attack from the centralizers who averred that 93-score butter, in 
the country, might score 90 or less at the retail point.3° 
Land O'Lakes found it necessary, in general, to pay its members for 
much of its butter before resale, since it was following a centralizer policy 
of holding supplies off the market for favorable prices. Hence it had to fore­
cast the price in advance. Such a relationship dedicated the organization 
to the pursuance of an administered price policy and to antipathy toward 
the butter exchanges whose prices were followed by other local creameries 
selling to dealers. This was also increasingly the object of the centralizers, 
since they too were in the main now using direct-selling methods. 
The matter of administered price, and the united desire of the largest 
cooperative marketer and the centralizers to discard the organized butter 
exchanges, soon introduced a divergence in policy between Land O'Lakes 
and the non-member local creamerycooperative and individual. In fact, this 
latter was precisely the group which was precipitated into cohesion in 1933 
by the drawing up of an NRA code proposal by Mr. John Brandt, President 
29 U. S., Federal Trade Commission, Cooperative Marketing, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Doc. No. 95,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928, p. 17.
30 Nicholls, Postwar Developments, etc., op. cit., p. 331. 26  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
of Land O'Lakes, and the centralizers, without consultation with this small-
business group. The latter then performed almost overnight a miracle of 
organization which resulted in the National Association of Local Creameries. 
It will be recalled that the wholesale price of butter was originally the 
price paid the butter producer. But with changes in the structure of market­
ing in the recent period, the price received by a manufacturer becomes sep­
arate and distinct from the wholesale price charged by, e.g., Land O'Lakes, 
or a centralizer, or, of course, an independent dealer. The economic motiva­
tion of a marketing enterprise of this type dictates the augmentation of the 
spread between manufacturer's price and what should now properly be called 
the wholesale price. The distributor will be interested, of course, in maximiz­
ing this wholesale price. But as buyers of butter from local creameries, dis­
tributors naturally strive to augment distributive margins at the expense of 
the local butter seller, i.e., will endeavor to depress the manufacturer's price. 
The major cooperative marketing attempts, including Land O'Lakes, have 
not succeeded in avoiding this difficulty. 
The Land O'Lakes organization enjoyed but a short era of growth. 
Whereas its great attraction for the member creamery at first was high 
butter and butterfat prices, this changed within a few years of the adoption 
of the Land O'Lakes name. In addition to the above-mentioned cleavage, 
the basis for butter premiums, and the favorable butterfat priceshigh scor­
ing butter  was undermined by "a steadily narrowing spread between the 
prices of 93-score butter and the lower grades since 1927  partly the result of 
depressed economic conditions, but apparently still more due to an ever-
increasing proportion of high-quality butter  (92-93 score)  during this 
period which could be moved only at an ever-lower price as lower-income 
groups were reached .  .  .  "31 As Nicholls points out, the expensive product 
differentiation program of the cooperative became consequently less mean­
ingful to the consumer, and many member creameries were reluctant or unable 
to meet the added costs of buying cream for a 93-score product in the face 
of lower premiums than had formerly been received.32 Furthermore, many 
chains, big buyers from Land O'Lakes in the late 1920's, began to substitute 
their own private brands of 93-score butter bought direct from locals. In 
many cases local creamery members were able to secure higher net prices 
(at least temporarily) by leaving Land O'Lakes and engaging in such direct 
selling.33 The membership of Land O'Lakes consequently fell from the 
peak of 503 recorded around 1927 to 365 in 1936.34 Although sales held to 
around 100 million pounds during the worst years of the depression, they 
fell sharply after 1933. The total number of cooperative producers in Min­
nesota fell only from 671 in 1928 to 631 in 1936, so the decrease in Land 
31 Nicholls, Postwar Developments, etc., op. cit., p. 355.
32 Ibid., p. 357.
33 Ibid., p. 357.
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O'Lakes membership was much greater than can be explained by general 
conditions. Output of all creameries in the state rose from about 283 million 
pounds in 1930 to 302 million pounds in 1938.35 
Other cooperative creameries, such as the Iowa State Brand Creameries, 
Inc. and the Mid-West Producers' Creameries Inc., have had considerably 
more success with looser, member-controlled service organizations. Develop­
ment of some adequate form of cooperation for small butter producers is 
certainly not to be ruled out. The major experimentLand O'Lakes has 
apparently failed so far to succeed in fulfilling its original conception of an 
instrument of the local creamery. 
10.	  SUBORDINATION OF LOCALS TO LARGE-SCALE MARKETING AGENCIES 
The development of the optimum, i.e., increasingly large-scale, distribu­
tion organization in the foods line was possible only if the organization 
handled a "family" of more- or less-related products. Among other factors, 
certain technical requirements, such as cold storage, dictated, for example, 
the butter-eggs-poultry combination in marketing. This economic utilization 
of facilities augmented the importance of the whole distributive function. 
It was these elements which transformed the handful of nonpacker central­
izers from mere butter processors into dairy product and related foods 
distributors. 
Moreover, the large nonpacker centralizers became important handlers 
of butter not produced in their own establishments. This development was 
begun in the early phase but greatly expanded during the interwar years. 
One of the largest centralizers, the Fairmont Creamery Co., with 16 cream­
eries of its own, and with sales in 1926 of about 56 million pounds of butter 
in that year "was soliciting butter for sale or consignment apart from butter 
manufactured in its own plants in order to maintain a profitable volume for 
continued operation of its distributive facilities  .  .  .  "36 The largest of non-
packer centralizers, the Beatrice Creamery Co., with 1925 sales of 75 million 
pounds, was then purchasing half of its butter from other creameries."' 
The great expansion of these enterprises in the 1920's was primarily 
through acquisition of other enterprises, both creameries and marketing 
concerns. Fairmont's growth through the absorption of many smaller com­
panies resulted in a 100 per cent increase in sales in the decade of the 
1920's.38 Beatrice carried the policy of engrossment of independent firms 
to a high level in this period. The incidence of this trend apparently fell most 
heavily upon the individual creameries. Beatrice maintained a steady rise in 
sales to 1925, then embarked upon a further vast program of acquisition 
which united the entire process of production and marketing of a family of 
35 Minnesota Agriculture Dairy and Food Commissioner,  Bulletin  of Information on Cream­
eries, Cheese Factories, etc., St. Paul, 1952, p. 79.
36 Nicholls, Postwar Developments, etc., op. cit., p. 333.
37 Ibid. 
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food products up to the retailer "to help carry the overhead costs of a 
vertically integrated marketing system  .  .  .  "39 The scope and diversity 
of Beatrice' program of expansion through engrossment of existing enter­
prises is revealed in the record of acquisitions during the period from 1928 
to 1930, during which period 18 small, independent creameries were ab­
sorbed.40 The accompanying increase in sales was from $53.3 million to 
$82.8. million.41 
Prior to the abnormal conditions of World War II, Beatrice' chief 
single item of business was always butter. In fiscal 1936, its butter sales of 
$26,470,000 amounted to 46 per cent of total sales.42 The drop to 25 per 
cent in fiscal 194743 was undoubtedly due to changes wrought by war and 
conversion, together with the secular decline in per capita consumption of 
butter. 
In 1947, Beatrice was maintaining 2200 cream-buying stations, owned 
public cold storage warehouses in 6 cities, including Chicago, and operated 
selling branches in 25 states.44 
The centralizer-packers, however, represent the apotheosis of marketing 
development in the butter industry. They conjoin into a vast subdivided 
organization, vertical integration  in butter with lateral integration of a 
family of foodstuffs. The packers penetrated the industry as processors and 
dealers while at the same time they were building a multiple-purpose dis­
tribution system. Among the packers, Swift and Armour are in the fore­
front in butter sales. The former led all other firms in volume of butter dis­
tributed in 1935 with sales of 137.6 million pounds, or 8.4 per cent of total 
creamery output.45 Swift manufactured 60 per cent of its sales in its own 
centralized creameries, purchasing 40 per cent from other processors or butter 
marketers.46 "As late as 1936  .  .  .  this system of purchasing butter from 
local creameries was greatly expanded. The Armour creameries, including 
concentration points for creamery butter at St. Paul and Mankato, Minn., 
and Dubuque, Iowa, are the most notable examples. The output of a large 
number of Minnesota and Iowa cooperative creameries and of a few in 
Wisconsin is purchased at these points  .  .  .  "47 
The Swift organization has continued to expand its policy of produc­
ing the greater part of its own butter, and was reported, in the years immedi­
ately prior to World War II, to have absorbed a number of additional 
creameries.48 The Armour policy is somewhat different. The number of 
creameries controlled and operated by Armour has decreased. Quintus and 
39 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

40 FTC, Agricultural Income Inquiry, op. cit., pp. 244-245.

41 TNEC, Monograph No. 35, op. cit., p. 27.
42 "Beatrice Creamery", Fortune, June 1936, p.  83. Beatrice also sells oleomargarine.
43 Moody's Industrials, 1947, p, 2504.
44 Ibid. 
45 Nicholls, Postwar Developments, etc., op. cit., p. 351.
46 Ibid. 
47 Quintus and Stitts, op. cit.,  p.  17. 
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Stitts conclude that Armour is operating on the theory it can be a very suc­
cessful merchandiser of butter but cannot process the product cheaper than 
efficient local cooperatives.49 An apparent divergence in policy between Swift 
and Armour suggests the presence of two plant optima on the processing 
level in the industry. This is consistent with our previous discussion of costs 
and plant size. 
If we survey the history of both packer and nonpacker centralizers, 
from the 1920's to the present, we see that local creameries have waged a 
losing battle against them in the competition over control of the market­
ing system in the industry. The locals have remained specialized butter-pro­
ducing units, and have not, unless members of selling cooperatives, been 
able to develop their own marketing organizations. As a result, the competitive 
differentiation between locals and centralizers has become more sharp, a 
differentiation exhibiting itself in two major ways :  (1) some of the local 
creameries have become almost completely dependent upon the large in­
dependent dealers ;  (2) others have had to sell their butter to centralizers, 
i.e., to their own competitors. The sale of butter by a local creamery to a 
competing centralizer is an illustration of what has been referred to above 
as "seller dependence." 
The final group that should be treated in our discussion of large-scale 
marketing developments is the chain groceries. However, limitations of space 
prevent more than a mere reference to this group. 
Growth of direct purchasing, and the attachment of local creameries 
dependent small enterpriseto centralizers and other large distributors, 
makes understandable the otherwise baffling facts of (1) a decline in the 
ratio of centralizer output to total output beginning in the late 1920's, and 
(2) an increase in the number of "individual" creameries since the 1930's. 
Our discussion indicates that the quantitative increase in importance of 
the local creamery has been associated with a decrease in its seller discretion, 
a subordination to the large-scale marketing concerns. The trend in market­
ing has confronted the small creamery enterprise with an ever-expanding 
oligopsony. The chief segments of this oligopsony consist of : 
(1) National or regional sales cooperatives ; 
(2) Centralizers, packer and nonpacker ; 
(3) Large independent dealers ; 
(4) Grocery chains. 
Of the four, the centralizers appear to be the primary "innovators" 
within the industry. Centralizers have not only outdistanced the locals in the 
strategic marketing process, they have continued to be important in the 
manufacture of butter. In this latter connection, two recent developments 
promise to provide the centralizers (and possibly the sales cooperatives) with 
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new means of securing even greater competitive advantages over the local 
creameries. These developments are : the emergence of the "flexible" dairy-
product plant, and continuous process buttermaking. 
11. RECENT INNOVATIONS AND THE LOCAL CREAMERY 
During the early years of the industry, and especially under the stim­
ulus of World War I conditions, many creameries expanded their byproduct 
production (skim milk, buttermilk, and dried casein, used for feed), and 
established canned milk departments." But the enlargement of this "by­
product" activity to the point of "multiple-product" operation is of  more 
recent origin, representing an important transformation in the entire pro­
cessing function. The latter evolution symbolizes the decline of the exclusive 
buttermaking plant.51 The so-called flexible, or multiple-purpose plant carries 
the advantages of diversity to the fabrication point. The change was stimu­
lated partly by the depression conditions of the 1930's and more importantly 
by World War II. The fall in butter prices, and the increase in quantities 
of fluid milk seeking an outlet in manufactured dairy products in the early 
1930's, compelled a greater emphasis on the variable utilization of whole 
milk in the creamery and cheese factory. "In the 7 years from 1929 to 
1936, the number of Wisconsin plants manufacturing dried and powdered 
skim milk increased from 57 to 106, and the number producing casein from 
176 to 401."52 In the study of midwestern creameries by Laughlin and Stitts, 
the same trend was noted. The sales of byproducts and butterfat, in products 
other than butter, on a subsantial scale by three of the cooperative associations 
surveyed were observed to increase the earnings per unit of product re­
ceived.53 They call attention to the fact that it was the receipt of raw material 
in the form of whole milk that amplified the alternative to butter "as an outlet 
for butterfat itself." All three sold sweet cream at premiums to ice  cream 
manufacturers, and one plant made large amounts of evaporated milk and 
some cheese. 
The extension of the flexible plant system tends to compel its adoption 
by the specialized butter factory, among other reasons, because the former 
type of establishment is able to pay higher prices for whole milk due to 
the greater margin in manufactured items other than butter. Wartime con­
ditions accelerated this process and accentuated the competitive isolation of 
the specialized (predominantly local) creamery. In Minnesota 
Creameries, located in areas of diversion, not buying milk are finding it im­
possible to maintain their patronage because of the economic advantage enjoyed 
by selling the milk from the farm. Likewise, the average roadside cheese factory 
disposing whey along the highway in an age when proteins and riboflavin can 
be isolated from the whey, is not making maximum returns to its patrons and 
may not long remain in operation in a highly competitive area. 
50 FTC, Report on Milk and Milk Products, op. cit., p. 38.
51 Cf. National Butter and Cheese Journal, January 1947, p. 31.
52 Nicholls, Postwar Development, etc., op. cit., pp. 104-105.
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Perhaps we have been too much concerned about the investment necessary for 
the processing of milk and its products, and rather unconcerned regarding the
economy of continuing to operate 800 creameries and 400 cream stations, 
when all the butter could be processed in fewer plants at a savings of millions 
of dollars to the producer .  .  .54 
During World War II, many creameries installed drying equipment for 
processing their own milk. Under the war stimulus and the more permanent 
emphasis upon nutrition in selling, production by the new spray and roller 
process of nonfat dry milk solids rose from 3,788,742 pounds in 1942 to 
98,650,529 pounds in 1945.55 
The possibilities of flexibility through multiple products are feasible 
in the main for the large plant only, while at the same time they tend toward 
a greater minimum-efficiency scale.56 
Inroads of the flexible plant have become so consequential that the 
question has been raised in the trade of an independent national organiza­
tion.57 This should not conceal the fact that the emergence of this type of 
processing establishment is a product of the evolution of the butter industry 
itself. As such it represents the elaboration in a new form of the internal 
differentiation between the local creamery and the centralizer, which has 
always been true. 
Continuous process buttermaking, a second major innovation in recent 
years, has passed well beyond the experimental stage, according to the 
trade journals. The revolutionary nature of the imminent technical change 
is indicated by the fact that, whereas the butter output per creamery em­
ployee in the United States rose from 48,000 pounds per year in 1919 to 
98,000 pounds per year in 1929, the conjectural output for a five-to-seven-man 
crew using continuous churns will be approximately 30,000 pounds per day.58 
Professor Thomsen declares that, "the cost of continuous churning equipment 
in a creamery manufacturing in excess of one million pounds of butter per 
year will in all likelihood not exceed the cost of equipment for the existing 
method  .  .  ." and adds that the conversion to the new process will permit the 
complete write-off of "all existing equipment for income tax purposes."59 
Professor Thomsen's anticipations point to a substantial raising of the mini­
mum efficiency scale of a plant. It seems reasonable to assume that the un­
favorable incidence of such a rise would occur with greatest effect in the 
local creamery area rather than on the other side of the plant-gap. An 
output of a million pounds of butter per year is, in general, incompatible 
under the existing system of procurement, with the noncentralizer system. 
54 Minnesota,  Bulletin  of Information on Creameries,  etc.,  1943,  op.  cit.,  p.  7.  The report
not only points to the existence of industry "excess capacity," but also suggests to the dairy farmer
that his cooperative creamery is  obsolete, thus giving recognition to the deepening of the schism
between the two.
55 National Butter and Cheese Journal, January 1947, p. 81.
56 Laughlin and Stitts, Patronage Problems, op. cit., p. 22.
57 National Butter and Cheese Journal, February, 1947, pp. 54-58.
58 "How Efficient is your Creamery?", Prof. C. L. Thomsen, University of Wisconsin Dept. of
Dairying, in National Butter and Cheese Journal, December, 1946, pp. 38-39.
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Perhaps it  is the spread of the multiple-purpose plant and the tech­
nical revolution in butter processing that in part lies behind the advice of 
the editorialist of the National Butter and Cheese Journal that the local 
creamery can best combat what it calls the encroachments of the 'big fellows' " 
by joining with others "so that they might operate more efficiently."6° The 
proposal is that small enterprise maintain itself by becoming what by its very 
modus operandi it cannot be." It is, of course, possible that the net result 
of the current changes will be fewer and larger establishments (in output 
terms) in the industry. This would involve an absolute diminution in the 
number of small firms, which is one type of industrial evolution. However, 
for those which remain, subordinate status is likely to continue. 
Changes in the structure of the industry since World War II have been 
consistent with the long-term trends revealed in this discussion. In the face 
of declining total production, the number of plants (and firms) has fallen 
even more, viz. some 38 per cent from 1939 to 1931.62 As a consequence, the 
average output of the remaining plants rose 18 per cent over the same period.63 
Meanwhile, important shifts in milk utilization as between dairy products, 
together with altered price relationships among such products has stimulated 
the spread of flexible operations. The intimate connection between the 
advancing technicque and industrial structure is suggested by Trelogan and 
Herrmann :64 
The factors causing the rising trend in average sizes of dairy plants are less 
easily datedthe growth is less a life process than it is a death process. As is 
clearly evident in the butter industry "growth" comes mostly from disappearance 
of the smaller plants  .  . 
Larger average sizes of dairy plants are to be noted as a reflection of an 
evolving technology .  .  . What this trend shows is that over the last generation 
the advantage seems to have been on the side of plants that were above average 
in size. 
Perhaps a more striking case will be found in the following chapter on the 
flour milling industry. 
60 December 1946, p. 31.
61 A similar proposal for the canning industry is made, with emphasis on the requirements of
volume marketing, by E. J. Coleman, Arthur Young & Co., New York City, in Canning Age, May,
1923. Mr. Coleman terms consolidation the "remedy for the small canner" (p. 21).
62 "That Old Time Creamery," The Milk Products Journal, March, 1954, p. 29.
63 Trelogan, H. C., and Herrmann, L. F., "Changing Economic Conditions in the Dairy Industry,"
The Butter, Cheese and Milk Products Journal, Nov., 1952, p. 61.
64 Ibid., pp. 62-64. III
 
SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY:
 
COMMERCIAL WHEAT FLOUR MILLING
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The concept of an automatic flour mill constructed on the conveyor plan 
is attributed to the American, Oliver Evans, who was "neither a miller nor 
a millwright," around 1785, a year late in the long history of milling but 
relatively early in the evolution of the modern factory system. But this dra­
matic forerunner of the mass-production technique, although it spurred the 
capitalistic organization of production, failed to realize  its revolutionary 
potentialities for a hundred years. The continued use of stones for grinding 
was indeed the "millstone around the neck" of the infant factory industry ; 
and the practice inhibited the emergence of other than minor improvements 
until the milling revolution of the 1870's.1 
The milling technology prevailing in the greater part of the 19th century 
failed to solve the problem of grinding in volume a refined product divested 
of the coarse bran coating and separated from the deteriorating and dis­
coloring influence of the wheat germ. Aside from the imperfections in the 
product due to the flat grinding system, i.e., grinding with the stones close 
together so as to make as much flour as possible at one grinding, large-scale 
production awaited the discovery of methods which could accommodate raw 
materials in quantity. The union of mechanical conveyance, utilizing elevators 
and gravity in the many-storied mill, with processing in volume, was made 
possible through the importation of the purifier from France and the use of 
Hungarian-type iron or porcelain-fluted rolls (in lieu of millstones), in the 
1870's and early 1880's. The purifier made it feasible, by means of a shaking 
screen and air blast mechanism, to retrieve the valuable "middlings" and 
screen off the brittle husk. This middling element in the wheat berry, formerly 
largely wasted, consists of the particles to which the hard, outer bran-covering 
adheres, and which encompasses much nutritious gluten useful for giving 
strength and rising power to bread. The employment of a series of rollers 
to crush by "gradual reduction" this innermost gluten and the starch cells 
merged with it, substantially diminished per-unit-power requirements, raised 
man-hour productivity, and enlarged enormously the capacity of the in­
dividual plant. 
The international coalition of American automatic conveyance with the 
French middlings purifier, and the Hungarian rolls, provided the technical 
equipment of the mechanized milling industry which, since 1890, has been 
1 Dedrick, B. W., Practical Milling, Chicago; National Miller, 1924, pp. 22-23. 
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subject only to comparatively minor improvements. The latter relate primarily 
to new sifting machines, artificial instantaneous bleaching, and improved 
processes of cleaning, blending, and conditioning of wheat.2 
The economic ramifications of the "new process," which in application 
comprised the so-called "milling revolution" of the 1870's,3 are unfolding 
even up to the present day. Focus of the first ramifications may be found in 
precisely that milling regionMinneapoliswhere progressive policies by a 
few manufacturers, drawing upon a salubrious combination of water power 
around the falls of St. Anthony, and rich hinterland soil, brought the new 
processes into initial operation. 
The wheat flour industry has always been concentrated in certain centers 
having access to power and transportation facilities and bearing varying re­
lationships to wheat-growing areas and flour-consuming points. Production 
moved gradually westward from the Eastern Seaboard as the nation developed 
in the same direction, drawing upon supplies of low-gluten, soft winter 
wheat grown in the milder climates east of the Mississippi. But the areas 
surrounding Minneapolisthe Dakotas, Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin 
could not grow a low-gluten, soft winter wheat. The growers in this region 
expanded the planting of hard spring wheat. The new process could readily 
turn out excellent refined white flour from this high-gluten grain, a flour 
rich in gluten and middlings. The latter type of grain was therefore an im­
portant source of supplies during the first expansion period accompanying 
the spread of the new methods in the Minneapolis district. 
Later, advantages of, and existence of the technical basis for, blending 
various kinds of wheat prompted the utilization of more widespread sources. 
Indeed, rapid increases in the amount of domestically available wheat scarcely 
accommodated the great spurt in flour manufacturing activity of the Min­
neapolis millers. They increased their output from some 193,000 barrels of 
flour in 1870 to almost 6,000,000 barrels in the crop year 1885-1886.4 
The general economic climate from 1870 to 1900 was favorable to the 
growth of what was at that time still overwhelmingly a consumers' goods 
industry. The decennial rates of increase of population approximated 26 per 
cent between 1870 and 1890 and the rate was still 21 per cent from 1890 to 
1900.5 Per capita consumption of flour averaged as high as 244 pounds per 
year in the crop years 1879-80, 1889-90, and 1899-1900.° The combination 
of high per capita consumption and rapid population increase resulted in 
growth rates for total physical consumption of flour that were never equalled 
subsequently. 
2 CF.  Kuhlmann, C. B., Development of the Flour-milling Industry in the U. S.  Houghton-
Mifflin, New York, 1929, p. 226.
3 Certain other innovations were also made in this period (ibid., pp. 123-125).
4 Kuhlmann, op cit., p. 27.
5 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1946, p.  4. 
6 Malott, D. W., and Martin, B. F., The Agricultural Industries, New York: McCraw-Hill, 1939,
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2. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF TIIE MINNEAPOLIS INDUSTRY 
The Minneapolis millers in the heart of the spring wheat region were the 
prime innovators and the most aggressive enterprisers of the early modern 
era. Indeed, they have been in the entire 20th century. In the former period, 
when that aggressiveness was associated with the continual disruption of the 
internal stability of the market accompanying intense competition, these 
millers were largely responsible for dooming the custom mill,' establishing 
the automatic system, creating large-scale production, and for building the 
corporate framework which later overcame all the local and regional bounda­
ries that had geographically segmentalized the milling industry throughout 
the colonial period, and the 19th century. 
In the half century following 1850 the Minnesota industry grew from a 
wheat output of 1,400 bushels, and flour products valued at $500, to 70,000,000 
bushels and $100,000,000 worth of value in flour.8 The latter achievement 
of the Minnesota millers represented in 1900 approximately 20 per cent of 
the total value of U. S. flour mill products.9 
Advantages of the interior mills persisted only until the installation of 
the middlings purifier, followed by the roller system. These innovations were 
introduced by the city millers ; notably by the Washburn firm (later Wash­
burn-Crosby Co.) which inaugurated the adaptation of the purifier developed 
by Edmund N. LaCroix of Faribault in its "B" mill in 1870, and by Pills-
bury, who, in the 1870's, had made a personal visit to Hungary. Both im­
provements were widely applied immediately in the Minnesota area. Their 
combination with the power and transport advantages of the strategically-
placed metropolis gave the edge to the somewhat larger concerns adjacent to 
the Falls of St. Anthony. The already substantial profit records of the latter 
firms were decidedly enhanced as a consequence, the increased price of 
Minnesota flour now being conjoined, especially after 1880, with rapidly 
falling unit costs.1° 
This favorable record accounts for the fact that the expansion of the 
scale of production and the building of large reserves, later utilized to aug­
ment competitive power, was largely self-financed. At the same time, the 
process of self-expansion was intimately bound up with the Minneapolis 
banks, which the millers controlled, and to a lesser extent with banks con­
nected with the flour manufacturers' Eastern marketing agencies.71 
7 A custom mill is one which grinds the farmer's grain for a fixed charge or toll, taken in kind
or cash, returning the processed product to the farmer. The earliest mills were of this type. In
1909 there were still 11,691 such mills, but they produced only 2.3 per cent of the total wheat flour.
(U.  S.,  Federal Trade Commission, Competitive Conditions in Flour Milling, Preliminary Report,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., May 3, 1926, pp. 3-4).
8 Rogers, G.  D., History of Flour Manufacture in Minnesota.  (Collections of the Minnesota
Historical Society, vol. X, Pt. 1, St. l'aul, 1905), p. 38.
9 Pickett, V. G., and Vaile, R. S., Decline of Northwestern Flour Milling, University of Min­
nesota Press, No. 5, 1933, p. 80.
10 Gras, N. S.  B., and Larson, H. M., Casebook in American Business History. Crofts, New
York, 1939, p. 721.
11 Kuhlmann, op.  cit.  p.  139-141. In 1889 the Pillsbury-Washburn Co.  (a merger of Pillsbury
with a firm controlled by the brother of Governor Washburn of Wisconsin, a principal partner of the
Washburn-Crosby Co.)  attracted a  substantial sum of foreign (English)  capital. This  is  the only
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Two aspects of this development emerge here. First, under the conditions 
of expansion at this period, the large number of new firms entering the 
industry in the Northwestern area apparently had little difficulty in procuring 
the necessary "venture capital," and, once they had secured a foothold, of 
enjoying sufficient returns to expand through reinvested profits. Secondly, 
the later utilization of accumulated reserves (by the larger concerns) to 
effect consolidations and pursue policies of industrial engrossment leading 
to oligopolistic stabilization, suggests a transformation of the function of 
these reserves. In their inception they represent the fruits of and the means 
to intensify policies of competitive, destabilizing innovations. 
These considerable "profits of innovation" were augmented through 
the activities of an organized oligopsony, known as the Minneapolis Millers' 
Association, a wheat-buying pool stemming from the 1860's regarding which 
it is known that 18 of the 20 mills in the city in 1876 were members. The 
pool controlled the country buyers at all important interior points, dictated 
the prices they should pay, parceled out the wheat to the mills upon its arrival 
in Minneapolis, and was able, through the vital decade of the 1870's, to ex­
clude outside buyers.12 
The expansion of the Minneapolis concerns during the depression decade 
of the 1870's was phenomenal. Mills in the city numbered 13 in 1870. In the 
course of the decade, although 10 mills were destroyed by fire, sufficient new 
ones were constructed so that in 1880 there were 24. Two new mills each 
year were built between 1872 and 1876.13 In the state as whole the  number 
of mills multiplied from 216 to 436.14 The remarkable growth of the Minne­
apolis firms was sustained through the next decade. 
In striking contrast with the incredible expansion of Minneapolis during 
these two decades, a contrast fraught with catastrophe for thousands of mills 
in other areas, is the fact that the value of all U. S. flour mill products rose 
from $444,985,000 in 1869 to only $513,971,000 in 1889.15 The flour output 
of St. Louis, center of the soft winter wheat area, experienced only a nominal 
rise from 1,351,000 barrels in 1870 to 1,872,000 barrels in 1890.16 
It is clear, however, that the progressive development in the new areas 
was accompanied by the rapid population of the industry with new  firms, 
bringing the century to a close with an industrial structure characterized by 
the presence of thousands of enterprises. In 1899 there were over 16,000 
"flour mills" in the country,17 including 9,476 merchant milling establish­
ments." 
12 Ibid., pp. 142-143.
13 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
14 Rogers, op cit., p. 47.
15 Pickett and Vaile, op. cit., p. 80.
16 Kuhlmann, op cit.,  p.  183. 
17 U. S. Congress, House. Report of the Industrial Commission on Transportation. Vol. IV, 56th
Cong., 1st sess., Doc. No. 476, 1900, p. 240.
18 U. S., Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Economic Factors Bearing upon the
Establishment of Minimum Rates in the Grain-Products Industry, February, 1942, p. 11. A merchant
mill purchases grain and sells the resultant processed commodity on a commercial basis. 37  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
3. BEGINNINGS OF INTERFIRM DIFFERENTIATION 
Although the absence of tightly-held patent control, and the prevalence 
of free ingress permitted the increase of enterprises and the corollary exten­
sion of the competitive structure typifying the industry from 1870 to 1890, 
internal changes were nevertheless occurring which were destined to produce 
basic alterations in its subsequent history. 
The internal economic differentiation between milling firms emerging 
in these formative years emanated from factors which may be conveniently 
classified into two broad groups :  (1) the technological and structural fac­
tors, and (2) the factors having to do with business policy and market 
results. 
The first group of factors consisted of unit cost differences, due partly to 
variations in scale of plant and firm, comparative uniformity of the product, 
and differences in sales channels. The second group of factors involved the 
export trade, buying organization, relations to the railroads, geographical 
diversification as a sales policy, excess capacity and price policy. The two 
groups of factors affected one another. This will be indicated in the course 
of the discussion, but they will, nevertheless, be considered individually 
and in order. 
The unit-cost-reducing benefits of increasing the scale of plant were 
apparently considerable, although statistical illustration in this early period 
is lacking. According to the testimony of Mr. Frank Barry, Secretary of the 
Millers' National Association given before the U. S. House of Representa­
tives in 1899, the small miller was already unable to supply the market at as 
low cost per barrel as the large plant. Intense price competition had com­
pelled the construction of plants of larger capacity, which cut unit costs. 
The growth in plant scale persisted under the stimulus of the purifier and 
rising markets throughout the depression of the 1870's and was perhaps even 
more pronounced from 1880 to 1890, after the introduction of rollers. 
The larger scale of organization of the rising Minneapolis leaders brought 
with it another advantage over smaller rivals :  blending of raw materials 
gathered from many sources so as to provide a uniform and controlled quality 
of product at all times. The spring wheat of the Northwestern mills, with its 
higher protein content, yielding better baking results, and its  distinctive 
flavoring of bread, surpassed all other types of wheat for high-strength bread-
flour. For household purposes, a medium-strength flour was required ; one 
that could be used for biscuits or pastry as well as bread. This created a 
twofold task : securing the proper wheat mixture, and engaging in progressive 
flour chemistry research. Through the mastery of these tasks, the large Min­
neapolis producers immeasurably speeded their work of outdistancing foreign 
competitors, those millers in the winter wheat areas, and their smaller rivals 
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It was a distinct characteristic of the small mill that it depended for 
its wheat supply upon local sources, just as its market was also increasingly 
delineated by local consumption capacity. 
It is a peculiarity, however, of the dependence of the local firm  upon 
nearby supplies that the variation in quality of wheat in  a given area, 
from year to year, is considerable; and in the absence of alternative sources, 
the flour product cannot be maintained at that degree of uniformity necessary 
to satisfy the requirements of stable market connections.19 Though some 
interior mills were able to sustain, and at times increase their volume of 
output and sales, they did so only by developing outside sources of varying 
quality wheat for scientifically controlled blending.2° 
The chemistry of flour, from tempering the berry to testing the finished 
product, had important economic repercussions. The integral association of 
the laboratory with the modern large-scale mill indicates the differential 
advantage which it possesses in the scientific department. 
But it was not only in the seasonal variation in quality of wheat that the 
procurement advantages of the larger terminal mills were manifest. While it 
is true that the smaller plant was not so exposed to fluctuation in grain prices 
as was the larger firm, nevertheless, when the former experienced a poor 
crop in its area, it was likely to be forced to shut down. This explains some 
part of the high mortality among small mills during these and later years, and 
undoubtedly operated to raise the continuing burden of fixed costs (insofar 
as they are 'retrieved at all), particularly those charges on equipment other 
than prime depreciation, which would be exceptionally high in  an industry 
such as milling where even in small plants mechanization is considerable. The 
factor of shutdown due to cessation of raw material supply is also  an impor­
tant contributor to the differential incidence of excess capacity in the industry. 
Development of the grain futures exchanges resolved the predicament 
of the fluctuating price of wheat so far as the large millers were concerned. 
These institutions were not accessible to the small local mill however. Hedging 
has thus remained characteristically a large-mill practice. 
Little is known about the difference in marketing channels resorted to 
by the multitude of small mills as compared to the growing terminal corpo­
rations of the Northwest area. From the sparse evidence, the commission 
house dominated distribution up to the 1880's, during which decade the 
larger Minneapolis manufacturers began to develop their future pattern of 
utilizing salesmen, agents and branch outlets for their  own brands ; with 
jobbers, brokers or wholesalers for unbranded and privately-branded output. 
19 "The growth of large-scale commercial baking  .  .  .  puts an ever increasing premium upon
standardized flour  .  .  ."  (Alderfer and Michl, op.  cit.,  p.  429). This element became important in later years, although as an advantage accruing to the large millers  it was complicated by the cor­
respondent growth of large scale enterprise in baking. The contemporary relationship here today
approaches that of bilateral oligopoly. Of course, cet.  par., the problem of oligopsony is at least as
momentous for the small firm which tries to enter this producers' good sector of the market.
20 U. S., Federal Trade Commission, Retort on Commercial Wheat Flour Milling, Washington,
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The lesser mills, other than those very small units selling in a purely local 
and/or custom market, relied almost exclusively upon the commission men, to 
whom they typically shipped on consignment. This relationship often involved 
the customary dependence upon the distributor as to trade credit, price, and 
even production policies. 
We turn next to the business policies and market results which tended 
to accentuate the growing competitive cleavage between the Minneapolis group 
and the remainder of the industry. 
Although additions to our national output of flour in the last quarter of 
the 19th century enormously intensified interarea and interfirm competition, 
reducing domestic prices of Minnesota "patents" 21 steadily from 1883 to 
1888, the large Minneapolis producers were able to absorb this decline, not 
alone by their lower costs, but also through the expansion of the export trade. 
The Washburn and Pillsbury firms were particularly active in this latter 
field. The former sent abroad for several months (in the late 1870's) the 
well-known milling and elevator executive, W. H. Dunwoody, to secure 
direct contracts with European buyers.22 The large Minneapolis millers out­
sold their English rivals, as well as their smaller American competitors, with 
the excellence and uniformity of their product, their lower production costs, 
and their close connections with the railroads. The latter were induced to 
cooperate by the use of low export rates and through bills of lading.23 
.  .  the large mill had a clear advantage in the export trade. So long as 
the market was relatively small and undeveloped the small miller probably had 
the balance of advantage in his favor. But when the market broadened to in­
clude most of western Europe, and single orders for 10,000 to 15,000 barrels 
became fairly common, the advantage clearly moved to the side of the large 
mills. To secure such orders it was necessary to control large manufacturing 
capacity to be able to fill the orders promptly and to make sure that the flour 
would be of uniform quality  24 
This pattern was set by the early 20th century, and exporting has since 
been confined to a relatively small number of the largest concerns. 
In an export industry manufacturing a relatively standardized commodity, 
small enterprise may be defined, in part, as that sector of the industry which 
is competitively delimited to the domestic market.25 
The benefits of an organized buying pool accruing to the large Minne­
apolis producers in the last vital decades of the century have been referred 
to above. Although this condition did not persist, the biggest firms created 
an effective substitute in the form of their own chains of so-called "line ele­
21 Flour is  divided into four general grades, known as patent,  straight, clear and low grade.
Within those grades, however, there are many modifications. (U. S., Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Wheat and Flour Prices from Farmer to Consumer, Bulletin No. 130, Aug. 15, 1913, p. 34).
Originally the Washburn Mill Co. had advertised its "new process" flour as made by a patented
process. Hence the name "patent" flour.
22 Rogers, op. cit., p. 53.
23 Kuhlmann, op. cit., p. 292.
24 Ibid., P. 130.
25 Brady, R. A., Business as a System of Power, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 
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vators" along railroad rights of way, not economically unlike the gathering 
stations for milk and cream possessed by the centralizer manufacturers of 
butter." 
Control of the grain exchanges has also remained an important aspect 
of the procurement policies of the largest manufacturers.27 
The 24 mills which by 1890 had made Minneapolis, with a flour product 
valued at $31,000,000, the greatest milling center in the nation, built their 
supremacy with the high strategy of competition joined with collusion that 
marked the last contradictory decades of the 19th century. Not the least of 
the elements in this strategy was the relationship of the Minneapolis mills to 
the railroads. The local merchant mill, as well as the expanding interior mills 
of the state, allegedly had access to milling-in-transit on an equal basis with 
the terminal producers.28 However, the institutional factor of railroad-miller 
relationships was appropriated by the larger Minneapolis producers as a 
competitive weapon. In general, the larger mills got better car service, avoided 
transfer charges that were customarily imposed on the small shipper, and 
enjoyed secret rebates." Low rates to the East out of Minneapolis were 
defended by the millers (and the railroads) on the grounds of water compe­
tition on the Great Lakes. In 1908, on this basis, the Kansas millers were 
refused a flour rate from the Missouri River to Chicago equal to the Minne­
apolis-Chicago rate.3° 
As a final point regarding market results, it should be noted that the 
geographical spread of the marketing organization of the large millers in 
the "flour city" brought with it certain resultant competitive advantages. The 
small mill was likely to be limited to narrowly restricted market areas due to 
the established sales contacts enjoyed by the larger millers in the region-wide 
and national markets. It was in this regard also that the larger manufacturers 
had an additional advantage, i.e., that any localized changes in the rate of 
consumption could be met in part by pushing sales in other areas where the 
shipper already had connections. Moreover, sales declines in specific markets 
could be better absorbed by firms producing large volumes for geographically 
diversified markets, since the losses in certain areas represented smaller 
proportions of total output and sales. Finally, just as the total economic power 
of an enterprise tends to be self-generative, so the penetration of varied 
markets in itself stimulates a cumulative and correlative increase in the 
demand for its product. 
A number of factors were conjoined in flour milling to produce, even at 
this early date, industry excess capacity, and firm excess capacity for the 
26 Report of the Industrial Commission on Transportation, op.  cit.,  pp.  79, 250.
27 For example, it was reported that the first vice-president of the Kansas City Board of Trade
in 1940 was Roy E. Swenson of General Mills (Northwestern Miller, Jan. 17, 1940, p. 23).
28 Report of the Industrial Commission on Transportation, op. cit., p. 243.
29 Kuhlmann, op. cit., pp. 130, 172-173. This boon was subsequently removed by a series of ICC
rate changes but only long after the favoritism had performed its function.
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small enterprise segment in particular. Flour is a consumer necessity in the 
modern American culture. The combination of this fact with the ease of 
ingress and moderate investment (in the early years at least) tended toward 
the multiplication of plants. Moreover, the cost structure for the firm was 
strongly weighted with overhead elements. In the presence of large numbers 
this stimulated price competition in the interest of 24-hour operation. This 
apparently was significantly true in the early period. Intensity of price com­
petition was further, as indicated above, an impetus to make capacity-
increasing innovations. In addition, an element that became progressively more 
important after the very first bonanza years in the Northwest was the rela­
tively low value added in this essentially processing industry. Under the 
conditions, low value added militated in the same price-cutting direction that 
resulted from high fixed charges, because where material costs are large, cet. 
par., profitability hinges upon volume. Finally, the integral relation between 
flour, and its important joint byproduct millf eed, always threatened to under­
mine earnings through the tendency of the latter to sell for what the market 
would bring. This danger was in direct ratio to percentage-of-capacity activity. 
In consequence, as early as 1899 the Secretary of the Millers' National 
Association found it necessary to emphasize that "the capacity of the mills 
of the country is excessive .  .  .", that a "condition of overproduction" obtains, 
and that the millers have "forced their capacity far beyond what they should 
have." 31 This was the condition of the industry on the threshold of the 20th 
century, a year in which the national output of flour stood at 99,764,000 
barrels. Forty years later the industry produced only 111,369,000 barrels.32 
Because any short period expansion elicited new entry, and because of the 
well-known tendency for durable capital assets to continue in production, 
however sporadically, despite financial and legal calamities, the elements 
within the industry which desired internal peace rather than "competitive 
chaos" could experience a rising market only with corollary feelings of 
impending catastrophe. This set of economic compulsions became translated 
into imperatives for policy, and the largest millers committed themselves to 
the destructionabsorption or controlof excess capacity.33 The multitude 
of small producers were to them the unique carriers of the plague. The results 
provide in large part the 20th century history of small enterprise in the 
industry. 
4. FORMATION OF THE LEADING MINNEAPOLIS GROUP 
The four largest flour-milling concerns in the industry today are General 
Mills, Inc., the International Milling Co., the Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. 
(which controls the operating firm Commander-Larabee Corp.), and the 
31 Ibid., pp. 71, 241.
32 U. S., Dept. of Labor, Economic Factors Bearing Upon Minimum Rates, op. cit., p. 11. The
data used are from the Census. 
33 This practice is typical of the leading "stabilization" group in many industries. (Burns, A. R., 
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Pillsbury Mills, Inc.34 Three of these enterprises, or components of them, 
figured, under varying names, in the early history of Minneapolis milling. Of 
the 13 leading producers analyzed by the Federal Trade Commission in its 
Agricultural Income Inquiry in 1934,35 six operated Minneapolis mills in 
1940. These six held 28,300 barrels out of the 30,150 barrels daily capacity 
in private mills in the entire center." Of these six leading firms, four figured 
prominently in the formative years of the modern milling industry : General 
Mills (then Washburn-Crosby), Commander, Pillsbury, and the Northwest­
ern Consolidated Co., now a part of the Standard Milling Co. 
The external expansion of these enterprises was originally based upon 
acquisition and merger. This was particularly true of Pillsbury and the 
Northwestern Consolidated. 
By 1889, 87 per cent of Minneapolis milling was conducted by four cor­
porations." A decade later "there were only three independent mills with a 
combined capacity of 2,200 barrels as against a capacity for the four corpo­
rations of 72,000 barrels per day  .  .  ." 38 
Of the few subsequent new entrants into Minneapolis, there remained 
in 1940 only the important Russell-Miller Co., a large interior producer 
owning a chain of mills in North Dakota, who entered the terminal city in 
1907, later reached a maximum capacity of 6,800 barrels in two mills and 
suffered a loss to 3,500 barrels in its present "A" mill ; and the independent 
Atkinson Milling Co., which established itself in 1917 with 1,450 barrels 
capacity." The Russell-Miller concern is today one of the largest in the 
country. Thus, five enterprises of national scope dominate the city's industry 
at present, and control approximately 91 per cent of its capacity. 
The record of growth and the expansive character of their industrial 
policy had by no means guaranteed the status of the Minneapolis millers 
against subsequent shifts in the geographic and enterprise structure of the 
flour trade. The Census of 1899 reported 9,476 merchant milling establish­
ments in the country and recorded 135 very large mills with annual output 
exceeding 100,000 barrels.4° But the compelling internal difficulties of a 
maturing industry, coupled with the manifest determination of the largest 
concerns to achieve a significant measure of control, presaged momentous 
changes in the position of the small firm in the ensuing 40 years. 
34 Special Committee to Study the Problems of American Small Business, Economic Concentration
and World War II, Report of the Smaller War Plants Corporation No. 6, 79th Congress, 2d Session,
Washington: 1946 p. 220; Business Week, July 10, 1948, pp. 78-79.
35 Op. cit., Part I, 1937, p. 281.
36 Northwestern Miller, April 24, 1940, Section Two, p.  30. The state of Minnesota maintains
a small testing mill in the city (capacity 170 barrels).
37 Gras and Larson, op. cit., p. 645.
38 Kuhlmann, op. cit., p. 165.
39 Kuhlmann, op. cit., p. 166, and Northwestern Miller, April 24, 1940, Section Two, p. 30.
40 U. S., Dept. of Labor, Economic Factors Bearing upon Minimum Rates, op.  cit.,  p.  11; and
the U. S., Federal Trade Commission, Report on Flour Milling and Jobbing, Washington, April 4,
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5. MARKET MATURATION, ELIMINATION OF SMALL MILLS, AND EXPANSION 
OF THE MINNEAPOLIS GROUP, 1900-1920 
In order to interpret the precipitous decline of small enterprise in the 
milling industry in the five decades of the 20th century, it is necessary to 
turn again to the developing strategy of expansion and stabilization pursued 
by the larger concerns, particularly the youthful giants of Minneapolis. To 
understand the policies of the latter it must be borne in mind that the growth-
rate of the output from the Northwest metropolis suffered a drastic decrease 
after the turn of the century. Minneapolis flour output stood at almost 
16,000,000 barrels in calendar 1901, but only twice after that did it ever 
reach 18,000,000 barrels.44 Following the war-inflated total of 17,500,890 
barrels in 1917, it fell off to approximately 15,000,000 barrels in 1920. 
Minneapolis producers fared but little worse, so far as their Northwest 
production was concerned, than the industry as a whole, for total flour output 
increased at an average annual rate of only 0.9 per cent between 1899 and 
1914, and the index of physical volume of production on an 1899 base stood 
at only 114.1 in 1914.42 Flour milling was no longer an expanding industry. 
The Minneapolis firms, insofar as their plants in that city were con­
cerned, enjoyed no escape through the export trade, which fell steadily. There 
was some small gain at the expense of both large and small mills in the inte­
rior. The proportion of total Northwest flour milled outside of the terminus 
decreased from an average of 50 per cent during 1905-06 to 46 per cent for 
the year 1915-16.43 The incidence of this shift, which fell primarily upon the 
small enterprises, contributed to the decrease in the number of "outside" mills 
(Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota).44 
The accompanying rise in Minneapolis capacity between 1908 and 1917, 
although not warranted by ex post knowledge of secular trend, undoubtedly 
appeared to the millers as an appropriate response to the increase in sales 
subsequent to the depression of 1907-08. This illusion was reinforced (for 
the milling industry) by the high ratio of operations-to-capacity in the city, 
ranging from 66 to 77 per cent between 1910 and 1917.45 
As a consequence of the slow upward movement in total consumption, 
and in view of the limited expansion of Minneapolis output, due partly to 
soil exhaustion and wheat quality deterioration, the continued growth of 
Minneapolis capital occurred in two new forms : geographical dispersion, and 
competitive appropriation of the markets of rivals. 
The first 20 years of the century ushered in two significant shifts in the 
industry. In both, Minneapolis millers played vital roles. These shifts changed 
41 In 1915, with 18,089,195 barrels and in 1916, with 18,541,650 barrels. (Northwestern Miller,
April 3  1929, Section Two, p. 52).
42 Mills,  F.  C., Economic Tendencies in the United States, New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1932, pp. 30, 180.
43 Pickett and Vaile, op. cit., p. 14.
44 Northwestern Miller, April 3, 1929, Section Two, p.  56b. 
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importantly the geographical and enterprise configuration of the industry. 
They involved the rise of Buffalo as a flour center, and the growth of new 
hard winter wheat and milling areas in the Southwest hinterland beyond 
Kansas City, Missouri. The expansion of these two centers occurred largely 
not on the basis of indigenous capital supplies, but rather from funds trans­
ferred from national, and especially Minneapolis, sources. This was preemi­
nently the case with Buffalo, and to a lesser degree true of the Southwest. 
A second new feature of the period was cessation in numerical increase, 
and the beginning of the decline in total establishments in the country, as 
reported by the Census .46 
Establishments producing 
All  1,000 or more bbl. of 
Year  establishments (a)  wheat flour annually (b) 
1899  9,476 
1904  10,051 
1909  11,691  5,621 
1914  10,788  5,055 
1919  10,708  4,692 
1921  3,845 
1923  3,088 
The period therefore introduces output increases in particular regions 
accompanied by decreases in others, but associated therewith is an absolute 
reduction in numbers of plants (and firms). The explanation suggested below 
for the failure of regional growth to witness the multiplication and internal 
expansion of new entrants exhibiting strong staying power is that the changed 
structure of the industry, and the policies of the national concerns associated 
therewith, coupled with maturing of the frontier of total demand, prevented 
the emergence of such a phenomenon. In New York, for example, the expan­
sion in output was almost entirely limited to Buffalo, the growth of which 
was enjoyed by a small number of Minneapolis concerns, as will be shown 
below. 
Meanwhile, the internal differentiation between concerns of national 
scope and the localized merchant mills in the industry, and the high mortality 
connected with it, proceeded at a rapid pace : 
.  .  . In the 10 years from 1904 to 1914 .  .  . one out of every three mills having 
an annual output of 5,000 to 20,000 barrels went out of business, their number 
decreasing from 2,123 to 1,377. On the other hand, the number of mills making 
over 100,000 barrels increased from 166 to 218, their output in 1914 amounting 
to over 60 per cent of the total for the entire country .  .  .47 
6. BUFFALO 
The key to the extension of Buffalo sales, and to an increase in influence 
over the national market, was considered by the Minneapolis concerns to 
reside in exploitation of the peculiar advantages of great terminal milling 
45 (a) U. S., Dept. of Labor, Economic Factors Bearing upon Minimum Rates, op. cit., p.  11;
(b) Northwestern Miller, April 3, 1929, Section Two, p.  110. 
47 FTC, Report on Commercial Wheat Flour Milling, op. cit., p. 8. 45  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
centers. Although certain of these, such as the older soft wheat center of 
St. Louis, have apparently remained relatively independent of any direct 
control, or amalgamation moves by the Minneapolis enterprises, the rise of 
Buffalo was definitely the creature of the national firms operating for the 
most part with head offices in the old spring wheat metropolis. 
Buffalo occupied a strategic position geographically. It lay in the direct 
line of haul of all varieties of western wheat as it passed to the northeastern 
consumption centershard spring wheat from the Northwest, hard winter 
wheat from the Southwest, and soft winter wheat from the older Central 
States area. In an era when blending and market diversification was assuming 
ever greater importance, this circumstance was vital. Buffalo was also a lake 
port. It enjoyed unusual power resources. Furthermore, the city was in a 
unique position to absorb the milling-in-bond business in Canadian wheat 
for export as flour. The export rate applying from Buffalo was slightly lower 
than from Minneapolis, with the c.i.f. price on Canadian wheat approximately 
the same for Minneapolis, Chicago, and Buffalo.48 
Up to 1901 the Minneapolis and other Northwestern concerns had been 
permitted to unload and store flour at Buffalo and then re-ship to eastern 
centers on a through rate from the point of origin of the flour. This rate was 
substantially lower than the sum of the two local rates.49 In that year, how­
ever, the long agitation of the small Buffalo millers against this privilege of 
"storage in transit without penalty" was successful, and the ICC withdrew 
the privilege. Almost immediately thereafter the Washburn-Crosby Co. de­
cided to build in Buffalo, and in January, 1904 its 3,500-barrel mill in that 
city began operation.5° The Company gave as reasons for its move, in addi­
tion to the withdrawal of the free-storage privilege, (1) that Buffalo was a 
desirable milling center because of its position as a distribution center, (2) 
that wheat could be shipped to Buffalo by water at very low rates, (3) that 
Buffalo was in a better position than Minneapolis to mill Manitoba wheat in 
bond (and besides, the Canadian Pacific railway had insisted that flour made 
from Canadian wheat at Minneapolis be shipped out over its subsidiary, the 
Soo Line), and (4) that cheaper power was expected at Buffalo. 
This dramatically timed move of the Washburn-Crosby enterprise was 
followed up by continued expansion of its  facilities, up to approximately 
48 Pickett and Vaile, op.  cit.,  p.  61.  Rates to England were lower from Chicago than from
Buffalo, and the Minneapolis concerns had particularly favorable terms from the carriers (cf. Kuhlmann,
op. cit., p. 215).
Two additional advantages of Buffalo are worthy of mention. Canadian wheat imported for
domestically consumed flour was purchased largely at opportunity prices as additions to domestic
wheat stocks, and the Buffalo miller was strategically located for this market (cf. Kuhlmann, p. 222­
223). In the second place, Buffalo was to be favored by the bakery trade: "in addition to the general
urge for rapid turnover of stock, the bakers had a special excuse for urging quick delivery. Millers
generally had adopted the practice of bleaching; hence aging was no longer necessary. Previously
the time spent in transit on the Lakes would have had to elapse anyhow before the flour was used,
and prompt delivery merely meant that  it must be stored in the baker's warehouse. This was no 
longer necessary, and consequently direct delivery from Buffalo mills became an advantage  .  .  ." 
(Pickett and Vaile, op. cit., p. 47).
49 Kuhlmann, op. cit., 216.
50 Pickett and Vaile, op cit.,  p.  16-17. Buffalo flour production averaged 593,985 barrels between
1900 and 1904 (Kuhlmann, p. 213); but after the alacritous move by Washburn-Crosby, output in
1906 was 2,347,500 (Northwestern Miller, April 3, 1929, Section Two, p. 56a). 46  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
20,000 barrels daily capacity in the 1920's. The firm completely dominated the 
Buffalo industry until the entrance of Pillsbury in 1923 (8,000 barrels), the 
Russell-Miller Co. in 1924 (3,000 barrels), Standard Milling Co. in 1926, 
International Milling Co. of Minneapolis in 1926, and the Commander-Lara­
bee Corporation of Minneapolis'in the same year. The Pillsbury Co. shipped 
the machinery from its Palisade mill to Buffalo, giving "unfavorable freight 
rates" and the pursuance of a policy of "zoning" the industry as reasons for 
the step. 
Hence, the spread of Minneapolis capital across the country was asso­
ciated with an out-migration of real capital as well as funds from their place 
of nativity. After 1923, Minneapolis capacity began to decline. 
In this way the Minneapolis firms, under the canny leadership of the 
Washburn-Crosby concern, retained control of their still considerable export 
trade, concentrated on the family flour trade in their declining and more 
obsolete Minneapolis mills, tapped new sources of mixed wheat supplies, 
moved closer to old and new markets, took full advantage of cheap water-
and-rail rates, and diversified their investments. 
The success of the original Buffalo firms in securing rescission of the 
storage-in-transit privilege was a Pyrrhic victory. The distinct decline in 
Buffalo as a milling center between 1885 and 1903, which the manufacturers 
of that city attributed to the railroad discrimination in favor of the western 
millers, was followed by a phenomenal growth subsequent to entrance of 
Washburn-Crosby, which raised the city's output level to 7,122,920 barrels 
in 191651 But the local millers failed to share in the expansion. None of the 
local firms in and around the city experienced any considerable growth during 
these years. The only new mills built at Buffalo were the property of the 
Minneapolis concerns. The one original enterprise in the city proper that 
appeared in the 1929 (and 1953) list of mills was George Urban and Son, 
listed as early as 1893.52 
The reasons for the remarkable rout of the established firms in the city 
and the failure of non-Minneapolis capital to penetrate this growing produc­
tion area are somewhat obscure. There may have been local causes, such as 
inadequate sources of funds or unprogressive entrepreneurship. However, it 
may be equally pertinent, in view of similar developments in other regions, to 
suggest that the established market connections of the original Buffalo con­
cerns were not experiencing an increase in sales, and that the advantages of 
volume output and aggressive selling techniques of the Washburn-Crosby Co. 
in the years prior to the entrance of the other Minneapolis producers  were 
more than the small millers in the lake city could withstand. The Minneapolis 
companies no doubt also were able to exploit the fact that the new firms in 
the winter wheat areas of Kansas, and to the west, were absorbed in capital­
51 Northwestern Miller, April 3, 1929, Section Two, p. 56a.
52 Kuhlmann, op. cit., p. 215. Also, Northwestern Miller, Almanack Number, April 28, 1953, p. 24. 47  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
izing upon the growth in those regions, as well as resisting direct competition 
in their own hinterland from the Minneapolis manufacturers. As for the 
older concerns in the soft wheat territory, these had for some time been 
suffering a decline in sales with concomitant inroads on financial reserves that 
undoubtedly discouraged a policy of vigor regarding invasion of the Buffalo 
market. Moreover, there were very few enterprises large enough to contem­
plate the prospect. Furthermore, those millers in the region who did sell in 
an extensive market tended to face toward the Southeast, where they enjoyed 
traditional consumer preference for their soft wheat products. 
7.	  DIFFERENTIATION IN MARKETING 
The great terminal cities were not only funnels through which raw ma­
terial in vast quantities passed, they were also centers of finance, and therefore 
of the supply of credit and capital. At least equal in importance to both of 
these factors, they were also the focus of the industry's primary distributive 
mechanism.53 In the development of its marketing system, the Washburn-
Crosby firm was no less aggressive than in its production and financial policies. 
The men who directed the corporation's policy early recognized that the 
national market, although at first overwhelmingly a consumption goods market, 
was increasingly developing a capital goods segment in which large commercial 
bakeries in urban centers were strategic. The program along this line was 
built up and expanded over the years. Without doubt the early growth and 
extensive scope of advertising activities in both segments of the market also 
contributed significantly to the elaboration of flexible, bilateral distributive 
organizations by the national concerns, particularly those operating out of 
Minneapolis. 
The differentiation in marketing between the national and the smaller 
local mills had advanced quite far by the second decade of the century : 
Several of the larger mills have established branch houses for the distribution 
of their product and sell from 30 to 60 per cent of their output in this way, 
the remainder going to jobbers and wholesale grocers. The smaller mills, on 
the other hand, distribute most of their output, exclusive of local sales, through 
brokers and jobbers, and make very small use of the branch house method  .  .54 
By the 1920's, the extension of the sales system of the Minneapolis firms 
had progressed so far that one authority was able to aver that "today there is 
not a single area in which the local miller does not have to face their compe­
tition  .  .  ."55 Although the Minneapolis producers lost volume in the section 
where they originally operated exclusively, the extension of their manufac­
turing plants, marketing organizations and selling campaigns to meet the 
increasing complexities of supply and distribution continued to provide them 
with volume sales obtained at the expense of the smaller concerns. 
53 "More than 75 per cent of the flour entering the competitive markets is produced by mills
located in or near the three largest milling centersMinneapolis, Kansas City and Buffalo," declared
the Federal Trade Commission in 1918. (Report on Flour Milling and Jobbing, op.  cit.,  p.  12).
54 FTC, Report on Flour Milling and Jobbing, op. cit., p. 8.
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The national enterprises were equally quick to devote their adequate 
financial resources, derived from years of profitable operation, to diversifica­
tion of production to fill consumer demand for graham, whole wheat, and 
rye flours. This movement was stimulated during World War I, when the 
Food Administration ordered the purchase of one pound of cornmeal, barley, 
rye flour or oatmeal with every four pounds of wheat flour.56 At this time, 
Washburn-Crosby and Pillsbury purchased and/or leased a considerable 
number of rye flour and other mills in order to fill mixed orders for the 
market. They also entered the production of durum wheat flour for manu­
facturing macaroni. 
The "Minneapolis" firms also broke into the breakfast food line in 
earnest in the immediate postwar years after failure of some earlier experi­
ments, constructing new dual-purpose plants in many cases. 
The continuous extension of the distributive facilities of the national 
milling enterprises made it possible for them to take advantage of a series of 
increases in minimum carload weights promulgated by the ICC. The effect 
upon the smaller producer selling outside his neighborhood market and lacking 
his own marketing facilities, was in general to either eliminate his market or 
increase his dependence upon the jobber. The latter relationship tended to 
stifle the development of the small miller's own independent distributive ma­
chinery. The shortage of cars and the resulting pressure to load to capacity 
was aggravated during and immediately after World War I. 
8. THE SOUTHWEST 
Meanwhile, the great Southwest wheat and flour industry had undergone 
a phenomenal expansion in the second decade of the century, a development 
which initially seemed to presage vast opportunities for the small miller. It 
failed to produce such opportunities. 
Growth of a regional flour milling industry in the Southwest, centered 
ultimately in Kansas City, Missouri, and based upon an ever-expanding wheat 
production area, had three important phases :  (1) the period in which expan­
sion was inhibited by the competition of the Minneapolis concerns ;  (2) the 
period of penetration of Minneapolis and other outside capital ; and (3) ac­
companying the second, the growth of national enterprise, independently of 
the Northwest, which formed along with the latter the present oligopolistic 
core of the industry. 
The hard winter wheat of the Southwest produced distinctive bread-
flours equally as good as the hard spring wheat of the Northwest. It was to 
be revealed later, in fact, that the shift away from home breadmaking and 
hand bakeries toward large commercial bakeries created a preference for hard 
56 Ibid.  p.  242. James F. Bell, chairman of the Board of Washburn-Crosby Co. following the
death of James  S.  Bell, was appointed General Chairman of the Milling Division of the War
Food Administration in August, 1917. (Northwestern Miller, April 3, 1929, Section Two, p. 17). 49  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
winter wheat flour as against the short patents manufactured by spring 
wheat millers. 
Nevertheless, the progress of milling in the region was slow compared 
to that exhibited by the Northwest at the end of the 19th century. In fact, it 
appears that the slow rate of market growth, together with the spread of 
modern technology produced some of the phenomena of economic contraction : 
whereas the number of mills in Kansas trebled in the decade 1860-1870, the 
330 mills of 1876 manufacturing wheat flour had declined to 255 in 1910.57 
The competitive elimination of smaller mills was to be attributed largely to 
the general economic disadvantages associated with size, according to a state­
ment at the time (1910) by C. B. Hoffman of the Enterprise concern, perhaps 
the leading miller in Kansas.58 
The rivalry between the spring wheat and hard winter wheat millers was 
intense at this period, and it appears that the Minneapolis manufacturers were 
successful for a time in restricting the growth of the Southwest producers. 
The Kansas millers complained for many years to the ICC against railroad 
rates which, as mentioned above, they considered unduly favorable to Min­
neapolis and the Northwest. Furthermore, the Kansas enterprises for a long 
time suffered lower prices on their best flours than those received by the 
Northwest millers, despite the fact that their winter wheat flours were equally 
as good. This they attributed to the aggressive advertising and selling methods 
of the spring wheat producers. 
The mills making flour from Kansas hard winter wheat had enjoyed a 
substantial export business up to 1906, but subsequently, with the rise of the 
Minneapolis-controlled Buffalo mills, nearly all this trade was lost." This 
intensified competition among the Southwestern millers themselves, as well 
as that between the Southwestern and Northwestern groups, hastening under 
this compulsion, and the pressures of chronic excess capacity, the elimination 
of small firms and the growth of concentration in the Southwest. 
On the basis of a survey reported in the Northwestern Miller in its issue 
of November 1,  1911, the mills of Kansas were suffering severely from 
excess capacity :60 
Operations as 
Year ending June 30	  per cent of capacity 
1908	  51.16 
1909	  51.52 
1910	  49.60 
1911	  46.06 
Concentration proceeded under these conditions at a rather rapid pace. 
Unlike the relationship between Minneapolis and the Northwest, the large 
57 Fitz, L. A., Development of the Milling Industry in Kansas, Kansas State Historical Society,
Collections, vol. xii (1910-11), p. 59.
58 Kuhlmann, op. cit., p. 200.
59 U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wheat and Flour Prices from Farmer to Consumer, op. cit., 
p.	  37. 
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enterprises in Kansas City brought the interior mills under their ownership 
or control so as to form a few important combinations with their headquarters 
at the terminus. Some of the more prominent of these were the Kansas Flour 
Mills Co., the Larabee Flour Mills Corporation, the Ismert-Hincke Co., and 
the Warkentin interests (Midland mill, at Kansas City). 
First among the outside national interests to see the growing importance 
of the new milling center was a firm with Minneapolis headquarters, the 
Standard Milling Co. which, through its subsidiary, the Southwestern Milling 
Co., built a 1,500 barrel mill at Kansas City in 1906. A quantitative indication 
of the degree of penetration by Northwestern capital into the Southwest by 
1930 is revealed in this fact :  of the total daily miller capacity of approxi­
mately 127,000 barrels in Kansas City (and the states of Oklahoma and 
Texas) at that date, the Northwestern-national enterprises owned and oper­
ated 31,000 barrels.6' In the ensuing decade the Minneapolis concerns sub­
stantially extended their Kansas City holdings. To scan a list of Kansas City 
flour mills, with their daily capacities in 1940, is most interesting :62 
Kansas Flour Mills Corp. 
Larabee Flour Mills Co. (Monarch Mill) 
3,300 
5,500 
Midland Flour Milling Co.  1,900 
Rodney Milling Co.  3,000 
Standard Milling Co.  6,500 
United Mills Co., Inc.  2,000 
Washburn-Crosby Co.  6,500 
Total, bbls.  28,700 
Of which Minneapolis firms held  18,500 
Of the seven remaining concerns, four of the original Kansas City 
enterprises retained their independent corporate identity : Kansas Flour Mills, 
Midland, Rodney, and United. Larabee had merged in the later 1920's with 
the Minneapolis Commander group ;  and Standard and Washburn-Crosby 
were of course Minneapolis firms. One of the four original Kansas City 
firms still independent in 1940, the Midland Co., was acquired in 1948 by 
International, of Minneapolis.63 In this way, the Minneapolis corporations 
came to dominate the milling heart of the Southwest, became truly national 
enterprises, and narrowed clown the membership in the oligopolistic center 
of the industry. 
The penetration of Kansas City by the Minneapolis millers represented 
the implementation of their program of diversification in supply sources, 
termed by Mr. Pillsbury "zoning of the industry". Further results of this 
penetration were :  (1) the high degree of concentration of production in the 
great Southwest terminus ; (2) the increasing size of the Minneapolis-national 
61 Pickett and Vaile, op. cit., pp. 15.16.
62 Northwestern Miller, April 24, 1940, Section Two, p. 29.
63 Business Week, July 10, 1948, p.  78, also, Northwestern Miller, July 6, 1948, p.  12. The list
of Kansas City mills was unchanged at the end of World War 11. (Cf. Northwestern Miller, April
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concerns ;  (3) the adverse impact of geographical dispersion of the large 
firms upon smaller, local competitors ; and (4) the consequent increasing 
difficulties attending the entry of new firms desirous of securing anything 
more than an insignificant proportion of the flour trade. One indication of 
the impact on entry of the change in industrial structure, and its coordinate 
business behavior patterns, is shown e.g., in the Northwest, where no new 
enterprises of importance have come into the market since the rise of the big 
Minneapolis manufacturers. 
The record of firms in the Kansas City terminus, just discussed, further 
illustrates the absence of effective new entry by smaller, local or regional 
capital during the last thirty years. 
It is not intended to suggest that the entire Southwest area also presented 
an oligopolistic situation by the 1920's, or even at a more recent date. Never­
theless, in Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas and Colorado a few large concerns 
accounted for substantial percentages of total output, and controlled the 
terminal markets by the end of the 1920's. 
The history of growth in the Southwest industry therefore exhibits the 
same trend toward concentration and engrossment of the market by national 
and/or regional consolidations that occurred throughout the United States 
(in the Northwest and Buffalo particularly), with its reciprocal, the diminu­
tion in numbers and market opportunities of the small miller. It must be kept 
in mind that regional and local retail markets are interwoven into the pattern 
of national demand, and the differential status of the large and small mill is 
generated on all geographical levels. 
Despite the medium degree of concentration in the industry, the economic 
pressures motivating the larger enterprises to achieve internal market stability 
were very great following the post-war depression in the early 1920's. Al­
though these enterprises typically enjoyed favorable rates of return on their 
investments, as we shall see below, they were of course under constraint to 
protect these rates. This was not easy, in view of the conditions which ob­
tained in the industry. As a consequence, the national concerns adopted two 
general policies designed to change those conditions. Their first policy was 
to secure positions of control over the network of geographically diversified 
mills and elevators. The second, to remove dangers to sales and profits occa­
sioned by the presence of large numbers of small and medium producers 
motivated by the compulsions of high fixed-charges, excess-capacity and 
traditional price-cutting principles. 
9. EXCESS CAPACITY, STABILIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, AND ENGROSSMENT 
OF THE SMALL MILLER, 1920-1940 
It has been suggested in the above discussion that the larger enterprises 
in the milling industry were peculiarly sensitive to product-price instability, 
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tively narrow margin upon which this processing industry operates. It has 
been estimated that raw materials comprised approximately 78 per cent of 
the value of product in 1939.64 A second circumstance is that the fixed compo­
nents of total fabrication costs are very large. Wage cost, to take one element 
of variable costs, represented only 4.3 per cent of value of product in 1939." 
The factor of high fixed costs is likely to function as a determinant of policy, 
particularly price policy, in a differential manner in such industries as flour 
milling. The large enterprise tends to price on long-run calculations so as to 
cover all costs ;  and, moreover, it very probably knows its total unit costs 
fairly accurately. Sponsorship and support of the cost accounting movement 
since World War I, by large enterprises with high sunk costs, and its imple­
mentation through trade associations under the leadership of such firms, 
attests to their tendency to price in the short-run on cost calculations ordi­
narily assumed in traditional price theory to apply only to the longer period. 
The small firm, on the other hand, is not likely to keep good accounts (compe­
tent cost accounting is in itself an overhead luxury) with a result that under 
competitive pressures, and in the absence of information, it will be inclined 
to make contracts on the basis of variable costs or variable costs plus some 
roughly-computed increment varying fortuitously. In other words, traditional 
theorizing regarding the menace of fixed costs for the price policy of an 
industry is probably more pertinent, in the later stage of the industry's his­
tory, when applied to smaller enterprise. That is to say, where structures are 
oligopolistic, the menace is likely to remain potential, but where they are 
quasi-atomistic, the potential becomes kinetic.66 In an industry such as flour 
milling, the structure evolves into a combination of these two ; the impetus 
for stabilization emanating from the oligopolistic segment. 
The complicating circumstances surrounding the existence of high sunk 
costs in the local-mill segment of the flour industry tended to aggravate the 
tendencies of the larger concerns to pursue acquisitive policies. These compli­
cating circumstances were (1) the relative absence of institutional barriers 
to entry ;  (2) the ease with which a small mill could change back and forth 
from custom to merchant milling, the former always acting as a sort of 
cushion to the particular firm and the latter as a disturbance to the commercial 
sector of the industry ; and (3) the higher incidence of excess capacity among 
the smaller mills. The first two influences are obvious. The third will require 
illustration and elaboration, not merely because it helps to explain the en­
grossment practices of the oligopolistic segment, and the effects of these 
practices, but also because inordinate excess capacity is itself one of the 
aspects of small enterprise status in this industry. 
According to census data, all flour mills in the U. S. utilized 58.5 per 
64 Alderfer and Michl, op. cit., p. 13.
65 Ibid., p,  12. 
66 The term "quasi-atomistic" is used to denote an atomistic fringe of small firms surrounding
a dominant oligopolistic core of large enterprises. 53  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
cent of their capacity in 1939, 56.7 per cent in 1940, and 59.8 per cent in 
1941.67 This condition has been chronic in the industry almost since the 
inception of the "new process" toward the end of the 19th century. It would 
seem that the leading firms might have cause for concern as a result  of the 
incipient danger to the price structure residing in this situation. To some 
extent the history of the industry justified such concern. It is no doubt a 
costly testimonial to the partial failure of all efforts at stabilization in this 
market, that such a condition should persist. It is a further striking fact that, 
for some at least, flour milling has provided a consistently remunerative 
investment. 
However, analysis of Table 1 will reveal much that remains obscure if 
one is limited to overall averages. The interfirm differentiation, so abundantly 
clear from these data, is also representative of the entire industry, both geo­
graphically and over time. 
Small enterprise in flour milling may be defined, in part, as that sector 
of the industry which typically operates at the lowest percentages of capacity. 
TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT TO FULL CAPACITY,* KANSAS MILLS, BY 
SIZE OF MILL, 1908 TO 1928 
Daily capacity of mills (bbls.) and average percentage operated 
Crop year  1,000 and  500 to  200 to  100 to  Less than 
(ending June 30)  over  1,000  500  200  100  Average 
1928  56.4  52.8  43.3  17.9  17.2  53.2 
1927  68.0  57.0  51.0  33.0  21.0  62.0 
1926  53.0  40.0  37.0  25.0  20.0  46.0 
1925  63.0  56.0  46.0  33.0  23.0  57.0 
1924  58.0  49.0  43.0  31.0  26.0  53.0 
1923  53.0  56.0  46.0  32.0  26.0  55.0 
1922  62.0  64.0  47.0  34.0  21.0  59.0. 
1921  54.7  50.2  40.3  24.5  15.7  48.3 
1920  652  65.1  55.5  332  23.5  60.6 
1919  59.3  57.0  49.6  33.4  22.3  54.3 
1918  53.5  53.0  48.9  30.2  18.1  49.9 
1917  64.0  68.0  58.0  36.0  26.0  61.0 
1916  68.0  64.7  62.3  38.5  30.5  62.8 
1915  70.5  71.8  63.6  39.3  28.6  67.0 
1914  69.6  61.0  64.4  38.6  28.0  62.7 
1913  67.5  64.0  60.7  30.5  322  59.8 
1912  53.3  59.3  53.4  28.0  27.2  51.4 
1911  57.2  63.8  52.0  30.1  27.2  53.2 
1910  53.0  63.0  59.0  44.0  29.0  54.5 
1909  50.0  68.5  62.1  41.0  36.1  56.1 
1908  62.5  64.0  60.0  42.6  26.7  51.1 
Average  60.2  59.4  52.5  33.1  25.1  56.1 
Capacity based on 300 running days. Source: Northwestern Miller, April 13, 1929, Section Two, 
P. 54. 
67 U.S., Dept. of Labor, Economic Factors Bearing upon Minimum Rates, op. cit.,  p. 20. 54  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
It was pointed out above that the strategy of the national and regional 
enterprises was to occupy the focal positions in the great terminal cities, 
leaving the interior areas as the special province of the small producer. The 
success of this policy is indicated in the fact that by 1941 "two-thirds of all 
mills  .  .  . which employed less than 6 workers, are in communities smaller 
than 2,500 population, four-fifths are in towns smaller than 5,000 population, 
and 93 per cent are in towns smaller than 25,000  .  .  ." 68 The vindication of 
the strategy from a competitive standpoint emerges from an analysis of mill 
activity in terminal centers as compared with activity outside. A study of the 
ratio of output to capacity in Kansas City and the interior mills, from 1911 
to 1928, reveals that the latter functioned at higher activity ratios from 1911 
to 1915; but after 1915, with the exception of one year (1918), the Kansas 
City mills showed higher ratios.69 (It should be emphasized this difference 
is typical.) 
Small enterprise was therefore bearing an inordinate proportion of the 
excess capacity partly because of its location outside the more favorable 
metropolitan sites. It is obvious, of course, that disadvantages of small-firm 
location encompass more than the excess capacity element, as has been  sug­
gested in part above.70 
It is significant for the small miller that expansion of medium enterprises 
in the interior centers was predicated upon their provision of procurement 
facilities independent of grain exchanges in the large cities. For most of their 
supplies these medium enterprises established their own lines of elevators at 
country shipping points in order to buy directly from farmers, following the 
policy initiated by the Minneapolis producers in the 19th century.71 The 
possession of vast terminal storage facilities and lines of country elevators is 
the hallmark of large and successful enterprise in the industry. The growth 
of this integrative phenomenon proceeded pari passu with the decline in the 
volume of trading in grain futures on the principal "contract markets" of 
the U. S. ; from $21,459,697 in 1926 to $8,418,072 in 1940.72 The small man­
ufacturer, on the other hand, to the extent that he is large enough to secure 
raw materials from beyond his immediate plant area, must rely almost exclu­
sively upon dealers and public elevators. 
It might be thought, under the stimulus of favorable wartime conditions 
from 1940 to 1945, that smaller millers would have been able in some degree 
to overcome these capacity problems. There was, of course, a substantial 
growth in output during those years. The U. S. total rose from 204,720,000 
sacks of 100 pounds in the crop year ended June 30, 1940, to 252,570,000 in 
68 U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Earnings in the Grain-mill Products Industries. Bulletin
No. 712, Washington, 1942, p. 21. These data are from a sample utilized for a wage survey.
69 Northwestern Miller, April 13, 1929, Section Two, p. 56.
70 One advantage of small-city location is lower wages.
71 It was reported in 1935 that one of the leading producers in the country procured 85 per
cent of  its wheat from its own or controlled country elevators (U.S., FTC, Agricultural Income
Inquiry, op. cit., Part 1,  p. 1085).
72 Northwestern Miller, April 30, 1941, Section Two, p. 50. 55  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
the crop year 1944-45the peak for the war period.73 Yet the same differ­
entiation found in peacetime, with its stagnant demand, held during wartime, 
viz., the larger mills operated at much higher ratios to capacity ; concentration 
of production was greater than concentration of capacity in the industry 
(corollary to the first) ; and the operating ratios of the smaller interior mills 
were generally less than those for mills in the termini. (Also corollary to the 
first point, since the smaller mills are in the interior.)74 
These comparisons were typical of the industry during the war years. 
Small mills failed to better their general position. Capacity status of small 
mills was substantially unchanged from 1942 to 1945; that of large mills 
was notably improved.75 
It must be recalled that pressures for business expansion on the part of 
national enterprises, in the context of the inimical influence of this industry's 
excess capacity upon price and profit ratios, operated within the framework 
of a practically constant total demand. Significance of the factor of constant 
demand resides, at this point in the discussion, in the fact expansion of 
national and regional corporations, so outstanding in the years 1920 to 1940, 
had to occur at the expense of the markets accessible to small enterprise. The 
result was the reduction in total number of mills in the U. S. from 6,485 in 
the census of 1921 to 2,143 in 1939.76 Further discussion of these develop­
ments will be clarified by a prior review of the activities of the Millers' 
National Federation and its affiliates in the early 1920's and the role of the 
larger producers in that organization. 
The immediate background for the work of the Federation, which was 
strongly along the lines of industrial stabilization, beginning in this period, is 
afforded by certain elements at work in the war period together with the 
economic conditions of the first postwar years. These elements, it is presumed, 
also functioned importantly as proximate stimuli for the consolidation move­
ment of the late 1920's and early 1930's. 
The index of physical output of flour and grist mill products, on a 1914 
base declined from 105.7 in 1919 to 91.0 in 1921, and still stood at only 96.2 
in 1923.77 American exports of wheat flour, which reached 26,450,000 barrels 
in 1919, dropped precipitously to 15,025,000 in 1922. The postwar recession 
of 1921 carried the price of 1st patents at Minneapolis from its war-period 
peak of $14.60 a barrel in June, 1920 to $7.10 in December, 1921. The 
general revival in 1922 failed to stem the downward trend. Average yearly 
prices of 1st patents declined from $12.61 in 1920 to $8.76 in 1921, $7.37 in 
1922, and to $6.70 in 1923.78 The fall in prices of wheat flour was, if any­
73 Ibid., April 30, 1946, Section Two, p. 26. The change in method of calculating physical units
from barrels of 196 pounds to 100-pound sacks occurred toward the end of the war.
74 Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
75 Ibid.  p.  29. 
76 U.S., Dept. of Labor, Economic Factors Bearing upon Minimum Rates, op.  cit.,  p.  11. 
77 Mills, F.C., Economic Tendencies, op. cit., pp. 194-195.
8 Northwestern Miller, April 3,  1929, Section Two, pp. 44 (export data), 90 (prices). 56  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
thing, slightly greater than the drop in wheat prices.79 To these adverse 
forbears of stabilization and consolidation there must be added the subjective 
influence emanating from the deep current of merger psychology which pre­
vailed during the 1920's. A further subjective factor of moment was the 
experience gained by the leading producers, acting as an emergency committee 
through the Millers' National Federation, between 1917 and 1919. It was 
invaluable experience in price control, profit stabilization, output restriction, 
control of new and old capacity, and administrative subdivision and coordina­
tion of the entire industry. Both war and depression thus provided the 
immediate catalyst for precipitating out of the admixture of market ma­
turitystabilization, consolidation and engrossment of small enterprise. 
The record of the work engaged in by the national and regional trade 
associations, between 1922 and 1926 particularly, related as it is primarily to 
control of price, capacity and production, is significant because it expresses 
the type of policy pursued toward the small-firm segment in market condi­
tions characterized by maturity. It further indicates the leading role played 
by the largest enterprises with greatest fixed investments. Finally, it shows 
both the inherent tendency of the small firm to participate in stabilization 
programs and its opposite tendency to act independently where the quasi­
atomistic segment is of some importance in the industry. It appears to be the 
greater compulsion among the large firms to effect stabilization, juxtaposed 
with the centrifugal tendencies of the small independent, which creates the 
conflict between the two segments, acting to submerge the latter group where 
such conditions obtain. 
As with a very large number of trade organizations, the Millers' National 
Federation is an instrument of the more prominent concerns in the industry. 
Inadequate representation of the small firm is typical. 
The Millers' National Federation itself was reorganized in April, 1924, 
giving control to the largest concerns through a plural voting arrangement. 
Milling companies were made direct members, with the voting power of each 
dependent upon production (not capacity !).80 
In its inquiry during the 1920's into competitive conditions in the in­
dustry, and the moves through the Federation to further "agreements, 
understandings, and cooperation to restrict competition," the Federal Trade 
Commission found that the most active firms in these moves were the larger 
ones, mentioning in particular the Washburn-Crosby Co., Pillsbury, and 
Kansas Flour Mills Co., Kansas City, Missouri.81 The movement for sta­
bilization among the largest enterprises was not limited to the three firms 
mentioned. Take the Southwestern region, for example. There, many of the 
79 The weighted average yearly price of No. 1 northern spring wheat at Minneapolis fell from
$2.07 per bushel in 1920 to $1.17 per bushel in 1923, a decline of 43.5 per cent. (Northwestern Miller,
April 29,  1947, Section Two, p.  30). The above decline in price of flour over the same period
amounted to approximately 47 per cent.
80 FTC, Conditions in the Flour-Milling Business, pp. cit.,  p.  11. 
81 Ibid.,  pp. 24-26 and FTC, Competitive Conditions in Flour Milling, op.  cit.,  p.  2. 57  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
larger mills, in addition to the Kansas Flour Mills Co., were prominent in 
the activity through the Nebraska Millers' Association.82 
A particularly destabilizing element was the Atkinson Milling Co., the 
small independent Minneapolis concern of 1,450 barrels daily capacity, ac­
cused by the president of the Southern Minnesota Association of "being the 
worst cutters in the business."83 The (smaller) Southern Minnesota mills 
themselves were, in the view of others, disturbing influences, as shown by 
an excerpt from a letter dated December 15, 1923, sent by W. H. Sudduth, 
vice president of the large Commander Mills Co. of Minneapolis to Walter 
Stern, president of Bernhard Stern & Son, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It read :84 
We attribute present conditions to the fact that everyone is short shipping 
instructions and is trying very hard to keep the mills running. The unfortunate
part of the whole proposition, as I look at it,  is the fact that most of our 
competition is among our own Southern Minnesota Mills. We do not hear 
very much about Washburn-Crosby Company,  Pillsbury,  or  Consolidated, 
but we hear a whole lot about a number of the Southern Minnesota Mills. I 
presume the other Southern Minnesota Mills hear about us. 
The reference to Washburn-Crosby is apparently indicative of a change 
in general price policy by the firm. Prior to 1923, the largest firm seems to 
have pursued a flexible policy on competitive pricing, but around the time of 
its assumption of leadership in the stabilization movement it seems to have 
embraced the "new competition" doctrines of Mr. A. J. Eddy. 
The Washburn-Crosby firm was sympathetic to, if not the progenitor of, 
the utilization by the Millers' National Federation of the facilities of the 
Livingston Economic Service, an organization which acted as a statistical 
clearing house for stabilization purposes and checked up on reports of price­
cutters.85 
The work of stabilization performed by the Millers' National Federation 
followed two main related channels : control of excess capacity through prop­
aganda and pressure among the rank and file of its membership to curtail 
production rates, with a maintenance of minimum prices largely by means of 
strong pressure upon culprits, from other members of the industry acting 
through the Federation. The latter objective was implemented by a great 
emphasis upon cost accounting, and the widely disseminated but deliberately 
unpublished code of "uncommercial and unethical practices that should be 
`outlawed' by flour millers." 86 
The problem of excess capacity was placed squarely before the industry 
on December 22, 1924 in a letter from Sydney Anderson, president of the 
Federation, to the members of the organization's executive committee.87 Mr. 
82 FTC, Competitive Conditions in Flour Milling, op.  cit.,  pp.  38-39. 
83 Ibid., p. 31.
84 Ibid.,  p. 28.
85 FTC, Open-price Trade Associations, op. cit., p. 434. Mr. George Livingston of the Livingston
Economic Service was Executive Vice President of the Federation from 1929 to 1939 (Northwestern
Miller, April 30, 1941, Section Two, p. 16).
86 FTC, Competitive Conditions in Flour Milling, op cit.,  pp. 77-78.
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Anderson's statement on the capacity problem gives first place to the "obso­
lete or uneconomically located" mills ; presumably these are the mills which 
(according to him) have "no real permanent market" and frequently effect 
sales "at prices below the general price level." This generally accurate concep­
tion of small enterprise in flour milling at the same time expresses well the 
attitude of the large concerns. For the latter, the central danger of excess 
capacity stems from these smaller mills, as Mr. Anderson indicates in the 
letter. It should be noted, however, that a certain amount of the obsolete plant 
was acquired by large firms for purposes of dismantling or removing it from 
the small enterprise segment of the industry. 
In his statement, Mr. Anderson stressed other focal problems of the 
industry :  (1) growth of large scale baking, the answer to which appeared 
to be "some form of consolidated selling" ;  (2) development of a voluntary 
minimum price policy that would guarantee profit margins ; and (3) spread 
of a cost accounting system throughout the industry which would be effective 
in "ironing out the competitive difficulties which occur under pressure." 88 
The whole question of capacity as related to the large and small producer 
was clarified in connection with a controversy over the NRA code for the 
industry. The Millers'  National Federation had continued  its  activities 
throughout the later 1920's, particularly in connection with the trade practice 
conference work sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission. Control of 
capacity figured prominently in these conferences. 
The NRA controversy followed some decisive years of merger and con­
solidation  in the industry, years which finally transformed the original 
Northwestern concerns into national enterprises. This was particularly true 
of the leading firm. Relatively high activity ratios enjoyed by these firms 
tended to foster agreement with several other important national and regional 
millers on a high ceiling of 144 hours. 
This proposal brought out all the internal schisms within the industry. 
The outright opposition which it elicited, together with the variety of alterna­
tive ceilings suggested, each receiving substantial support, contributed greatly 
to its eliminaton from the final code. An extensive poll was taken by the 
Federation after a storm of protest led by the National Grange and the new 
National Independent Millers' Association, which had sprung up around a 
program of opposition to the Federation code. The poll revealed that of 18 
firms with annual output in excess of 800,000 barrels in 1932, ten voted for 
144 hours and six favored no restrictions  on hours. At the other extreme 
were 252 producers, each of which had manufactured less than 25,000 barrels 
in 1932. Of this group of small enterprises, 71 voted for  a 78-hour ceiling, 
91 for a 96-hour ceiling, and only 30 for  no restrictions.89 Thus, in a poll 
88 Ibid., pp. 131-135. passim.

59 Ibid., December 13, 1933, p. 662.
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conducted by the trade association itself, the small millers favored restriction 
of activity much more clearly than did the large firms. 
The lower ceilings advocated by the small producers appear to have been 
an attempt to compensate for their typically poorer rate of activity. From the 
standpoint of the largest concerns, 144 hours actually amounted to no limi­
tation, whereas a 78-hour or 96-hour restriction would have seriously crippled 
them, running up their costs despite their ability to use standby capacity. Two 
important implications of this are :  the higher activity ratios of the large 
firms had become institutionalized and acknowledged, and, they considered 
it possible to control the capacity danger by means of general competitive 
superiority plus application of the other two provisions of the article in the 
proposed code on regulation of production. 
Meanwhile the capacity controversy brought into public view two other 
significant aspects of the differentiation between the national and the local 
enterprises in this regard. It was made clear that the former had for some 
time followed a policy of buying up capacity and either (1) dismantling it 
or (2), holding it as a stand-by reserve. The existence of a reserve plant in 
operating condition reinforces the conclusion that the 144-hour ceiling on any 
one unit was actually no limitation. In other words, the 144-hour proposal 
can be interpreted, in the context of the conditions of the industry in 1933, 
as a publicity device designed to offset the goal of the smaller producers to 
"keep the mills running," and as a supporting clause to the other two provi­
sions of the article on regulation of production in the code proposal. 
It is not implied in connection with the interpretation developed herein, 
of the 144-hour provision, that the larger enterprises were not prepared to 
curtail production in their own plants, e.g., on grounds provided in traditional 
monopoly and oligopoly theory. However, the work of the Federation with 
regard to capacity control at this stage in the industry's history seems to have 
been directed against the quasi-atomistic segment. The latter really embraced 
the idea of curtailment which was only ostensibly favored by the former. 
The small-firm group turned curtailment into a competitive weapon against 
the larger producers. Such a move, however, had the unfortunate  conse­
quences for the small millers of representing them in the eyes of the public 
as proponents of contraction and inefficiency. Such an anomalythe advocacy 
of production curtailment by a quasi-competitive enterprise grouping, which 
traditionally had sought to raise its activity ratiosis to be explained only in 
terms of the desire of that group to close the gap in operating rates between 
it and the larger concerns. 
The enterprise ideology which tends to accompany change in the struc­
ture of markets in the direction of oligopoly will produce output curtailment 
rather than the foregoing of a return on all costs. There is for the oligopolistic 
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related ; there is rather an administered price determined by total costs plus 
profit (or, including profit) at some "optimum" output point on the estimated 
cost-plus-profit curve. The spread of cost accountancy is in large part the 
expression of this attempt at administration of prices. This elevates costs to 
the status of an independent variable in price determination.90 Production is 
geared to an optimum capacity operations rate rather than to any "given" 
market demand. 
The opposite enterprise viewpoint is expressed in the slogan, indicated 
above, of the organization of small milling concerns, the American Millers' 
Association, Marion, Indiana. That slogan is : "Keep the Small Mills Run­
ning." 91 It is precisely this approach to the problem of excess capacity which 
might be termed the out-of-pocket-costs viewpoint. It appears as unethical to 
the administered-price ethic, creating conflict between the two groups of a 
segmentalized industry. Motivated by short-run cost objectives, where only 
variable costs are relevant, and assuming highly elastic, given, firm demand 
functions, the small miller conforms much more closely to the Marshallian 
competitive archetype than does his large-scale rival. The two segments there­
fore represent conflicting price policies within the single industry : "adminis­
tered" vs. "market." 
Failure in these years of the stabilization movement, functioning as it 
did largely through the trade association, has been attributed to the industrial 
structure ;  i.e., to the large number of sellers.92 This seems to have been a 
primary factor. However, structural changes toward fewer sellers proceeded 
rapidly, following the activities of the Federation in the early 1920's. Certain 
leading elements in the industry apparently shared the opinion that where 
voluntary cooperation failed because of number of sellers, consolidation and 
further concentration was a surer alternative. After the middle 1920's, con­
centration, combination and stabilization work by the leading enterprises 
proceeded conjointly. Combination and expansion of large units by acquisition 
were superimposed upon concentration of capacity and output under the aegis 
of approximately 200 mills owned by a considerably smaller number of firms. 
The comparatively constant volume of sales during the period 1920 to 
1940 sharpens and clarifies the declining importance of the small mill as 
illustrated, e.g., in plant-size series. Census figures on the number of estab­
lishments, beginning with the first year in which the elimination of plants 
with annual value of product of less than $5,000 occurred, are as follows :93 
90 FTC, Open Price Trade Associations, op. cit., p. 192.
91 Northwestern Miller, May 22, 1940, p. 19.
92 TNEC, Monograph No. 35, op.  cit., pp. 43-44.
93 U.S., Dept. of Labor, Economic Factors Bearing upon Minimum Rates, op.  cit.,  p.  11.  It 
is estimated that, had the exclusion of plants with output valued at $500 to $5,000 been made in
1919, fourteen per cent of the mills reported for, that year would have been eliminated, along with
one-fifth of 1 per cent of the total value of products of all mills. This would have left 9,209 to be
compared with the 6,485 for 1921, a drastic fall, no doubt due largely to the over-extension of small
plant construction during the war, followed by the depression of 1921.
Exclusion of small merchant mills from the 1939 census is estimated by the Northwestern Miller
to have amounted to about 1,000, May 22, 1940, p. 12. SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY  61 
Number 
Year  of establishments 
1921  6,485 
1923  5,232 
1925  4,413 
1927  4,035 
1929  4,022 
1931  2,412 
1933  1,932 
1935  2,193 
1937  2,238 
1939  2,143 
Inability of the small firm to retain its market in the face of requirements 
of modern technology, with its concomitant large fixed plant, the superior 
procurement and marketing facilities of the more powerful competitor, with 
geographical shifts, matured conditions of demand, and cyclical vicissitudes, 
is expressed in these striking data on number of plants. This decline in 
numbers is  the main form in which the "problem of small enterprise" 
exhibits itself in the flour milling industry. That the downward trend has 
continued under war and postwar conditions is shown in the more compre­
hensive records on the number of flour mills as compiled by the Northwestern 
Miller: 94 
Number 
Year  of establishments 
1939  3,865 
1940  3,423 
1941  3,337 
1942  3,001 
1943  2,947 
1944  2,913 
1945  2,571 
1946  2,562 
1947  2,534 
1948  2,148 
1951  1,799 
The fewer small firms which remain in the industry, moreover, have 
received a progressively smaller proportion of the total volume of business. 
Our analysis of the milling industry has shown that excess capacity, attempted 
market control (stabilization), and the high mortality of independent enter­
prise are all conjoined in a common pattern of evolution. 
The organic character of this evolutionary process is revealed in the 
continuous growth of concentration in production and the progressive im­
provement in the competitive position of the large firms, in contrast to 
relative deterioration in the economic importance of smaller millers. These 
trends in the past are the empirical premise for the anticipated future disad­
vantaged status of small enterprise. It is most interesting to examine briefly 
specific trends in the case of the largest concerns. 
9 4 193 9 -1947 ,  from the issue of April 27, 1948, Section Two, p. 26; figures for 1948 and 1951
from the Almanack Number, April 28, 1953, p. 23. 62  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
While total value of product fell slightly from $877,680,000 in 1914 to 
$853,219,000 in 1935, the capitalization and assets of ten leading firms in the 
industry grew very substantially.95 Their total capitalization increased from 
$60,519,942 in 1914 to $159,905,740 in 1935, a rise of 164.2 per cent. This 
increase in total capitalization was almost wholly composed of, and about 
equally divided between, growth in capital stock ($48,455,210, or 131.2 per 
cent) and in surplus account ($46,300,355, or 262.9 per cent). "The increase 
in total capital stock was principally due to issues in connection with acquisi­
tions, mergers, and consolidations of other companies, issues to finance con­
struction of additional properties required in the natural expansion of the 
business, and stock issued as dividends  .  .  .  The increase in surplus  .  . 
resulted largely from reinvested earnings amounting to $48,328,867. How­
ever, it should be noted that part of the increase represented surplus from 
revaluation of assets which amounted to $7,184,699 at the end of 1935,.  .  ." 
This is an enviable record of rapid expansion for a stagnant industry, but a 
record experienced by only a relatively small group of enterprises. From the 
standpoint of the lesser concerns, the outstanding features of this expansion 
were :  (a) the rate of growth of the largest firms was far greater than that 
for the small, enduring firms in the rest of the industry; (b) part of the 
growth was in the form of direct acquisition, for purposes of continued 
operation, of independent enterprises ;  (c) part of the expansion also in­
volved acquisition of plant for purposes of removing it from the industry 
entirely ; and (d) the differentially high profitability enjoyed by the largest 
firms, as compared to the smaller producers. 
In a nonidentical group of milling firms, covering the period 1919-1922, 
and using size of milling investment as a measure, the following rates of 
return (net income over investment) were found to obtain:97 
Rate of return 
Size of investment  (per cent) 
Under $250,000  6.1 
$250,000 to $500,000  8.4 
$500,000 to $1,000,000  10.5 
$1,000,000 to $2,000,000  10.0 
$2,000,000 and over  11.0 
Closely similar results were arrived at by using output as the criterion 
of size. 
In a later study of the Federal Trade Commission, from which informa­
tion pertaining to the Washburn-Crosby Company was originally excluded 
due to an injunction obtained by the milling firm, but which was subsequently 
95 The ten were General  Mills,  Inc.;  Pillsbury Flour Mills Co.; Commander-Larabee Corp.;
Standard Milling Co.;  Flour Mills of America, Inc.; Colorado Milling & Elevator Co.;  Russell-
Miller Milling Co.; International Milling Co.; Centennial Flouring Mills Co.; Fisher Flouring Mills
Co.; Globe Grain & Milling Co.; King Midas Mill Co. (FTC, Agricultural Income Inquiry, op. cit.,
pp. 907-910).
96 Ibid. 
97 TNEC Monograph No. 35, op. cit., p. 84. 63  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
procured by the Commission as a result of reversal by a lower court, the 
inclusion of the Washburn-Crosby data in a sample of 91 identical concerns 
for the 2-year period, 1923-1924, lowered the average investment per barrel 
and raised the average rate of return for the group." 
Eleven leading producers in the industry (including General Mills) taken 
as a group showed exceptionally favorable profit records through the depres­
sion years of the 1930's.9° Part of this favorable profit record, though only 
part, can be attributed to continuing unit cost advantages enjoyed by the 
largest enterprises. A study by the Millers' National Federation covering the 
crop years 1935-36 to 1937-38 showed that mills with annual output of under 
50,000 barrels averaged $1.233 milling cost (manufacturing, administrative, 
selling and interest on long-term creditors' claims) per barrel, whereas those 
with output of 1,600,000 barrels and over averaged $1.017 per barrel, a 
striking differentia1.10° 
General Mills, and the other large concerns to a lesser degree, have 
developed the flexibility, diversity and size necessary to maintain high profita­
bility in spite of the chronic "problems" obtaining within the industry. The 
success of these larger enterprises, and their great growth during the difficult 
period from 1920 to 1940, indicates that for them the problems were either 
largely shelved or shifted to other, smaller firms. 
The trends of differentiation find their ultimate resolution in oligopoly 
and internal market stabilization. The milling industry continues to move in 
this direction. The growth of the Minneapolis-national, the Southwestern, 
and a few Coast enterprises, sharply raised the concentration ratios for the 
industry. Five large concerns were milling about 23 per cent of the total 
output of flour in 1921; by 1935 the three largest companies milled 29 per 
cent of the total production, of which General Mills had more than half.1°1 
Four years later, the three largest accounted for 38 per cent, and General 
Mills for 23 per cent, of the total dollar volume of flour sales in the United 
States. 
Since in the fiscal year 1934-35 these three concerns purchased 38.4 per 
cent of the total commercial wheat crop of the country,102 on the assumption 
of approximately constant inventories of grain, and allowing for the use of 
wheat for cereal and related uses,  it  is indicated that they were perhaps 
supplying grain to other millers. Nicholls asserts that this is very likely in 
the case of General Mills, which purchased 23.3 per cent of the U. S. total 
in 1935, although its wheat flour sales amounted to but 15.7 per cent of 
the tota1.1" 
99 Competition and Profits in Bread and Flour, op.  cit.,  particularly the supplemental report,
Conditions in the Flour Milling Business, Senate Doc. No. 96, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., Washington,
1932, pp. 2-3.
99 FTC, Agricultural Income Inquiry, op. cit., p. 818.
100 U.S., Temporary National Economic Committee, Relative Efficiency of Large, Medium-Sized
and Small Business, Monograph No. 13, Washington, 1941, p. 61.
101 TNEC Monograph No. 35, op. cit., pp. 39, 90.
102 FTC, Agricultural Income Inquiry, op. cit., p. 6.
103 Nicholls, W. H., Imperfect Competition within Agricultural Industries, Ames, Iowa: Iowa
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Twenty-eight firms controlled 40 per cent of the total milling capacity 
by 1940, and approximately 54 per cent in 1953.104 In view of the higher 
activity ratios of the largest concerns, these firms must have produced con­
siderably more than 54 per cent of the total production in that year. This is 
not a high degree of concentration, compared to a number of other industries, 
but what is important in the present context is the trend. 
It might be said that after the consolidation of the last 25 years, the 
competitive differentiation between large and small firms had deepened to 
the point at which members of the small-enterprise segment could only in 
very exceptional and isolated cases bridge the gap between membership in 
that segment and membership in the corps of leaders. With regard to the 
future prospects of the small-firm sector, it has been suggested above that 
the industry leaders will continue to follow policies which reduce the com­
petitive potential in this sector until the power of market stabilization is 
effectively in the hands of the leaders. In other words, the "reduction process" 
involving elimination of small and medium producers, and mitigation of their 
power to disrupt the market, can be expected to persist so long as they are 
an effective threat to market stabilization. 
It is doubtful if structure of the flour industry is yet such that the 
small-firm segment is sufficiently small in numbers or in share of the total 
volume of business to avoid further engrossment. This appraisal of prospects 
is based upon a number of factors, but particularly upon the growth of con­
centration in the 1940's, the size-distribution of firms at the end of that 
decade, and certain price results which have occurred since the decline in 
wartime demand. 
It is true that concentration of production in the 1940's proceeded at a 
remarkable rate. On this score comparison may be made with the capacity of 
the largest 28 firms referred to just above as holding, according to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, approximately 40 per cent of total industry capacity in 
1940. The Northwestern Miller shows the capacity of the 28 largest concerns 
in early 1949 to have been approximately 698,000 sacks daily.105 In the same 
journal, issue of December 13, 1949, Mr. Herman Steen, vice-president and 
secretary of the Millers' National Federation, estimated total commercial daily 
capacity for the industry liberally at approximately 925,000 sacks.1°6 There­
fore the largest 28 firms had expanded their capacity from 40 per cent of the 
industry total to about 75 per cent at the end of the decade. This is certainly 
notable. However, it must be recognized that the leading core of 38 firms, 
each with a capacity of 5,000 or more sacks daily, is rather too numerous to 
be thought of as a representative case of fewness, and its business policies 
as a group do not seem to have achieved a high degree of cohesion, i.e., we 
104 U.S., BLS, Earnings in the Grain-Mill Products Industries, op.  cit.,  p.  12,  for the 1940 
estimate. The figure for 1953  is calculated from the Northwestern Miller, Almanack Number, April
28, 1953, pp. 23, 28.
Northwestern 17. orthwestern Miller, April 26, 1949, Section Two, p.
dos Ibid., P. 12. 65  SMALL ENTERPRISE MORTALITY 
do not have a "hardened" oligopoly core. Furthermore, the numerous small 
and medium firms occupying approximately a 25 per cent position capacity-
wise in the market still represent an important sector ; at least of the domestic 
market. 
It might be reasoned that the small-firm segment could now be realis­
tically expected to adopt a cooperative attitude regarding output controls, 
rates of utilization of capacity, and price policy, such as, for example, a 
standard differential between prices charged by the leaders and those quoted 
by the lesser millers. This has been done frequently in other industries. It 
is not to be denied that such arrangement is now possible in the flour industry. 
However, it must also be recognized that where the small- and medium-firm 
segment remains rather substantial, as it does in this case, the possibilities 
for achieving such a pattern of controls and of price differentials are dis­
tinctly less than they would be if the oligopoly core were less numerous, 
production more concentrated, and the small-firm segment reduced to, say, a 
10 per cent position in the market. Furthermore, in this industry, the millfeed 
market, which is quite separate on the demand side from the flour market, 
can always become a price-cutting area to stimulate increased flour output and 
thus bring additional downward pressures to bear on the price structure for 
flour. The postwar price-break in millfeed in 1948, for example, soon brought 
with it what the industry considered "disastrous price competition" in flour.'" 
These pricing results held in spite of considerable progress made since the 
war in bringing capacity and utilization ratios down to the point at which 
they are more in line with total demand.'" 
In the view of this writer, it would seem that on balance the numerous 
medium and small firms are still probably a factor inimical to the policies of 
collective control over price and output to which the leading millers dedicated 
themselves as early as the 1920's. If this be correct, some further reduction 
in the size and numbers of the small-firm segment may be anticipated in 
the 1950's. 
Flour milling appears to provide a "classic" illustration for those who 
argue that mature capitalism involves the numerical demise of small enter­
prise. Whatever may be said by the contrary-minded, who have on their side 
the weight of evidence insofar as the retailing and service trades are con­
cerned, this industry is preeminently illustrative of numerical elimination in 
the fabrication segment of the economy. 
107 Northwestern Miller, April 26, 1949, Section Two, p.  3. 
108 Ibid., p. 4; and Northwestern Miller, December 13, 1949, p. 12. IV
 
NEW ENTRY AND SMALL ENTERPRISE:
 
THE AUTOMOBILE'
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The formal theorizing of economists in the field of Industrial Organ­
ization, whether they operate with the concept of pure competition, monopo­
listic competition, or oligopoly, has proceeded for the most part on the 
explicit or implicit assumption of free ingress. The existence of barriers to 
ingress in the oligopolistic industrial reality of our day has unfortunately 
failed so far to produce appropriate theoretical recognition, and in conse­
quence we are almost completely without the analytical tools required to 
integrate the phenomenon of business entry with the more developed ideas 
pertaining to industrial structure and to certain aspects of business policy. 
This is all the more noteworthy in view of the great influence in the orthodox 
theories of business enterprise of the Marshallian tradition which, on its own 
peculiar concept of quasi-biological evolution, was under special constraint to 
treat the conditions determining the turnover of firms. Yet, it is almost as 
appropriate to say today what Joan Robinson wrote nearly 20 years ago 
"the problem of the conditions influencing the entry of new firms, in response 
to a rise in demand, or the disappearance of old firms, in response to a fall 
in demand, preesnts an interesting and largely unexplored field of inquiry." 2 
The essential character of competition may be said to be focussed in the new 
entry situation obtaining in any given period of economic history, and of the 
history of particular markets. 
The passenger car segment of the automobile industry is a fruitful area 
for the study of the problem of business entry. It represents in many ways a 
whole group of industries in which new entry has become progressively more 
difficult, just as on the other hand the shoe industry, for example, represents 
the opposite widespread phenomenon of relatively free entry with its associ­
ated continuous turnover of a high proportion of the total firms. The auto­
mobile industry is also representative in that, like many others, it has evolved 
from a multi-firm structure in its early days to oligopoly in its later phase 
of development. Furthermore, its "product" falls into that broad class of 
differentiated consumer (primarily) durables which was so influential in 
changing the makeup of civilian manufacturing output since the turn of 
the century. 
Many hundreds of firms at one time or another have engaged in the 
commercial production of passenger cars, that is, actually placed cars on the 
market. As late as 1921, there were almost 100 firms turning out cars on a 
1 A somewhat more complete discussion may be found in the writer's "Closure of Entry in the
American Automobile Industry," Oxford Economic Papers (New Series), Vol. IV, No. 3  (Oct.,
1952), pp. 213-234.
2 The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London: MacMillan, 1946, p. 92 Fn 1. 
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commercial basis. But more important for the general problem of small 
enterprise than mere numbers of firms are the implications of the closure of 
new entry in the industry in the 1920's. 
The ensuing discussion in this chapter will attempt to develop the hypoth­
esis that :  (1) the problem of closed entry in the automobile industry was 
associated with the transformation of the market from a multi-firm structure 
into an oligopolistic structure ; (2) in its early stages the industry exhibited a 
pattern of high enterprise-turnover in response to high profitability, as 
portrayed in conventional theorizing about free markets ;  (3) the industry 
subsequently developed a number of characteristics which were incompatible 
with the continuation of such a pattern ;  (4) when there was new entry or 
attempted entry in the industry, it assumed the form mainly of price-class 
extensions or commodity extensions from within, which phenomena, however, 
do not conform to traditional concepts of new ingress as emanating from 
outside and independent sources; and (5) entry of the Kaiser enterprise was a 
very special case based upon a reconstitution of certain conditions which had 
contributed to ingress in the earlier history of the automobile market. 
From the standpoint of the entry problem, the evolution of the passenger 
car market may be divided into an era of phenomenal growth ending in the 
middle 1920's, followed by a period of maturity and structural hardening with 
its terminal point the beginning of World War II, succeeded in turn by the 
special war, conversion, and preparedness period from 1941 to the present. 
2. ENTRY IN THE PERIOD OF RAPID GROWTH 
We are fairly well supplied with the facts of enterprise turnover in the 
earliest of these three periods through the careful works of R. C. Epstein 
(The Automobile Industry) and L. H. Seltzer (A Financial History of the 
American Automobile Industry), both published in 1928. We know that 
in the first two decades of the century scores of new concerns entered the 
market, many of them engaged ordinarily in one or another branch of the 
engineering and related industries in Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and the New 
England States. Entrants well exceed exits (on the average) for the whole 
period so that there was an increase in the net number of firms engaged in 
the commercial production of cars  i.e.,  selling cars to consumers in the 
national, or at least a regional market (ignoring price-class or length of time 
in the market). 
There were many more enterprises reaching the preparatory stages of pro­
duction than there were enterprises actually marketing finished cars. In the 
discussion of entry below, the former are generally excluded. They belong 
in the category of what we shall term "stillborn entry." The prevalence of 
this phenomenon in the early period suggests that for industries manufac­
turing complex products new ingress may be a much more difficult and 
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competition, perhaps even in the theory of workable competition. It is esti­
mated by Seltzer that nearly 1,000 separate enterprises were organized to 
engage in automobile production up to 1927.3 
New entry in the early period was greatly facilitated by the basic condi­
tion of rapid and substantial growth in total market demand. New firms 
could grow without diverting sales from other producers. It was not a 
question of sharing in or disrupting a given pattern of total demand ; or even 
of creating demand for particular makes through product differentiation, 
although this factor became increasingly important after the rise to domi­
nance of Ford. 
The multi-firm structure of the market, together with the comparatively 
low concentration of control over production (the small-firm segment of the 
market still accounted for an important proportion of the total volume of 
business) and the small size of investment in passenger-car assembly proper 
all contributed further to the ability of a moderately-sized new entrant to 
compete on more or less equal terms with established concerns by absorbing a 
small percentage of the total market. 
The new entry process was also made easier by virtue of the relatively 
simple design, engineering and assembly requirements of the product. Al­
though the complexity of the product already offered some impediment, con­
tributing, in part, to the proliferation of stillborn entry, its adverse influence 
was mitigated by at least two considerations :  (1) the fabrication of cars was 
largely an assembly job, and (2) such assembly function was still possible 
as a sideline activity of varying importance to established machinery, cycle, 
wagon, carriage, metal-working and other manufacturers. Passenger car pro­
duction involved what A. R. Oxenf eldt calls "commodity-extensions" on the 
part of these established concerns.' The latter were on the "inside" during 
the strategic founding years of the new industry. Hence, in many outstanding 
cases, new entry did not mean that outside capital in freshly-organized enter­
prises was penetrating an established market, but rather that a new market 
was in process of creation as an offspring of existing industries and firms 
which were simply diversifying their product-mix. In this case it happened 
that the offspring swallowed up the parents. 
The method of assembly, rather than complete integrated fabrication, 
facilitated entry by making it possible to use small plants and largely hand 
methods, drawing upon supplies of already quite standardized interchangeable 
parts from other established industries. The 1905 Census declared that "while 
some of the larger plants turn out all the parts, the smaller establishments, 
and by far the greater number, do not, but purchase more or less material in 
3 Op, cit., p. 64.
4 New Firms and Free Enterprise, Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, pp.
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fully or partially manufactured form. In fact, there is a strong tendency in 
this direction .  .  ."5 
On the financial side, several conditions prevailed which aided the be­
ginner. Much of the long-term risk capital and working capital was readily 
available from the related founding and contributory industries just men­
tioned. Short-term credit was also at hand from suppliers of raw materials 
and parts on the one hand, and the distributing trade on the other. The motor 
vehicle manufacturer purchased materials from the multitude of partsmakers 
on credit, usually about 30 to 90 days. Hence, in addition to  shifting much of 
the technical burdens upon this group, the latter also assumed a substantial 
portion of the risk of an assembler whose working capital requirements were 
at this stage relatively high. The arrangement was supplemented on the 
marketing side by a system of cash deposits with each order from dealers, 
the balance becoming due upon delivery of the car. The latter was shipped 
to the dealer after an assembling process frequently shorter than 90 days, 
with a sight draft attached to the bill of lading. This put the industry on a 
cash basis from the selling side, while its purchases were on a credit basis. 
The demand for automobiles was such that dealers contracted to accept ship­
ment from assemblers immediately upon production, regardless of current 
retail  sales  in a particular  locality,  in accordance with a prearranged 
schedules 
In addition to these readily accessible sources of funds, the new firm, 
once it had succeeded in putting cars on the market on a commercial  basis, 
stood a good chance of making substantial returns which would provide 
internal funds for expansion. Returns in the first decade of the century were 
in many cases little short of fabulous ; and even in the second decade average 
returns on net worth were estimated by Epstein to be several times the going 
rate of interest.? High profitability acted as a stimulus to both new ingress 
and rapid self-expansion when the newcomer got to the stage of commercial 
production. 
Nor was the potential passenger-car producer impeded by the presence 
of any apparently deliberate efforts on the part of established makers to keep 
him out. An attempt was made during the first decade of the century to 
control the number of firms and their policies through the restrictive use of 
engine patents, but this effort was nullified by 1911 under the leadership of 
Ford, after a long period of litigation over the Selden patent. 
The high enterprise turnover rates prevailing during the earlier stages 
of the industry's development emanated mainly from the conditions thus 
5 Quoted in Fabricant, S., Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1937, New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1940, pp. 306-307.
6 See Seltzer, op. cit., pp. 22-23, 53; Hamilton, W. H., The Pattern of Competition, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1940, p. 30; U. S., Federal Trade Commission, Report on Motor Vehicle
Industry, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. House Doc. No. 468, Washington: Government Printing Office, June
5, 1939, p.  108. 
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outlined, conditions which provide an interesting and essential background 
for the contrasting circumstances that emerged in the interwar years. 
3.	  MATURATION, OLIGOPOLY, AND CLOSURE OF ENTRY 
The "new era" of the 1920's brought with it the same leveling off of 
growth in the automobile industry that is found in the life-cycle of many 
other industries. This may be considered a decisive factor in shaping the 
changed entry conditions that marked the second, or interwar period, of the 
industry's development. 
The peak-year output in the history of the industry during this era was 
1929, when factory sales were approximately 4.6 million passenger units, a 
figure substantially above the 3.9 million ceiling which obtained from 1930 
to 1948. The peak year for private unit export sales was also 1929, and has 
never since been approached.8 Saturation of the market within the framework 
of (1) the civilian economy, (2) the contemporary structure of income flows, 
and (3) the existence of a "normal" used car market, is suggested by the 
ratio of population to passenger car registrations :9 
January 1, 1920	  13.0 persons per car 
"	  " 1929  52  " 
" 1935	  5.6  " 
" 1938	  5.1 
Chronic extra-cyclical excess capacity had emerged clearly by the middle 
twenties, for in 1926, a Kitchen cycle peak during the "new era," some 4.3 
million cars and trucks were turned out with a physical plant capable of 
assembling approximately 7.3 million units." 
By a rather striking historical coincidence, the year 1923 witnessed the 
transformation of the automobile market into a primarily replacement 
(saturated) market, the ascension of the industry to the position of first place 
in American manufacturing, and the founding of the last member of the 
so-called "big three" leading firms : the Chrysler Corporation. Just two years 
earlier saw the peak number of firms for the industry. 
These strategic years of the early 1920's witnessed the reversal of the 
entry-exit ratio, inaugurating an extended period of decline in the number 
of concerns. By 1926 there were one-half as many producers as had existed 
five years earlier. The failure rate (ratio of firms failing to total active firms) 
was in automobiles many times higher than that for all manufacturing, trad­
ing, and commerce. 
The later 1920's brought about the overwhelming domination of the field 
8 Automotive Industries, March 15, 1948, p.  94, March 15, 1947, p. 81; and Automobile Manu­
facturers' Association, Automobile Facts and Figures, 1940, pp. 30-31.
9 Automotive Industries, July 23,  1938,  p.  108. The ratio had fallen to approximately four by
1950. Like other conditions related to the industry in the postwar, semiconversion, semiprepardness
economy of 1945-50, however, this low figure appeared out of line with long-run civilian trends as
shown in the interwar years, 1920-40. About 64 per cent of all cars were over eight years old in
1949; only 24 per cent were over eight years old in pre-war 1941. Passenger cars scrapped jumped
from 963,444 in 1948 to 2,300,000 in 1949. (cf. Automobile Facts, Feb., 1951, pp. 4-5.)
10 Seltzer, op. cit., p. 59; and Automotive Industries, Mar. 15, 1947, p. 81. 71  NEW ENTRY AND SMALL ENTERPRISE 
by the cars in the low-price class (at that time under $1,000). This develop­
ment, together with the emergence of the big three, which as a group held 
by that time a virtual monopoly in this price-class, meant that any serious 
competitive challenge by a new firm or a new make could come only from a 
car in this price-class. Such a challenge would constitute what we shall term 
"effective new entry," which, more specifically, would require fulfillment of 
the following conditions : 
(a) Entrance of new firms, and/or introduction of new makes (of con­
ventional body style and with wheelbase over 100 inches), which 
secure more than a negligible share of the low price, high-volume 
market ; 
(b) Substantial inroads into the 90 per cent position enjoyed by the big 
three as a group after 1933, by penetration of the low-priced field. 
(c) Significant life-span of the new firm and/or make. 
It is with effective entry, so defined, that the following analysis will be 
primarily concerned. In so defining new entry we do not overlook, but merely 
refrain from treating here, the matter of product innovations inaugurated 
by the leaders. 
The cessation of effective entry, from the standpoint of new enterprise, 
occurred with the founding in 1923 of the Chrysler Corporation. The cessa­
tion of effective entry, from the standpoint of make of car, occurred with the 
birth of the Plymouth in 1928. Some authorities have refused to go this far, 
looking upon the Plymouth as the direct descendant of the much older Max­
well car.11 In any case, after Plymouth had cut into the low-price field, no 
new make, coming from an existing or new firm, was able to offer a serious 
challenge to the control of this field by the big three. 
Numerous attempts were made, however, to break into the low-price 
market during the two decades following. 
Only three new domestically manufactured makes were introduced to 
the American market on a commercially productive basis in the years imme­
diately preceding the great depression :  the Falcon-Knight, the Ruxton and 
the Cord. All three cars were produced by older enterprises or by enterprises 
growing out of older concerns. Only the Falcon-Knight had aspirations of 
entering the low-price field, its four-door sedan being priced in the medium 
group at $1,095 f.o.b. in 1927. Despite its moderate cost, the long experience 
of the Falcon Motors Corporation, and the intimate association of John 
Willys with the venture, the car was out of the market only two years later. 
Observation of the entry-exit trend of the depression decade is facilitated 
by reference to the accompanying Table. The production records of "inde-
Cf., e.g., Automotive Industries, June 1, 1946, p. 18. TABLE  2.  NEW PASSENGER CAR REGISTRATIONS OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS, BY MAKES, 1931-1941 
Make of car  1931  1932  1933  1934  1935  1936  1937  1938  1939  1  1940  1941 
Auburn  29,536  11,646  5,038  5,536  5,163  1,848  146 
Bantam (Austin)  2,941  3,675  1,057  700  1,227  800  138 
Continental  3,310  953 
Cord  1,416  335  1,174  1,149 
De Vaux  4,808  1,358 
Durant  7,229  1,135 
Franklin  3,881  1,829  1,329  360 
Graham  19,209  12,858  10,128  12,887  15,965  16,439  13,984  4,139  3,660  1,856  544 
Hudson  19,189  8,641  2,956  19,307  21,587  20,825  90,043  40,889  62,855  79,979  73,261 
Hupmobile 
La Fayette 
17,427  10,794  6,726  6,566 
9,301 
7,450 
17,445 
1,556  403  1,020  907  211  103 
Marmon  5,687  1,365  86 
Nash*  39,366  20,233  11,353  14,315  17,739  43,070  70,571  31,814  54,050  52,853  77,824 
Packard  16,256  11,058  9,081  6,552  37,653  68,772  95,455  49,163  62,005  73,794  69,653 
Pierce-Arrow  4,522  2,692  2,152  1,740  875  787  167  17 
Reo  6,762  3,870  3,623  3,854  3,894  3,146 
Rockne  2  16,966  14,554 
Studebaker  46,533  25,002  21,688  41,560  39,573  67,835  70,048  41,504  84,660  102,281  114,331 
Terraplane (Essex) 
Willys and Whippet 
42,545 
42,936 
28,778 
22,483 
35,831 
15,314 
40,510 
6,576 
53,838 
10,439 
78,471 
12,423 
t 
51,411  t 
13,012 
t 
14,734  t 
21,418  22,102 
Willys-Knight  8,405  3,415  353 
Miscellaneous  3,548  3,732  1,159  324  1,858  5,294  1,441  799  1,789  4,454  3,082 
Total  322,198  188,190  148,346  171,398  233,479  321,640  394,818  183,057  285,887  337,646  361,038 
Source: Automotive and Aviation Industries, March 15  1946, p. 88.
* Included with Hudson. 
t Figure for 1936 includes La Fayette for 10 months. 73  NEW ENTRY AND SMALL ENTERPRISE 
pendent" concerns, as indicated by new registration of makes, readily, submit 
to classification into three main groups : 
(1) Firms and makes exiting. 
(2) Firms and makes enduring. 
(3) Firms and makes representing attempts to enter or re-enter the 
market. 
The first group includes, in addition to those mentioned above, the DeVaux, 
Durant, Franklin, Marmon, Pierce-Arrow, Hupmobile, Graham, Essex, 
Terraplane, Willy's Whippet (dropped in 1930), Willys-Knight, and, in the 
miscellaneous category, Stutz and Dusenberg. The second group encompasses 
Hudson, Nash, Packard, Studebaker, and Willys. The last group includes the 
DeVaux, Rockne, Continental, LaFayette, Terraplane, and possibly the Willys. 
Although discussion of the factors behind the exits is intimately related 
to the problem under consideration, and to the capacity of certain others to 
endure, it will be impossible to treat these matters here. With regard to group 
three, the outstanding unsuccessful attempts were staged by Nash (the 
LaFayette) and Hudson (the Terraplane). 
These two major entry efforts in this period were price-class extensions 
by existing firms (smaller independents). Differentiation in costs and com­
petitive power between firms, largely due to size differences, can easily explain 
the inability of these independents to penetrate the high-volume price class. 
4. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE ENTRY PROBLEM 
If, for a moment, we view the industry according to our customary ap­
proach as having two distinct (though interrelated) segmentsthe three 
leaders, and the independentswe can describe developments in the inde­
pendent segment and then analyse the ways in which it is competitively dif­
ferentiated from the core of leaders. This should throw some light on the 
entry problem. 
In the strategic years of the 1930's, the segment of smaller passenger 
car producers experienced a decline in its relative share of total sales. By 
1933 the independents held about a 10 per cent position, which status persisted 
thereafter up to conversion for war. Over the same period, the relative share 
of the five enduring independents in the total sales of all independents rose 
from 76 per cent to 99 per cent between 1933 and 1941. In other words, the 
depression strengthened the enduring independents at the expense of other 
smaller manufacturers, although it weakened them with respect to the leaders 
(as a group the independents accounted for about 25 per cent of total sales 
in 1929). Stated in still different terms, stabilization of the competitive posi­
tion of the leaders was associated with intensified competition for the 
remainder of the market among the independents. 
No enduring new firms or makes entered the class of independents (or 
of leaders) in this period. No enduring new makes produced by independents 74  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
entered the strategic price class controlled by the leaders. 
Also especially noteworthy is the fact that the gap in size of firm be­
tween leaders and independents has remained persistently enormous. Such 
a gap is present in numerous other industries ;  for example, cigarettes and 
tin cans, and was found in the butter industry (chapter two). It is especially 
striking in the case of automobiles. Despite the remarkable achievement of 
the Kaiser-Frazer Corporation in the postwar years,  it  failed to even 
approach closure of the firm-size gap. 
What changes, in the structure and functioning of the automobile in­
dustry, had occurred in the interwar years which might explain the incapacity 
of new firms, or established firms, to place makes on the market which would 
seriously cut into the low-price class for an enduring period? Why did the 
persistence of relatively high profitability fail to fulfill its traditional function 
of attracting new outside resources into the market ? 
One certain factor of importance was the appearance of a plateau in 
the long-run trend of total demand for new cars. As pointed out above, such 
a plateau emerged in the mid-1920's. Then new car demand became, within 
the framework of the given "normal," peacetime pattern of income flow, 
used-car supply, and average age of cars registered, mainly a function of 
( 1) replacement requirements of a segment of existing car users and (2) 
population growth. These changes meant that a new firm or make would have 
to wrest sales from established brands, a generally more difficult task than 
partially filling a sales vacuum created by a large, unsatisfied demand on the 
part of first-time car owners. 
A second factor was the great growth in both plant- and firm-size. De­
spite the fact that automobile production remained substantially an assembly 
operation, the fixed investment alone became enormous. Where resulting 
overhead costs are very large, as J. M. Clark has pointed out,12 risk in the 
initial investment is an obstacle to free entry of new competitors, limiting 
their possible number and increasing the risk that must be taken. The influ­
ence of this factor in itself may not be decisive, however, in the absence of a 
high concentration of production. But in the case of the low-price class of 
cars in the automobile industry, risk is peculiarly an increasing function of 
scale of production. This relationship inheres in the fact that, with relatively 
constant total demand, a significant share of the market gained by a newcomer 
might well be associated with losses for both itself and established concerns.13 
It is primarily this condition which perpetuates the "gap" between the leaders 
and the independents and makes effective new entry so unlikely. 
The problem of bridging the production (and sales) gap between the 
independents and the big three in the low-price category may be considered 
the decisive factor in the failure of the LaFayette and Terraplane to break 
12 Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, op. cit., p. 146.
13. Cf. in this connection, Kaldor, N., "Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity," Economica,
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into this sector of the market. Even though sales were rising, it was appar­
ently necessary to reach a sales volume in the several hundred thousands in 
order to bring unit costs down to that level at which a return was possible 
from the low-price passenger car. Neither the La Fayette nor the Terraplane 
approached this break-even point at production rates below the 100,000 figure. 
E. A. G. Robinson has generalized such situations in his conclusion that 
"where the gap between the minor and major optima is a wide one, growth 
to the major optimum by expansion from the minor optimum will be 
impossible." 14 
The potential entrant may be repelled by the prospect of losses due to 
failure to achieve sufficient volume to cover costs at going prices. He may 
also be aware that recognition by established sellers of such hazards increases 
the possibility that the latter might for a time relinquish a policy of price 
stability in favor of sharp price reductions aimed directly at the newcomer.15 
This consideration again tends to increase both risk and initial minimum 
investment. 
The possibility of mobilizing such vast sums must be appraised in the 
context of the special characteristics of the contemporary private capital 
market. Although the supply of savings is ample, the market is oligopolistically 
organized, and its members are highly sensitive to the policies of the leading 
houses, many of whom are financially involved with established concerns in 
the automobile and related industries. Moreover, the investment psychology 
of the financial community is undoubtedly a great deal more "security con­
scious" and much less "opportunity conscious" than it was 50 years ago. In 
the absence of adequate supplies of funds from suppliers and dealers during 
the interwar years of automobile history, it  is not difficult, therefore, to 
understand why government loans might become the only feasible source of 
large scale, long-term financing. Such a conclusion is certainly consistent with 
the important role of government funds in the case of the Kaiser enterprise. 
Related to the growth of firm-size and improvement of the product is 
the increasing technical complexity of supplies procurement and assembly 
methods. These developments have also added to the difficulties confronting 
the potential innovator. It is true that they probably operate with greater 
force in the case of the new firm than in the case of the new make marketed 
by a smaller established fabricator.  Nevertheless, the intricate technical 
problems of plant design, continuous production, and related engineering 
research, generally militate against easy entry, just as on the other hand, 
simplicity of fabrication and product facilitate ingress in, for example, many 
of the food processing industries. In the case of the automobile industry, the 
emphasis upon style variation that accompanied the spread of the product 
14 The Structure of Competitive Industry, London: Nisbet and Company, Cambridge University
Press, 1931, p. 24.
15 Cf. Bain, J.  S., Economics of the Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry, Berkeley: University of
California Press, Part II, 1945, p. 193. 76  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
differentiation movement as the industry came of age has also tended to 
increase the complexity of product-design problems in general and "change­
over" costs in particular. 
Product differentiation through sales promotion is itself an additional 
factor tending to erect barriers to entry under such conditions as have been 
present in the automobile market since the 1920's. In general, the larger the 
sums devoted to sales promotion by established firms in a given commodity 
price bracket, the greater will be the expense of creating a niche in the 
market for a new make in that bracket. The importance of this relationship 
is especially great in the low-price, high-volume cars, where the promotional 
effort has been extraordinary. Superior productive efficiency on the part of a 
newcomer, even if attainable, might be unrealizable in sales unless the hurdle 
of demand creation is overcome. 
As the automobile industry achieved its full growth, the effectiveness of 
sales promotion, of course, became integrally connected with the ownership 
or control of a network of marketing and servicing facilities. Both factors 
tended to reinforce each other in their aspects as barriers to ingress. The 
peculiar cogency of the marketing network in this connection is enhanced by 
exclusive dealer arrangements :  entry requires building a vast new structure 
of wholesale and retail outlets. 
A final factor that may be cited for its impact upon the entry problem 
is the differential advantage enjoyed by the leaders in the auto industry by 
virtue of their plant and product diversification in the form of a family of 
cars in several price classes (no reference is made here to product diversifi­
cation extending into entirely different markets). It seems reasonable to 
assume that a potential entrant would, like the established independents, 
be limited at the outset at least to a relatively narrow range of car-types and 
price-classes. In such case, the entrant would lack the advantages of the 
leaders stemming from the tendency of sales promotion for one car to stimu­
late consumer preference for other lines manufactured by the same concern. 
Diversity of price-lines and car-types also makes feasible a broader territorial 
coverage. One reason which has been advanced for the elimination of many 
non-diversified "short-line" companies in the farm implement industry is the 
difficulties of the smaller manufacturers in obtaining broad territorial distri­
bution of their products. 
In addition to the marketing advantages of a family of cars, there are 
also to be considered the cost-savings in the sphere of procurement, fabrica­
tion, and assembly, due to volume purchasing and production of supplies or 
parts which are interchangeable between makes or usable in their raw condi­
tions as materials for all makes and models. This element is more significant 
the more established firms become diversified with respect to penetration into 
other industries. 
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tion,  it seems generally agreed that a number of the "natural" economic 
barriers to new enterprise outlined above are of rather widespread signifi­
cance. The automobile entry experience furnishes empirical foundation for 
some of the hypotheses of these other writers on new business entry. It also 
suggests the existence of certain factors neglected by most ; notably, the rate 
of market growth, technical complexity of processes and products, conditions 
effecting the supply of capital, and the degree of plant, product and industry 
diversification of the leading established concerns. 
The review of entry conditions in this industry also suggests that the 
development of concentrated, diversified oligopolistic industries in recent 
decades may have ushered in a change in the character of business entry in 
American manufacturing. It suggests that new entry in new industries may 
consist largely of commodity-extensions of large firms in other established 
industries ; and that successful, i.e., effective new entry in established indus­
tries may take the form, in the main, of commodity-extensions and price-class 
extensions by established firmsusually by the leaders of the latter group.16 
5.	  SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF ENTRY AFTER WORLD WAR II 
Discussion of the reason for closure of entry in the automobile market 
might well be terminated at this point, principally on the basis of the long-run 
trends exhibited between 1900 and 1940. However, a question may arise as 
to whether developments in the 1940's, particularly the emergence of Kaiser-
Frazer, does not nullify much that already has been said. Specifically, does 
the appearance of this new auto manufacturer refute the thesis that the last 
effective new entrant was the Chrysler Corporation ? If Kaiser-Frazer were 
taken as a case of effective new entry (which is not the case), to what extent 
would it be necessary to qualify the general analysis and industrial signifi­
cance of closed entry conditions in the preceding discussion ? In order to 
advance some tentative answers to these questions, developments in the 1940's 
(latest phase in the industry's evolution) should be reviewed briefly. 
Little need be said regarding entry during the war period itself. The 
performance of the industry from 1946 to 1950 is, for the purpose at hand, 
notable for (1) a rapid growth in output to a peak absolutely higher than any 
previous total (6.6 million passenger units in 1950) ; (2) the gradual return 
of a used-car market ;  (3) an apparently temporary improvement in the 
position of the independents as a group, followed by a return to their tradi­
tional 10 per cent position in 1953 (15 per cent of the total physical output 
in 1949) ;  (4) the return of the leaders to roughly the same relative market 
position with respect to each other which they occupied in the last half of 
the 1930's;17 and (5) the entry of one important new producerthe Kaiser­
16 Cf.,  e.g., Walter F. Crowder, Adolph G. Abramson, and Esther W. Staudt, "The Product
Structures of Large Corporations", in U.S.., Temporary National Economic Committee, The Structure
of Industry, Monograph No. 27, Washington: Government Printing Office,  1941, pp. 668-670. Also,
A. R. Burns, The Decline of Competition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936, p. 420.
17 Shares in 1953 were approximately 48 per cent for General Motors, 23 per cent for Ford,
and 22 per cent for Chrysler. (New York Times, Oct. 4,  1953). 78  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
Frazer enterprise. We shall confine our discussion mainly to the entry of 
Kaiser-Frazer. 
The newcomer attained a 5 per cent position in the industry by 1948, 
suffered a drastic decline to 1.5 per cent in 1949, rose moderately in relative 
standing again in 1950 on the basis of a large absolute increase in sales for 
the industry during that boom year, and was all but out of the passenger 
car business by 1955. Despite this rather erratic record, it is generally ac­
knowledged in the trade that the enterprise scored a remarkable achievement. 
The pertinent question, however, is whether the entry of this firm funda­
mentally qualifies the general analysis of entry presented above. Aside from 
the failure of the newcomer to fulfill our requirement of enduring life-span, 
it can hardly be said that in other regards the entrance of Kaiser-Frazer 
demonstrates the existence of anything approaching free ingress. Neither 
does the general significance of the automobile entry experience for industry 
(as a whole) appear to be basically qualified by this case. 
The entrance of Kaiser-Frazer seems in the main to be the product of 
two circumstances which may in historical perspective still be described as 
atypical ;  (1) certain special postwar economic conditions having a peculiar 
import for this particular industry, and (2) the intervention of the govern­
ment on behalf of the newcomer. 
The automobile market, under the special conditions obtaining after 
World War IT, reproduced temporarily some of the circumstances that were 
characteristic of the period prior to maturity. The going concerns realized 
higher rates of return than the average for all manufacturing, but this, of 
course, has been generally typical of most periods in the history of the auto­
mobile. More important, some of the elements that brought 22 firms into the 
industry at the end of World War I were again to be found in this period. 
Two such elements of considerable significance were the rising price trend 
and the existence of a total demand greatly in excess of supply. In addition, 
certain other factors generated out of wartime expansion in the economy 
tended to re-create a favorable environment for new ingress, and hence call 
for comment. 
The disequilibrium of demand and supply reversed the conditions which 
obtained in the market from the late 1920's to World War II. This was 
undoubtedly basic to the entry of Kaiser. Furthermore, we may consider 
four specific additional elements in the situation conducive to the appearance 
of a concern such as Kaiser : 
(1) A short supply of competing new cars. 
(2) A backlog of unappeased wartime and "reconversion" demand, not 
only for cars in the price-class of this particular entrant, but also in 
the price-classes above and below that. Consumers were consequently 
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case of the Kaiser car above the low-price category), whereas ordi­
narily the market is much more rigidly segmentalized. 
(3) The absence of a "normal" used car market, and the unusually high 
average age of vehicles in use. These factors impelled a similar 
breakdown of market stratification. Buyers who would tend to fall 
into the medium- and high-priced used car market were forced into 
the market for medium-priced new cars since the latter were in many 
cases the only type available. 
(The lack of an adequate supply of used cars was undoubtedly 
also extremely favorable to the creation of a market for foreign 
small cars, "bantam" cars, and the Willys Jeepsters and station 
wagons. Willys may be considered an enterprise exit so far as the 
conventional full-sized car market is concerned.) 
(4) The availability of a variety of relatively inexpensive, wartime in­
dustrial plant and equipment surplus, in peacetime, that was quite 
usable for car manufacture. Almost $1,900,000,000 in production 
facilities usable in peacetime was added to the existing plant and 
equipment of the eleven automobile manufacturers between 1940 
and 1945, an increase of approximately 123 per cent over the value 
of their gross physical capital assets in 1939. 
Through the exploitation of these favorable short-run factors, the Kaiser-
Frazer firm performed a remarkable feat of engineering and enterprise. 
Kaiser exploited the situation fully, aided by highly favorable leases from the 
RFC from 1946 to 1948. He also acquired former aircraft facilities in Cali­
fornia for West Coast operations. In addition to government aid through the 
Willow Run leases, and through lease from the War Assets Administration 
of their very large blast furnace and coke oven plants at Cleveland, he also 
received invaluable financial assistance (notably a $44,000,000 loan in 1929) 
from the RFC directly, after the private capital market had declined to 
finance him.18 
Entrance of Kaiser-Frazer into the industry attests that no industrial 
structure can remain indefinitely rigid. Even taking such entry into account, 
however, the industry fails to exhibit the perpetual influx of new enterprise 
which in conventional economic thinking has been assumed to be characteristic 
of free markets. Only the ebb of older concerns has remained to justify the 
appropriateness of the traditional concepts in this case. 
Evolution in the automobile industry therefore suggests the hypothesis 
that entry conditions in certain types of oligopolies may not be assimilable 
into our theories of free markets. There would seem to be a much higher 
degree of immobility of resources, at least as to the in-movement of resources, 
than is customarily assumed. Furthermore, the emergence of such immobility 
18 Attention should be called to the announcement in 1953, consummated in 1954, of the merger
between Kaiser and Willys (Business Week, March 28, 1953). 80  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
appears entirely possible in the absence of any significant "collusive," delib­
erate, or "artificial" barriers to entry : the barriers are immanent in the very 
structure and modus operandi of markets characterized by fewness, together 
with heavy fixed investment, plateaus in the secular trend of demand, tech­
nical complexity of the product, plant and product diversification, extensive 
marketing and/or servicing facilities, product differentiation, and, in the 
case of the auto industry, retooling for major body changeovers. V
 
STABILIZATION AND DEPENDENT ENTERPRISE: 
THE GLASS CONTAINER INDUSTRY 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 1 
Purpose of the present chapter is to analyse briefly the operation of 
certain important aspects of a representative policy of market stabilization 
in an industry where it reached perhaps the highest point of development 
achieved anywhere in American manufacturing, in the absence of government 
intervention. Our purpose, therefore, is to reorient certain well-known, as 
well as certain neglected, facts about this industry so as to show the position 
of the small-firm segment where a "pattern of protection and privilege" 
(Brady) has been almost fully shaped. We shall also examine the incidence 
of the disruptive impact of the small-firm group upon the evolution of that 
pattern. 
The "glass bottles and jars" industry entered the 20th century technolo­
gically restricted to the use of semiautomatic equipment in wide-mouth ware 
and hand methods in other types of containers. The basic inventions used 
were the Siemans regenerative furnace of 1861 and the continuous melting 
tank of 1872.2 In 1904, on the eve of the revolutionizing Owens automatic 
suction machine for delivering molten glass to the forming unit, approximately 
158 semiautomatic or hand-method establishments, owned by 155 firms, man­
ufactured a total U. S. output of approximately 12,000 thousand gross 
containers.3 
The subsequent two decades were noteworthy for : 
(a) More than 100 per cent growth in total output (to 28,393 thousand 
gross in 1923) ;4 
(b) A drastic net reduction in number of firms, due to the mass elimina­
tion of hand-technique plants and a policy of restrictive licensing on 
suction feeders pursued by the Owens Bottle Company. This limited 
expansion of established firms, and ingress of new ones contributed 
to the rise of Owens to the position of leading producer ; 
(c) Solidifying of the competitive opposition to the monopolistic exploi­
tation of the Owens feeder patent ; 
1 For the general features of this industry, see an interesting discussion by R. L. Bishop, "The
Glass Container Industry", in Adams, Walter, The Structure of American Industry, New York :
MacMillan, 1950.
2 U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity of Labor in the Glass Industry. Bulletin No. 441.
July, 1927, pp. 3-5.
3 Ibid.,  p.  15; U.S., Temporary National Economic Committee. Hearings. Patents: automotive
industry, glass container industry. Part 2. Washington, 1939, p.  755. 
4 Productivity of Labor in the Glass Industry, op. cit., p.  15. 
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(d) The consequent discovery, in 1918, of an alternative patented (gob 
feeding)  method, and  its  acquisition by the Hartford-Empire 
Company, a patent holding company,5 and 
(e) The competitive conflict between Owens and Hartford, leading to 
their historic agreement of 1924 to stabilize the industry. 
In spite of a 100 per cent expansion in total output, and very favorable 
rates of return, the glass container market was not populated with a multitude 
of small concerns. The characteristic elimination of outmoded units attendant 
upon the late industrial revolution in glass containers was not compensated 
by an influx of new enterprises, because control of completely automatic 
methods was restrictively exploited by the controlling firm, which is also the 
largest manufacturer. Entry was limited from the outset. In consequence, the 
great growth in the market was accompanied by a net decrease of plants to 
102, and of firms to 80, by 1920.6 
The decisive decade and a half which followed is marked by the absence 
of a clear secular growth in total output. It will be recalled that the latter 
stood at 28,393 thousand gross in 1923. Thereafter a gap in the data appears 
until 1928, when total shipments had risen to only 31,943 thousand gross.' 
The 1929 output of 35,686 thousand gross was not again reached until it was 
exceeded slightly in 1934, with 35,797 thousand gross manufactured. Subse­
quently the industry again entered an expansion period, and output amounted 
to 51,227 thousand gross in 1939.8 Thus, although the true secular trend for 
the entire period is upwards, the years to be discussed below, in which the 
stabilization policy was crystallized, were notable for a relatively slow growth. 
The same period, following World War I, also witnessed the emergence 
of excess capacity in the industry. Production was 72.6 per cent of capacity 
in 1926.9 By 1928, shipments of approximately 32,000 thousand gross were 
made by an industry with a capacity of some 47,000 thousand gross." This was 
partly due to the fact technical progress is so rapid in the field of glass factory 
equipment. It has been estimated that, on the average, equipment becomes 
obsolete every third year.11 Despite all efforts by concerns in the industry to 
5 Hartford-Empire was the product of a merger in 1922 of the Empire Machine Company, a
patent holding company controlled by the Corning Glass Works, manufacturer of optical, heat-resistant
and other "pressed and blown ware," and the Hartford-Fairmont Company, manufacturer of glass­
ware machinery and developer of the (Peiler) gob-feed method.
6 TNEC, Hearings, Glass container industry, op. cit., 805. 
7  Ibid., pp. 821-22. Shipments probably run slightly less than output totals, but the latter are
not available for all years.
Commodity Research Bureau, Commodities in Industry, 1940, New York, 1940, pp. 290-291.
During World War II, due to the shortage of metals, the glass container industry enjoyed a phenomenal
expansion in  sales.  Production in  1940 totalled 52,116 thousand gross; using the same year as a
base, the 1944 output index stood at 200 (Glass Packer, October, 1947, p. 749.)
9 U.S., National Recovery Administration. The Glass Container Industry,  Statistical Materials 
Series No. 36, pp. 6-8.
10 Testimony of E. G. Ackerman, assistant business manager of the Glass Container Association;
the trade organization for the industry, at NRA hearings. U.S., National Recovery Administration.
Hearings on the Code of Fair Competition for the Glass Container Industry. Hearing No. 205, August
20, 1933, p. 29.
11 Seidler, G., "Allocation of production in the glass container industry" Report for the NRA,
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effect a policy of capacity control, chronic plant excess plagued this market 
throughout the entire period from 1920 to World War II. Average operation 
from 1928 to 1938 was at about 55 per cent of active capacity (i.e., capacity 
which can be put into full operation immediately, or within 30 days).12 The 
policy regarding surplus capacity pursued by those with controlling power 
in this industry may throw some light upon economic behavior in other lines 
less favored by the facilitating element of a patent monopoly. 
The glass container industry is characterized furthermore by the presence 
of moderately high overhead costs. This is suggested by the census data. 
Wages in 1939 accounted for 21.5 per cent of value of product, and raw 
materials, fuel, etc. for approximately 38 per cent of value of product's This 
puts glass containers in the group of medium labor-cost industries and be­
tween low and medium "raw materials" costs industries according to the 
Alderfer and Michl classification.14 While this is a very crude measure of 
overhead costs, it is clear that the cost structure of the glass container industry 
places it in a group with relatively high overhead and relatively substantial 
investments in fixed assets. 
We are dealing, then, with an industry whose modern technique has 
emerged late enough to call it a 20th century industry. It is one characterized 
by significant overhead costs for the firm, industry excess capacity, and, 
during the period of evolution of its stabilization policy, from 1924 to 1935, 
a mild expansion in total market demand. 
2. SMALL ENTERPRISE: A DEFINITION 
The study of the glass container market will be treated largely as a study 
in the evolution of a policy of industrial stabilization with particular attention 
to its incidence upon, and implications for, the status of a small manufac­
turing enterprise. As is now well known, this policy was constructed around a 
system of patent rights. It is the interpretation herein developed that the 
patent network was not the outstanding feature from the viewpoint of the 
evolution of structure and policy, or for the incidence of the latter upon 
small enterprise; rather, the patent control arrangements are viewed as a 
means of implementing policies which emanated from the economic conditions 
inhering in the modus operandi of the industry itself. Such an interpretation 
seems entirely consistent with the record of the preceding industries in the 
present study. The latter exhibit many basic trends similar to those in glass 
container. The existence of tightly held patent privileges in glass container 
functions primarily to sharpen and accentuate industrial behavior patterns 
that tend in other markets to lack such clear outlines. On these grounds the 
study of this industry crystallizes and summarizes many of the problems of 
the smaller manufacturers as surveyed in butter, flour, and automobile. 
12 TNEC Hearings, Glass container industry, op. cit., pp. 803, 817.
13 Computed from Statistical Abstract of the United States,  1946,  p.  831.
14 Alderfer, E. B. and Michl, H. E., Economics of American Industry: New York, 1942, pp.
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The relevant history of the small firm in glass container  is  pre­
eminently the history of its conflict with the policy of stabilization as pursued' 
by the leading factors in the industry. The latter emerged as Owens and 
Hartford-Empire following the agreement between the two in 1924; and 
their policy union was formally expanded to include the second largest pro­
ducer, Hazel-Atlas Glass Company in July, 1932, and Ball Brothers, largest 
producer of fruit jars, in March, 1933.15 Two additional firms, Thatcher 
Manufacturing Company and Anchor Hocking Glass Corporation, may also 
be added to those prominent in the stabilization movement. Hence, the oligo­
polistic core is composed of six firms : five container manufacturers and one 
patent holding company. This core was already established in the industry 
prior to the rise of the stabilization movement and continued throughout the 
entire subsequent period. Owens dates from 1907; Hazel-Atlas from the 
Atlas Glass and Metal Company, 1901; Thatcher from 1905 ; Anchor Hock­
ing from the Hocking Glass Company, organized in 1905 and merged with 
Anchor Cap Corporation in 1928; Ball Brothers from 1882; and Hartford 
Empire from 1922, although both Hartford-Fairmont and the Empire Ma­
chine Company antedate this merger. 
"Small enterprise" in the industry is in general composed of (1) pros­
pective entrants who were refused licenses to engage in glass container 
production ;76 (2) the 28 firms which were consolidated with other companies, 
primarily through acquisition by the oligopoly group, between 1920 and 
1938; (3) the 29 companies that found it impossible to operate under the 
monopolistic conditions in the industry during these years, and were forced 
to leave the market ; and (4) the approximately 36 dependent firms which 
remained through the years of conflict to disturb, but occasionally embrace, 
the stability movement nurtured by the dominant factors. This totals 93 active 
commercial producers, plus an unknown number of potential entrants. 
3.	  STABILIZATION, SUPPRESSION OF ENTRY, AND DEPENDENT ENTERPRISE 
The Hartford-Owens agreement of April 9, 1924 was the product of the 
recognition that the interests of stability could not possibly be furthered, and 
that the almost complete destruction of the asset values of the two concerns 
might result, unless the rivalry between them over the licensing of patented 
machinery was amicably terminated. In the years preceding the settlement of 
1924, the two concerns engaged in a race to secure control of gob-feeding 
15 U.S. v. Hartford-Empire Co.  et  al. No. 4426, D.C., N.D. Ohio, W.D., Aug. 25,  1942, pp.
26-29, 40-47, 59-67. Hereinafter cited as "Civil Action No. 4426."
16 The Glass Container Association, in  its  report to the TNC alleged that 22 new companies
had entered the industry between 1920 and 1938 (Hearings, op. cit., p. 805). However, the Government,
in  its brief against the leading concerns, averred that no newcomers had "been admitted into the
industry during the entire existence of" the Hartford-Empire Company. In rebuttal, attorneys for the
latter claimed only that it had licensed two newcomers, Northwestern and Diamond, during that period
(after  1922).  (U.S., Federal Supplement, vol.  46, No.  4,  pp.  541-622, October 26,  1942, p 552.
Hereinafter cited as "Fed. Sup. Vol. 46.")  If the Government and Hartford-Empire are correct,
formation of Hartford-Empire marks the cessation of effective entry, since Owens probably did not
license a newcomer after 1914 (U.S., Temporary National Economic Committee, Technology in our
Economy, Research Monograph No. 22, Washington, 1941, p. 215), and certainly did not after 1918.
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patents and inventions, and the manufacture and licensing of machinery 
under such patents. But compulsion towards stabilization was too strong, and 
negotiations between them looking toward a cooperative resolution of the 
struggle began in 1919. 
In a memorandum by H. K. Smith of Hartford, summarizing a confer­
ence between the two firms, dated December 23, 1921, the conflict between a 
policy of stabilization and the entry of a multitude of small new competitors 
was sharply delineated :17 
The Owens Company were now making a third attempt to get some solution 
of a very serious situation .  .  .  if they did not succeed in doing so, they would 
have to fight over the entire field to a general finish, by all proper means .  .  . 
(in which case) ­
a.  Either the Owens Company would result in dominating the entire glass 
industry, or 
b. The . .. industry would be thrown wide open on a purely competitive basis 
with no considerable patent protection for anyone, and any "farmer" could take 
up this cheap method and go into the glass business .  .  . 
.  .  .  however,  .  .  .  as long as Owens and Hartford continue to fight each 
other, the so-called "outside" feeders will continue to operate and increase in 
number, with all their destructive effect on the stability of the industry .  .  . 
Small enterprise is identified, as is a many-firm market structure, with 
the destabilizing force of competition, notably with respect to freedom of 
entry. An extract from a letter written during the negotiations period (on 
February 15, 1921) from F. Goodwin Smith of Hartford to E. M. Ashcraft 
of the Illinois Glass Company, stated : 
Owens felt that if no one controlled the gob feed method, the whole field 
would be open to a number of feeders which would unstabilize the general trade,
and that our licensees would be thrown into competition with a lot of small
factories that could get Howard or Miller feeders on a 5¢ or 6¢ royalty 
rate .  .  .18 
Stabilization might require the exercise of the entire organized economic 
resources of the two concerns, with Owens the active agent, against "price­
cutters" both medium or small: 
.  .  . there should be  .  .  . some concern  like Owens .  .  .  to force a stable 
price policy upon all important producers ; that if Owens, by the plan as above
suggested, had the free use of its own suction feed and the free use of the 
gob feed it could then go to any other producer who threatened to cut prices 
and unstabilize the market and inform him that such a policy was detrimental, 
but that if the outsider persisted in doing so Owens had a sufficient margin,
by reason of its free use of both devices, so that if necessary it could come 
out on top in a price war and still make money .  .  .19 
17 Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., pp. 557-559.
18 Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit.,  pp. 559-560. Some years after the stabilization program had been
in operation, Owens calculated that "stabilization (was) worth several hundred thousand dollars a
year." (Ibid., pp. 566-567).
19 Memorandum by H. K. Smith of Hartford, January 17, 1922, paraphrasing statement by J. C.
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Professor J. M. Clark has argued that new entrants bear a double threat to 
established enterprises.20 It may be inferred that the threat is most potent in 
cases where the latter operate under the constraint of high overhead costs 
and a relatively stagnant secular trend of market demand. In the first place, 
the new concerns are likely to possess superior techniques, making it possible 
for them to cut prices. In the second place, if they do not cut prices, the 
industry may in any event suffer from augmentation of its excess capacity. 
It appears that the competing Howard feeder, among others, represented just 
such a threat at this time in the industry's evolution and in the progress of 
the Hartford-Owens negotiations. "Howard has a going business and a feeder 
which can compete with ours unless properly shut up," wrote V. M. Dorsey, 
patent counsel for Corning and Hartford on April 12, 1922.21 The use of 
such feeders by new or established small concerns to cut prices illustrates one 
aspect of Professor Clark's formulation of the conventional argument. Thus, 
F. Goodwin Smith, an officer and director of Hartford, expressed the convic­
tion that "the Howard feeder was sufficiently good to upset trade conditions 
in general, inasmuch as the feeder when operated by the smaller glass con­
cerns would permit the small concerns to continue to exist and at the same 
time quote prices which would be detrimental to the general trade  .  .  . "22 
The objectives of stabilization were inimical to the continued existence 
of small enterprise, partly because the latter were subversive of the going 
price structure. The identification of competitive pricing, with a market 
structure containing many small producers, placed the suppression of entry 
in the forefront of Hartford's historic policy of stabilization from the incep­
tion of its commercial expansion period in 1917. It gave rise to its practice, 
along with Owens, of restrictive licensing and refusal to license. 
.  .  .  if we put out these machines  .  .  . without restriction, we would dis­
organize the whole industry which was then divided into a large number of 
small units and most of these manufacturers would not be able to refrain from 
using practically all the savings produced by these machines in fighting with each
other 
We licensed the machines only to selected manufacturers of the better
type, refusing many licenses whom we thought would be price-cutters, and 
.  .  . We restricted their fields of manufacture in each case, to certain specific
articles, with the idea of preventing too much competition  .  .  .23 
Refusal to license continued to be the chief instrument for stifling new 
entry into the industry. 
Since the existence of competing feeders in 1922 (notably those of 
Howard, Miller, and Federal, in addition to Owens) was a basis for continued 
entry of smaller competitors, it became necessary to eliminate this potentially 
disturbing factor in the related machinery manufacturing line. An organized 
20 Clark, J.  M., Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, Chicago, 1923, p.  546. Cf.  also, Buchanan, N. S., The Economics of Corporate Enterprise, New York, 1940, pp. 340-341.
21 Fed Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., p. 557.
22 Ibid., p. 563. Statement to the Hartford Executive Committee at a meeting on May 18, 1921.
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campaign to accomplish this was begun in 1922 by Owens and Hartford­
Empire.24 
The second largest producer, Hazel-Atlas had already begun to follow a 
stabilization policy as early as 1923.23 Impetus for engrossment of the feeder 
machine line was given partial expression by one official of Owens, who 
writes with reference to the Miller machine :  "It is fatuous to believe that 
glass manufacturers are going to continue to pay royalties in the face of 
competition which pays no royalty and yet has the use of such a successful 
feeder  .  . 
26 
By the end of 1925, Hartford owned or controlled all the feeder right,, 
which these various companies possessed.27 A similar process of engrossment 
of independent machinery manufacturers occurred with respect to the items 
of equipment used in the industry, in particular, other suction machines, 
forming machines and annealing lehrs.28 Ancillary manufacturing in this case 
directly threatened the structure and functioning of the small-plant, scattered, 
and easily accessible raw-material industry which it served. Complete en­
grossment, implemented by patent power, was the policy pursued. 
Within the industry proper, the protection of manufacturers' asset values 
and the royalty incomes of the Hartford-Empire Company required coordina­
tion of the capacity and output totals for the industry. As basic price determi­
nants, and through these, profit ratios, capacity and output absorbed much of 
the attention of the dominant oligopoly during the whole period of stabiliza­
tion. This aspect of the problem of achieving stability bears upon both the 
control of entry and the subordination of established small enterprise to the 
dependent status which it ultimately occupied. Like Owens, Hartford early 
dedicated itself to "the general principle of preventing over plant-investment 
24 "  .  .  therefore the Howard situation and possibly the Federal must be appraised and pro­
vision made for controlling them by successful suit and bringing the users in as sources of income,
or, failing a control by successful suit, by purchase on a fifty-fifty basis, to which purchase I think
Owens must be positively committed." (Ibid., p.  561, communication by A. D. Falck of Corning to
F. Goodwin Smith, April 25, 1922.) ".  .  .  as each of our companies, Hartford-Empire and Owens,
have something on the Federal Company, the best strategy is for our two companies to go against
Federal in unison. This  .  .  .  cuts out the chance of the Federal Company playing one of us off
against the other  .  this,  if carried out successfully with Federal,  is  the one procedure which
will promptly and completely stabilize the situation and stop the very serious Miller advance." (Ibid.,
p. 562, minutes of an Executive Committee meeting of Hartford, April 19, 1923.)  .  . 
"Users of Miller feeders to be sued for infringement by Hartford with agreement (i.e., with Owens)
that they either be stopped or certain ones be allowed to continue to use Miller feeders at higher rates
of royalty than Hartford is now asking." (Ibid., p. 563; memorandum by F. Goodwin Smith, April
27, 1923.)
25 "To my inquiry as to whether we could rely on Hazel-Atlas going with us in this policy, their
answer was in the affirmative  .  .  . Mr. Owens quoted statements of Mr. J. C. Brady which would lead
to the conclusion that the Hazel-Atlas Company would rather pay royalties for the use of its plug feeders,
than to have the field open, quoting him further as saying that they would, if necessary, return to the
flow feeder for their line of ware in case the royalty situation became too onerous." (Ibid., pp. 563­
564, memorandum by H. W. Carter of Owens, Nov. 7, 1923.)
26 Ibid., p. 564. Letter from H. W. Carter of Owens to W. H. Boshart of Owens, August 23, 1924.
27 Howard realized "something ought to be done to stabilize the trade" and was "willing to con­
sider any proposition that gave the stockholders a reasonable return and did not destroy the prestige
which he and his company had obtained," according to a memorandum by F. Goodwin Smith on April
25, 1922.  (Ibid.,  p.  563). It is difficult to determine whether this attitude involved a willingness to
stabilize, or coercion. Howard was engrossed by outright purchase through the Beech-Nut Packing
Company, one of the original organizers of Hartford (Ibid., p. 557). Both Miller and Federal were
also purchased. Hartford and Owens shared in the purchase price of each, $145,000, for Miller and
$1,600,000 for Federal.  (Ibid.  p.  564). Nearly all users of these machines, usually under suit for
infringement, eventually became Hartford licenses. (Ibid., p. 549),
29 Civil Action No. 4426, op. cit., pp. 30-31, 51-52. 88  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
and over-production, as well as keeping the licenses out of the hands of 
objectionable and irresponsible parties  .  .  ."29 
The appropriate perspective with regard to small enterprise, when the 
achievement of industrial stabilization is the objective, was stated by a Hart­
ford official (H. K. Smith) while the Hartford-Owens negotiations were 
in progress : 
.  .  . there is also involved in this general question, the question as to what is 
to be done with the outsiders when dominated. How many shall be allowed to 
survive and at what price? 30 
The policy represented in a statement such as this brings out an aspect 
of the status of small enterprise which has not previously been discussed in 
this analysis. Given the institutional framework of the American anti-trust 
laws, and the public hostility toward "monopoly," the maintenance of a fringe 
of smaller units tends to become a part of the high strategy of oligopoly. 
"Under the present trust laws in the United States, it is natural for large 
scale business to permit a fringe of competition to survive, some of which 
they have the economic power to extinguish. They may use this power if 
provoked, and the weaker producers know it." 31 It may be recalled that 
during the International Harvester case in the early 1920's, the company took 
pains to stress that "the number of new manufacturers established  .  .  .  for 
the production of the more important implements was about equal to the 
number withdrawn from the industry," and that "new firms did not enter a 
field they believed to be closed against them, or from which they have seen 
other firms eliminated by impossible conditions." 32 This same consciousness 
of the necessity for representing an industry as structurally competitive or 
as possessing the entry conditions associated with such structure, can be 
inferred from the surprising averment by the Glass Container Association 
that "22 new companies" entered the industry between 1920 and 1938. The 
dominant concerns may thus favor the preservation of a certain limited 
number of dependent smaller producers. 
It was of course recognized by the stabilization group in the glass con­
tainer industry that the existence of too many producers would make the 
task of private economic planning of entry, capacity, plant expansion, output 
and price a difficult one. The matter of "how many shall be allowed to 
survive" was taken up, with the patent as a facilitating instrument, soon after 
the Hartford-Owens agreement of 1924. 
The complex of economic motivation which forced the policy amalgama­
tion between the two firms, and the business objectives embodied in that 
settlement, were outlined in a memorandum by H. K. Smith in April 1922: 
29 Fed. Sup., vol. 46, op. cit., p. 568. (Memorandum of H. K. Smith, April 21, 1922).
30 Ibid. Smith was at that time Secretary, General Counsel, and a Director of Hartford.
31 Clark, J. M., Overhead Costs, op. cit., p. 440.
32 Burns, A. R., Decline of Competition, op. cit., p. 114. 89  STABILIZATION AND DEPENDENT ENTERPRISE 
.  .  . the commercial considerations, involved in  considering either our agreement 
or a conflict between Owens and Hartford-Fairmont, are of greater importance 
than the relative patent values controlled by the two companies. By "commercial 
considerations" is meant the domination of outside feeders, the stabilization of 
the industry tending against irresponsible price-cutting ; the general cooperation 
between the gob and suction processes for an orderly development of the two 
side by side, such as will be most beneficial to the interest of the two companies 
and to the industry ; and finally the steadying influence that will be established 
in the machine side of the industry by a recognized cooperation between the two 
companies .  .  . 
That "commercial" factors, rather than patent considerations, were the 
underlying forces in the development of stabilizationa fact which thereby 
gives the history of this industry greater significance for industry as a 
wholeis indicated, not only by the above memorandum but also the inclu­
sion in the 1924 agreement of the statement that "the undersigned believe it 
is for the interest of both companies to mutually disclose, consider and settle 
any overlapping or conflicting matters of inventions that may arise between 
the companies, even though such overlapping or conflicting matters may be 
outside the field of licensed inventions .  .  ."34 Owens pressed for high royalty 
rates primarily to build up a revolving fund for "coordinating" the recalci­
trant, smaller producers.35 Drawing upon raised royalty rates for both Owens 
and Hartford licensees, the latter were thus designed to finance their own 
demise, unless they relinquished their seller independence. The policy of 
Owens and Hartford was to "cooperate actively in attacking the outsiders, 
sharing equally in the expenses, including cost of buying out outsiders  .  .  ." 36 
Thus, small enterprise receives definition. 
4. CAPACITY CONTROL AND DEPENDENT SMALL ENTERPRISE 
The construction of the capacity control program was therefore a multi­
lateral task. Prevention of the entrance of new capacity was one means. 
Elimination of independent firms was another. The equipment of some of 
these may well have been obsolete and "inefficient." "Weak producers must 
be absorbed, even though their plants prove useless and are closed down." 37 
The problem of efficiency is not a matter for elaboration here, but on 
the basis of consumer-oriented criteria,  it  is doubtful if the benefits of 
monopolistic "innovation," following Schumpeter's line of argument, can 
be very easily demonstrated in this industry. It is true that the acquisition of 
inefficient plants by, e.g., Owens, may have in some cases removed such 
equipment from active production. But the cost of such acquisition, paid in 
the first instance by the industries purchasing container ware, must allow for 
consideration of the royalty system, the maintenance by the leading firms of 
33 Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., p. 561.
34 Ibid., p. 564.
35 Ibid., p. 560. Memorandum by F. Goodwin Smith of Hartford, January 24, 1922.
36 Ibid.,  p.  560. Minutes of an Executive Committee meeting of Hartford, April 19, 1922.
37 Clark, J. M., Overhead Costs, op.  cit.,  p.  144. It may very well be that in many industries
where technical progress is relatively rapid, the small enterprise segment holds the bulk of the obsolete
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large idle, stand-by capacity, and the effect of the suppression of competing 
producers, upon price. As one writer has reasoned, "If such giant corpora­
tions as General Electric and the Hartford Empire Company ride to market 
on efficiency alone, why have they been so concerned with barricading them­
selves against the invasion of competitors ? The existence of such careful 
programs to impose license and other handicaps upon small producers raises a 
presumption against claims for efficiency." 38 
The industry has been able to show a secular decline in price, but evi­
dence for testing the extent to which the savings of improvements have been 
passed on, is lacking. Capital-saving innovations, particularly in the field of 
furnace construction and utilization, with the special advantage of reducing 
costs without increase of production, have been made.39 But the high profita­
bility of the leading concerns, among other things, suggests a faulty trans­
ference of lowered production costs into price." An industry which super­
imposes a monopoly policy of stabilization upon an oligopolistic structure has 
the weight of theory against its claims to efficiency. 
Schumpeter's line of reasoning does not seem borne out in this case. 
At the time of the NRA code discussions the oligopoly center proposed that 
smaller producers place a ceiling on their rate of operations lower than had 
obtained in practice among the latter.41 The policy of eliminating price com­
petition, the maintenance of a system of price leadership by lines of ware, 
and the organized frustration of inventiveness on the part of "outsiders," 42 
further indicate that economic advance may more appropriately be identified 
in this industry with the smaller container manufacturer than with the pro­
ponents of stabilization. 
The reduction and control of capacity via the method of acquisition and 
merger, not unique in this industry, explains in great part the net reduction 
in number of concerns. Twelve firms went bankrupt during the years under 
review." Much of the plant acquired from bankrupt or absorbed companies 
by the larger concerns was dismantled, but a substantial proportion  was also 
held by them for either stand-by purposes or in order to secure a larger quota 
under the production control scheme fostered by the leading firms." Under 
this plan, production allocations made to each producer were based  upon his 
proportionate holdings of the total capacity in the industry. 
Another method used by Hartford to limit total capacity was to prevent 
small producer plant expansion. This was effected typically by stipulations 
in the licensing agreements for the use of the Hartford-owned machinery ; 
38 Brown, P. L., The Economics of Small Business Enterprise. Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio State Uni­
versity, 1944, p. 174.
39 Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., pp. 555-56.
40 For data on profitability of leading concerns and of the industry, cf. Civil Action No. 4426,
op. cit., pp. 75-77; TNEC Hearings, op. cit., p. 798; Moody's Industrials, 1947, pp. a14-a15; Fortune,
April 1932, p. 70.
41 Hearings on the NRA Code, op.  cit.,  pp. 67-70. Also Article VII of the Code as originally
prepared.
42 Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., pp. 577-613.
43 TNEC Hearings, op. cit., pp. 806-09.
44 Civil Action No. 4426, op. cit., p. 71. 91  STABILIZATION AND DEPENDENT ENTERPRISE 
and is an important aspect of the dependent status of the small producer in 
this industry. It is impossible to speak of enterprise autonomy in the absence 
of discretion regarding plant expansion, a problem which is readily assumed 
away in the context of a theoretical overemphasis upon the short-run deter­
mination of price and output for the individual firm. 
By restricting the number of feeding machines to a licensee, Hartford 
prevented many of its licensees from expanding their businesses into various 
parts of the United States.45 Many concerns were refused permission to 
branch out into the production of additional lines of ware. Such a case was 
the Three Rivers Glass Company, Hartford licensee, and a "price-cutter." 
The firm ventured to inaugurate production of a line of fruit jars in violation 
of its license with Hartford as well as an agreement of March, 1933 between 
Ball Brothers and Hartford. The latter repeatedly sent notices to Three 
Rivers to drop this commodity-extension. Thereafter, in 1936, Ball acquired 
the patents of this smaller competitor and then closed down its plant." 
Hartford refused a license in July, 1933 to C. H. Hubbard to manufacture 
fruit jars. Again, in 1933, it refused a license to one, Pine, who had con­
sidered acquisition of the plant of the Interstate Glass Co. in order to expand 
into the production of the same line of ware. Hartford stated that "Ball 
Brothers are not anxious to have a new competitor springing up beside 
them." 47 
Expansion ceilings were placed upon other small producers in the form 
of limits in licensing contracts upon the total number of units that might be 
produced. No licensee of Hartford was permitted to produce all types of 
glass-ware on machines licensed from 4.48 The Sterling Glass Company was 
limited to the manufacture of 30,000 gross beer bottles and 10,000 gross of 
food condiment bottles per year.49 Brockway Machine Bottle Company, one 
of the more "cooperative-minded" concerns, was limited to the production 
of 250,000 gross of widemouthed food containers per annum.5° Among the 
licensees authorized to manufacture milk bottles, e.g., the Florida Glass Man­
ufacturing Company, similar output ceilings were stipulated." Many small 
firms were similarly restricted, as to their discretion to expand, by license 
requirements stipulating either the customers to whom their products might 
be sold (Knox, Gayner, Latchford, Maryland, Laurens, Clean, Maywood, 
and Chattanooga) or the territory in which they might sell (Northeastern)." 
These cases show in sharpest form how free enterprise was superseded by 
dependent enterprise in this industry. 
Rivalry between the leading oligopoly and its small-firm appendages was 
45 Civil Action No. 4426, op. cit., p. 78.
46 Ibid., p. 65.

47 Ibid., p. 66.

48 Ibid., p. 79.

49 Ibid., p. 83.

50 Ibid., p. 85.

51 Ibid., P. 57.
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not always quite so one-sided as the above licensing arrangements might 
suggest. Conflict broke out more openly, as it did in the case of flour milling, 
over the excess capacity issue. At the time of the NRA, much evidence came 
to light regarding efforts of leading firms to suppress the competitive poten­
tial represented in plant capacity under control of smaller producers. The 
capacity program in the industry's code resembled closely that of many other 
industries having similar structures and problems, but, in such programs, 
patent factors are minor or nonexistent. The capacity and production code 
provisions in glass containers were almost identical with those in the cement 
industry." 
The excess capacity situation in glass containers has been likened to that 
which obtains in textiles, dresses and soft coal, largely because of the easy 
entry conditions that would exist in the absence of institutional impediments." 
The stabilization program of the dominant oligopoly and its trade organ­
ization, the Glass Container Association, had not succeeded in eliminating the 
threat of excess capacity. In 1933 the total output of the industry was 34,826 
thousand gross, whereas total capacity amounted to 63,000 thousand gross.55 
It is estimated that the industry as a whole operated at only 60 per cent of 
capacity." Of course, this low ratio by no means can be attributed entirely to 
the ineffectiveness of the stabilization program, for the industry had suffered 
a severe setback from prohibition, followed by depression. On the other 
hand, a high percentage of the excess plant was held for "quota" purposes by 
the dominant group, and in such role actually reflected the degree of success 
of that stabilization program. This latter aspect of the excess capacity situa­
tion warrants further analysis. 
5.  PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND INTERGROUP QUOTA RIVALRY 
One authority on the industry pointed out that in 1933 "almost all of 
the idle productive capacity is in the hands of the three or four largest firms, 
while the great majority of small firms work at full practicable capacity." " 
When a group of investors, former glass container producers, attempted 
to rebuild and equip part of the plant of the Northern Glass Works Company, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, after several years of idleness due to prohibition, it 
petitioned the Glass Container Association for assistance and was told that 
"if there was a new glass works starting in Milwaukee the Owens-Illinois 
Company would start it, as they now have thirty shut-down obsolete factories, 
and surely would not see anyone else get started in this rich territory.58 From 
the standpoint of direct cost-profit relationships, this condition was a dis­
53 U.S. National Recovery Review Board, Second Report to the President of the United States,
Washington, no date, pp. 14-16.
54 TNEC Monograph No. 31, op. cit., p. 114.
55 NRA, Hearings, op. cit., p. 29; and Statistical Materials No. 36, op. cit., p. 9.
56 NRA, Statistical Materials No. 36, op. cit., pp. 6-8.
57 Seidler, "Allocation of Production, etc.", op. cit., pp. 22-23.
58 NRA Hearings, op.  cit.,  pp. 56-58. Letter of Mr. M. V. Dahinden to Hon. R. J. Cannon,
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tinctly disadvantageous one for the largest concerns, and one important 
purpose of the capacity provisions of the NRA code was to rectify it. On 
the other hand, it was the product of the long-run perspective of excess 
capacity control that had guided the stabilization group, and also was a nec­
essary premise for their retention of high output quotas under the production 
allocation plan. As mentioned above, according to the latter arrangement, 
which "was in operation years before N.R.A.," 59 the proportion of the 
industry's total anticipated demand for a coming period allotted to a particular 
firm was based upon its proportionate holdings of the total capacity. By 
buying up plant capacity, therefore, the leading concerns accomplished three 
aims :  (1) they removed such plant from control by potential price-cutters ; 
(2) they acquired production quota for the fulfillment of "ordinary" demand ; 
and (3) they put themselves in an advantageous position to exploit any 
unexpected increase in total demand. This practice is by no means unique, 
for, as Professor J. M. Clark has pointed out, "the early history of the trust 
movement furnished glaring instances of combines overloading themselves 
with plants which were burdens rather than assets." 6° But in the conditions 
existing in the glass container industry they were clearly not an unmixed 
burden. It was precisely the burdensome aspect of excess capacity, i.e., the 
fact that the largest producers held the greater portion of it (accounting for a 
higher percentage of total excess capacity than of total production), which 
the NRA code was designed to set right. 
Let us bring together the various aspects of the complex capacity issue, 
in order to summarize their differential impact upon the leading producers 
and the small firms : 
(1) The large enterprises held the great bulk of the idle and obsolete 
capacity; i.e., a more than proportionate share. 
(2) Looked at industry-wise, production was normally substantially less 
than capacity. 
(3) The program of the leading concerns demanded that each corporate 
unit operate its "available plant" at a stipulated ratio to capacity (a 
ceiling). This would have different effects upon the large and the 
small firms, as follows : 
(a) The small, one-plant firms would have to operate their plants 
at the stipulated utilization ceilings. This would have meant re­
ducing their rate of operation in many cases. 
(b) The large, multiplant firms would operate their active plants at 
full capacity rates, thus enjoying lower unit-costs, and no re­
duction in rate of operation of those active plants. Their excess, 
or unutilized capacity, would exist in the form of other idle­
59 Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., p. 587. Communication of G. F. Riemann of Capstan Glass Company,
July 3, 1935. Riemann was a member of the strategic "Statistical Committee" of the Glass Container
Association. 
60 Clark, J. M., Overhead Costs, op. cit., pp. 144-145. 94  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
stand-by or dismantled plants.61 The more a large firm possessed 
of the latter, the higher its production quota, and therefore the 
more fully-active plants it could enjoy. 
The code committee of the Glass Container Association, which proposed 
and submitted the code to the NRA, was composed of five individuals, of 
which three  represented the dominant oligopoly groupOwens-Illinois, 
Hazel-Atlas, and Thatcher. The code emphasized in its controversial Article 
VII the existence of excess capacity in the industry. The proposed code 
stated in "Schedule A" that the "principle of sharing the available business 
equitably between the various members of the industry" would have to be 
recognized so long as "the industry is operating below 80 per cent of 
capacity." 62 The final code enunciated the same principle, so long as the 
industry was "operating below 70 per cent of yearly registered capacity," and 
"not to restrict production but to maintain a reasonable balance between 
production and consumption of glass containers and to secure adequate 
supplies thereof." 63 On the basis of a six-day, rather than the customary 
seven-day operating week in this necessarily continuous furnace-production 
industry, a Code Authority, chosen on a capacity-voting arrangement,  was, 
according to the final code, to 
.  .  . from time to time, but not less frequently than each six months, prepare 
an estimate of expected consumption of glass containers. Upon the basis of 
such estimate the Code Authority shall make equitable allocations to each mem­
ber in the Industry in accordance with the plan so approved  .  .  . After such 
allotments have been assigned, no person shall produce glass containers in 
excess of his allotment.64 
Recognition was to be extended to "the greater difficulties to be met by 
the smaller producers in the industry in operating on a controlled basis"  as a 
result of the functioning of this code.65 
The differential impact of the capacity and production ceiling provisions 
of the code, in the framework of the strategy being pursued by the oligopo­
listic center, was brought to light at the hearings. Two complainants from the 
related machinery and equipment industry appeared at the hearings, with  a 
joint statement. One was the Amster- Morton Co., lehr manufacturers ; the 
other the H. L. Dixon Co., engineers and contractors specializing in furnace 
construction for the independent producers. This statement in part  was 
as follows : 
We desire to object to Article VII of the  .  .  . Code .  . 
I.	  It is discrimination against the minority interest in the bottle industry who 
need increased production to operate on a profitable basis  .  .  . 
61 The statement by Seidler, quoted above, is therefore readily subject to misinterpretation. The
active plants of the larger manufacturers were operated at least at as high utilization ratios as the small,
one-plant enterprises.
62 U.S., National Recovery Administration, Proposed Code of Fair Competition for the Glass
Container Industry, Washington, August 23, 1933, Registry No. 1022-1-03, p.  6.
63 U.S., National Recovery Administration, Code of Fair Competition for the Glass Container
Industry. Washington, October 3, 1933, Approved Code No. 36, reprinted in Codes of Fair Competition,
vol. I, Washington, 1933, p. 465.
64 Ibid. 
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4.	  Clause VII is unnecessary in an industry now perfectly controlled by a 
machinery patent situation in the hands of a few, who allocate and classifiy 
production made on their machines.
5. The industry is and has been in a very healthy state throughout the de­
pression.  It has benefitted handsomely by Modification and Repeal of the 
Eighteenth Amendment .  .  . 
6. The larger producers have for a period of 5 years been acquiring smaller 
producers to give them a preponderance of capacity. Most of these acquired 
plants have been closed down and represent about 700,000 tons of potential 
idle capacity. However, the plants are obsolete and no attempt has been made 
to rehabilitate or use them. According to the restrictive provision of the Code, 
no small producer can add a new furnace, but the large producer can now
rehabilitate these plants to acquire for himself all the benefits of Repeal 
.  . and  business recovery  .  . 
9. Our clientele consists of the manufacturing group outside of the large pro­
ducers, and the curtailment of the small manufacturers' production and ex­
pansion will wipe out our business." 
In a telegram to Mr. Malcolm Muir, NRA, on August 26, 1933, the 
Fairmont Glass Works wired: 
We desire to protest vigorously against paragraphs one and two under Schedule 
A of trade practices in that such arrangement would work to the decided dis­
advantage of some of the smaller manufacturers restricting further their present 
limited activities and destroying any possibility of showing progress  .  .  . 
.  .  . we .  .  . did not subscribe to or vote for these provisions in this Code at 
Buffalo meeting.67 
Framers of the code inserted an escape clause in paragraph VII of the 
above mentioned "Schedule A" to the effect that "it is further agreed that 
the above provisions are not obligatory to all groups under the glass division 
herein referred to as the industry. In case the majority of the members in 
any competitive group declare that the principle  of sharing the available 
business equitably does not apply, failure to so apply this provision shall not 
be construed a violation of the code." 68 In a letter to General Hugh S. 
Johnson, NRA administrator, on July 29, 1933, the Amsler-Morton Company, 
manufacturers of furnaces and furnace equipment for the glass container 
industry, registered a protest against this provision, as follows : 
Modification has swamped this industry with orders and the Owens-Illinois 
Glass Company, the largest producer and chief offender, feverishly makes new
furnaces prior to the enactment of the Code to retain for itself its present 
production quota and saddle on its  less able competitors the restrictions of 
Article VII .  .  . 
Through a very questionable patent situation unfair restrictions are placed 
on small producers and Article VII of Schedule "A" of the  Code is intended 
for a few .  .  . 
This provision, created by a hand picked committee, is to protect monopolies 
of certain classes of ware produced in the trade .  .  .69 
In a letter from the small Brockway Glass Company, to E. G. Ackerman 
of the Glass Container Association, on August 26, 1933, the former declared 
66 NRA Hearings on the Code, op. cit., pp. 39-42.

67 Ibid., pp. 61-62.

68 Ibid., pp. 64-66.

69 Ibid., pp. 63-66.
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"it is generally conceded that the larger manufacturers are now selling less 
than their quota will be fixed at, while the smaller manufacturers are selling 
larger amounts than they can hope to obtain as a quota figure. This might 
result in a mad scramble on the part of the larger concerns for the business 
that must be given up by the smaller units, and unless some more definite 
provision is placed in the code to prevent selling at less than cost the smaller 
manufacturer is going to find himself with a reduced production at a low 
price  .  .  ." 7° 
The letter goes on to add that "every small manufacturer unquestionably 
will be perfectly satisfied if given a reasonable quota, as long as he can be 
assured that he is going to be able to sell his glass at a profit." This attitude 
indicates the tendency of the smaller competitor, when under severe pressure, 
to seek an escape from his unequal conflict with the dominant oligopoly, an 
escape at the expense of competitive price. That is to say, when under such 
pressure, he seeks to embrace the economics of stabilization, providing some 
of the benefits will dribble down to him. The wishes of Brockway were ade­
quately incorporated into Article IX of the Trade Practice section of the 
code, implemented by the requirement of a uniform cost accounting system 
which would cover "all the factors of cost as provided for by the Association 
cost system." 
It is thus seen that the leading pro-stability forces sought to correct the 
great defect in their capacity program by reducing the production quotas 
allocated to the small firms, increasing their own shares of the total market 
sales, and, at the same time, bringing the smaller manufacturers into their 
system of stabilized prices through forced agreement on a uniform plan of 
cost accounting. 
5.	  INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS UNDER A STABILIZATION PROGRAM 
For those small concerns which, as in the case of glass containers, are 
suffered to survive, stabilization brings loss of independence, but it may also 
bring temporarily high operating rates, inflexible prices and protected profits. 
The dependent producers may thus become integrated into the "pattern of 
privilege and protection." The coercive conditions associated with the con­
struction of such a pattern by those leading firms for whom the compulsions 
to stabilize are keenest, induce the smaller "outsiders" to join the "in-group" 
on pain of extinction. A pro-stabilization attitude, such as expressed by the 
smaller Howard and Brockway concerns, referred to above, is one result. 
The Obear-Nester Company refused to become a Hartford licensee, and 
thereby prompted the institution of a suit for infringement. They had ven­
tured to combat the ample resources of Owens and Hartford. A Hartford 
official declared, "we have no particular desire to oppress the Obear-Nester 
Company, but  .  .  .  their action in  .  .  .  neglecting to pay minimum royalties 
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for a considerable period and then finally alleging the total invalidity of the 
contract on the ground of the Sherman Law has left a very bad taste in our 
mouth and I don't propose, if possible, to let them get away with it."" 
But the opposition of Obear-Nester to this overwhelming power within 
its market, had also to cope with pro-stabilization pressure from the small 
enterprise fringe itself. For example, a communication from R. A. Blunt of 
the smaller Buck Glass Company to F. Goodwin Smith of Hartford,  on 
May 23, 1935 related a discussion had by the writer with J. Morrison of 
Obear-Nester, which consisted in part of the following : 
My advice to Morrison was  .  .  . 
"The only really effective control exercised in our industry is through the 
Hartford agreements. If another feeder comes into the market, it might reduce
the amounts of royalties paid by various people now, but it would entirely 
destroy the protection which various people enjoy in their principal lines .  .  .72 
The same tendency for small enterprise to acquire a vested interest in 
stabilization, particularly where the financial inducements of a competitive 
alternative seem to have been removed by an established pattern of control, is 
suggested in a Hartford memorandum on a feeder litigation conference on 
April 6, 1926, to the effect that ".  .  . our milk bottle licensees would welcome 
a suit against Lamb as tending to put an end to Lamb's price-cutting policy 
.  .  ." 73 However, as has been remarked above, there is never surety that the 
system of stabilization will hold together. The degree of uncertainty in this 
regard is in direct ratio to the number and economic importance of the small 
enterprises in the market. 
It is not to be inferred that the incorporation of a part of the small 
enterprise sector of a market dominated by a stabilization-minded, oligopolistic 
core brings a depedency that is at the same time a guarantee of profit security. 
It seems likely that the vicissitudes of the market will recreate continually the 
schism between the small enterprise segment and the dominant group, just as 
they will produce a conflict within the latter." 
Activities of leading concerns, Owens in particular, when Repeal  pre­
sented the industry with an unexpected increase in demand, shows the insta­
bility of the protection sometimes afforded both large and small producers 
under private planning for market control. An unexpected drop in total 
demand is likely to have similar adverse effects upon this type of "security," 
embraced in a vacillating way by the smaller sellers. Dependency  reasserts 
itself in the form of enterprise insecurity. 
71 Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., p. 609. Communication from H. K. Smith to Lehmann and Lehmann,
attorneys, April 20, 1926, regarding the suit against ObearNester.
72 Ibid., p. 594.
73 Ibid., p. 590.
74 Cf. on the last point the evidence of a conflict between Hartford and its controlling corporation,
Corning, in regard to the latter's request in 1930 for permission to make containers out of ordinary glass at standard royalties (Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., p. 555); and the antagonism of Hartford and
Owens stemming from the differences between "a company which must primarily regard the granting
of licenses from the point of view of greatest possible income, and a company which, on the other band, would primarily have in mind the effect of such licenses on competition." (Letter from H. W. Carter
of Patent Department of Owens to J. C. Blair of Owens, August 14, 1923, Fed. Sup. vol. 46,  op. cit.,
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Conversely, the continued existence of a small, quasi-competitive segment, 
though it may exist on sufferance and offer legal protection, remains as an 
abiding source of now potential, now actual, disturbance. The record of this 
industry is replete with complaints by Owens and Hartford against such 
firms as Lamb, Nivison-Weiskopf, Three Rivers, Hemingray, Salem, Knox, 
Whitall-Tatum, Turner, Tygart Valley, Fairmont, Peerless, Maywood and 
McKee for "not observing established price practices in the industry." 75 
Similarly, the extension of the production quota system, a cornerstone 
of stabilization and the special province of the Glass Container Association, 
was effected only by making concessions to the small enterprise segment. "In 
setting the quotas the 1 and 2 furnace factories were given more than their 
share because it was the only way the quota arrangement could be made to 
work  .  .  .  it is considerable of an advantage to have a quota which permits 
full capacity operation." 76  This suggests that the smaller concerns acted in 
concert regarding the quota system, and in so doing won for themselves an 
advantage in utilization rates. It was different when the individual firm 
acted alone. Capstan contemplated purchase of the Diamond Glass plant in 
1935, emphasizing to itself that it was "buying quota." "However, before 
doing anything definite at Diamond we would of course make sure the major 
concerns would guarantee this quota to us if we buy the plant and dismantle 
it. Their quota amounts to 0.7% .  .  .  and would be about $600,000." 77  In 
this case it was necessary to secure approval of the "majors." 
In this industry the majors were favored by the patent weapons, which 
made it easier to impose the quota plan than would have been the case 
otherwise : 
While it is true that no one was absolutely bound to follow the quota system,
nevertheless in practical effect all companies had to follow it  quite closely 
or run the risk of bringing down upon them the wrath of Hartford, Corning, 
Owens, Hazel-Atlas, Thatcher and Ball. Since the smaller manufacturers had 
to rely upon Hartford alone for their machinery and equipment, this was tanta­
mount to compulsion. In fact, Hartford, through its policy of retaining title to 
practically all the machinery used by its licensees, retained a control over them
under the threat of Hartford to take away this equipment in event of their 
bad behavior, at least at the expiration of the eight or ten year license which 
was customary .  .  .78 
Nevertheless, a  "recalcitrant minority" of smaller concerns continually 
disturbed the attempts to make the quota system function smoothly. This 
emerged  very clearly under pressure of market adversity during the early 
years of the great depression. A report on a meeting of the leading factors 
in the industry by E. G. Ackerman, dated September 19, 1930, contains the 
following paraphrase of the speech by Mr. Charles R. Stevenson, outstanding 
75 Cf. Fed. Sup. vol. 46, op. cit., pp. 590.592.
76 Ibid.,  p. 587. Communication of G. F. Riemann of Capstan, July 3, 1935. This statement reveals
part of the explanation for the superior ratios of operation to capacity enjoyed by the smaller manu­
facturers. 
77 Ibid. Communication of G. F. Riemann, July 15, 1935.
 
78 Ibid., pp. 594-595.
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figure in the field of glass containers, consulting engineer for over a score of 
the nation's leading industries, and for many years Business Manager of the 
Glass Container Association : 
Mr. Stevenson added that industry as a whole is facing a real showdown in 
management .  .  . He said that there must be a complete solving of unemploy­
ment, and that industry must be allowed to force the will of the majority upon 
a small but disrupting minority, if business is to prosper, and if safe and sane 
margins of profit are to be maintained. These facts must be faced by our 
Association. 
Additional evidence of the presence of virile competitive elements in the 
industry in the years following 1930 is found in the expansion of the price-
cutter Knox, as well as the bitter controversy around the question of alloca­
tion in the NRA Code, referred to above.. It is further significant that, 
although the trade association, and its "statistical committee" of high execu­
tives from the major concerns, was the primary vehicle for extension of the 
quota plan, as of August 5, 1933 only 14 of the total of 46 glass container 
firms subject to the NRA code were membersof the association.79 The conflict 
79 NRA Statistical Materials No. 36, op. cit., p. 11. 
between stabilization and small enterprise persisted, a decade after the signing 
of the historic Hartford-Owens declaration of war on all "outsiders." It is 
not surprising that E. G. Ackerman during this period had occasion to declare, 
"we need a 'Moses' for the industry." VI 
SUMMARY:
 
TOWARD A THEORY OF SMALL ENTERPRISE'
 
1. TESTING THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS 
The central working hypothesis of the present study posited that the 
strategic factor for the emergence of the modern "small business.problem" 
in manufacturing is the rise of the large corporation and the growth of 
industrial oligopoly associated with it. Hence, the focus of the problem here 
has been the competitive relations of small enterprise, taken as a group, and 
large oligopolistic enterprise, also taken as a group. 
That the smaller producer in modern industry no longer competes merely 
with rivals of roughly equivalent economic resources is obvious. The extent 
to which he must deal with unequals is indicated in part by the various studies 
of concentration in manufacturing production made in recent years. 
It now seems generally established that high concentration is a perma­
nent feature of our manufacturing economy ; that the large producer is widely 
distributed throughout this sector of productive activity ;  and that those 
industries, taken collectively, wherein the large rival is absent are of sub­
stantially less economic importance than those where he is found. Therefore, 
the case material in the present work, and the additional empirical evidence 
drawn upon in this general discussion, comes from industrial markets in 
which the large enterprise shares the market with small firms. 
The exclusion of the industries at the bottom of the concentration list, 
i.e., the so-called "small-business industries," is therefore a logical result of 
what is considered strategic to the competitive problems of small enterprise. 
Such exclusion, however, is not designed to imply that these industries are 
not a part of the total problem of small enterprise. They undoubtedly present 
the economy with great issues of efficiency, price policy, entrepreneurial op­
portunity, governmental regulations of business affairs, and so on. Numerically 
they may be of almost equal importance to small enterprise in markets with 
considerable concentration.2 
On the basis of the emphasis made in the present study, therefore, the 
problem of small enterprise emerges as an aspect of the theory of oligopoly. 
When the evolution of an industry generates enterprises of widely dif­
fering size, we now believe that at some point such quantitative differentiation 
produces significant differences in the power to compete for relative shares 
of the total market. Hence, when a market classification such as "heavy con­
1 In connection with the discussion in this chapter, see Vatter, H. G. "Small Enterprise in Dominant
Group Industries," Proceedings, 25th Annual Conference, Pacific Coast Economic Association, Corvallis,
Ore., Sept. 7-8, 1950, pp. 16-20.
2 It is recognized that not all concentrated industries are oligopolistic industries; neither is the
reverse always true. But the coincidence of the two is satisfactorily widespread. 
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centration of industry output in the hands of very few firms, with dispersion 
of the remainder among relatively few .  .  .", or "moderate concentration of 
industry output in the hands of relatively few sellers, and dispersion of the 
balance among quite a few firms .  .  .  oligopoly with a 'competitive fringe' .  .  ." 
is set up, it  is suggested that certain significant "associated differences in 
behavior" may result.3 This is just what has been involved in the use of such 
market structures in the present study. The automobile and glass container 
industries fit the first classification, butter and flour milling the second. Dif­
ferentiation in size between firms has been used as a starting point to elaborate 
corresponding differences in competitive power between the group which 
makes for concentration within the market and the group which makes for 
dispersion. Such two-fold classification exhausts the total number of enter­
prises in the given industry ; hence, we use the term "bilateral differentiation" 
of markets. These market structures are sub-categories of oligopoly ; and the 
few concerns in which a significant proportion of total output is concentrated 
have been designated the "oligopolistic core" ; whereas the remainder of the 
industry, "dispersed" in varying degree, has been designated the "small 
enterprise sector." 
Industrial markets are not a congeries of autonomous, competitively 
undifferentiated producers. Our fundamental classification of markets into 
these two segments conforms to the practice of the business community 
itself, which typically distinguishes between "leading firms" and "independ­
ents," between "majors" and "minors," between "cooperators" and "out­
siders," or simply the "large" and the "small." 
Technological elements can be instrumental in bringing about size dif­
ferences and accompanying competitive differences between firms. Otherwise 
it would not be a truism that technological change has been a factor in the 
growth of large-scale enterprise. This has very specific implications for the 
problem at hand. Technical progress  is very seldom absorbed to equal 
degrees by all firms, both large and small, in a given industry, any more than 
it is between industries. To take as illustrative, one type of technical progress 
the application of electricityit has been shown that, on the plant basis, 
the rate of utilization of electric power per man-hour is much greater in 
concentrated than in nonconcentrated industries.4 In a sample of 21 manu­
facturing industries in 1937, wide differences were found in the KWH con­
sumed per man-hour in establishments within each industry arrayed by size 
according to number of wage-earners.5 
It would obviously be a mistake, however, to define the concept of 
industrial differentiation in such terms that it appeared always to be generated 
by technological (or cost) factors. Industrial differentiation may be brought 
3 Bain, J.  S., Pricing, Distribution and Employment, op.  cit.,  p.  178. Such structures probably
correspond roughly to Kaplan's "mixed industries" (Small Business, op. cit., p. 146).
4 U.S., Temporary National Economic Committee, Technology in Our Economy, Mon. No. 22,
Washington: 1941, pp. 206-07. Data are for 1937.
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about partly by product differentiation,  as  in flour milling, automobile, 
cigarettes, gasoline, and so on. It may be produced by the penetration of 
certain leading manufacturers into distribution, as did the centralizers in the 
butter industry ; by the reverse movement of distributors into manufacture, 
as in the case of the packer-centralizers, and also in the butter industry ; or 
by various other instances of forward or backward integration. 
Once differentiation has become sharp, so that there are two major 
segments (not merely one dominant firm) to the market, it may become 
extremely difficult for a typical member of the small-firm segment to rise out 
of the ranks. This seems true, for example, in the automobile market, where 
the sales "gap" between the independents (now only two !) and the big three 
appears impossible to close. A similar gap appears to exist in the rubber tire 
and tin can industries. 
On the other hand, many markets in which there is some degree of 
bilateral differentiation reveal a rather gradual gradation in their array of 
firm sizes, and in such cases it is difficult to distinguish the line of demarca­
tion between the oligopolistic and the small-enterprise segment. Illustrations 
of this condition to varying degree are found in the flour milling, paperboard, 
and, if the national market be taken, cement industries. In such cases the 
careful study of competitive behavior over time is of particular importance 
in the determination of the dividing line and of the functional differentiation 
between the two segments. 
Finally, the generation of bilateral market segmentation is sometimes 
stimulated in part from outside the given industry. One example is the work 
of promoters or investment houses, as in the case of the earlier history of the 
automobile and many other industries. Again, fabricating concerns in related 
industries may diversify their investments. Such concerns are likely to be 
large and to contribute significantly to the formation of the leading core in 
the industry which they penetrate. Cases in point are the mechanical refrig­
erator and synthetic rubber industries. In the glass container industry we 
have the special case of a patent-holding company being the primary vehicle, 
along with a dominant producer, for the creation of a favored few firms on 
the one hand, and a numerous group of subordinate competitors on the other. 
The evidence from the case studies seems to show that, in the main, the 
presence of a class of smaller independents is likely to be a source of dis­
ruption with respect to the actual or attempted establishment of a policy of 
controlled competition. This destabilizing influence appears to be operative 
generally and typically at all stages of market evolution in the case of small 
firms ; whereas, it was for the most part, only in the less advanced stages of 
market growth, and/or periods of rapid market growth, that the large con­
cerns tended to follow policies vigorously disruptive of established market 
patterns. This historical aspect is all-important because it indicates that the 
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from the leaders, stands out clearly only in the more advanced stages of 
development of an industry, when such role is performed in the hostile setting 
of stabilization efforts by the leaders. 
It may be presumed that the characteristic histories of particular markets, 
between about 1875 and the present, reflect structural changes in general 
economic history, although this is not under examination here. 
The essential criterion of disruption is persistent independent effort to 
change the distribution of business among the firms in an industry. There is 
no particular competitive technique, policy or type of behavior, however, on 
which it might be said that the small firm has any special claim. 
In generalizing the evidence in the case studies of the destabilizing influ­
ence of the small-firm sector, the most significant data must be drawn from 
more mature market conditions in which the large leading concerns have 
attempted to minimize competitive uncertainties by one means of control or 
another. This is so because the modern problems of the small competitor 
usually only develop in that stage of industrial evolution in which (1) inter-
firm differentiation has already gone so far that the larger enterprises have 
acquired a stake in stabilization, and (2) stability appears to the large-firm 
group as possible only by measures and devices which constrain the smaller 
independents. Hence it is often possible to infer the existence of the disturb­
ing influence of smaller independents from the efforts of the leading core to 
contain and control disruptively competitive forces in the market. 
What are these disruptive forces ? What do they threaten to upset ? 
Certainly where the high state of flux associated with vigorous independent 
efforts by all to redistribute market shares is found, there is no "stability" 
(actual or attempted) to be undermined. But disruption has a different con­
text where some group within the totality endeavors to pursue a common 
policy of control of the centrifugal tendencies in the market. We then have 
two policies : stabilization and disruption. The disturbance of stability, insofar 
as it comes from interfirm relations within the given market, may emanate 
from (1) the cooperating group, or (2) noncooperating "independents." For 
the present we ignore the former, recognizing that it is a very important 
factor in oligopolistic behavior. As for the second source of disturbance, 
there can be no doubt that its existence is a highly important consideration, 
perhaps the most important in the majority of cases, underlying a number of 
prevailing techniques of market control. Furthermore, it  is necessary to 
recognize that such techniques, in industries having structures of the type 
treated here, are inaugurated, developed and applied primarily by the leading 
core of large firms. 
Not all techniques of control reflect primarily the reaction of leading 
cores to the competitive potential of small firms : some are mainly measures 
for maintaining stable relations among the former. The techniques which 
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the latter through independent policies to redistribute market shares both 
within the small enterprise sector and between it and the oligopoly core, 
may be classified into two broad categories :  (1) "the coercive activities of 
large enterprisesthat is, those that are designed to destroy competitors or 
to discipline them through fear . .  ." 6 and (2) certain among other forms of 
behavior usually associated with monopolized markets.? 
As a final aspect, taken from general industrial evidence, of the "exces­
sively competitive" character of the small-firm segment of industry, attention 
should be called to the apparently more flexible behavior of prices in non-
concentrated industries, when total demand falls cyclically, than in concen­
trated industries. This phenomenon (aside from the extent to which it may 
be traced to oligopsony) may be related to the problem under consideration 
by three major assumptions. The first assumption is that "industry," when 
conceived as a single-product market, will give a correlation between concen­
tration and price flexibility closely similar to that obtaining for an industry 
defined on the basis of other criteria, as in the present study, to include 
typically more than a single product. The second assumption is that in com­
paratively nonconcentrated industries, the policy of the small firm tends to 
dominate ; and in concentrated industries, the policy of an oligopolistic core 
is likely to rule. The third assumption is that cyclically flexible prices represent 
a mode of business behavior at odds with the stabilization policies widely 
associated with oligopoly-dominated markets. 
A clear formulation of the relationship appears in the Structure of the 
American Economy:8 
.  .  the dominant factor in making for depression insensitivity of prices is the 
administrative control over prices which results from the relatively small number 
of concerns dominating particular markets. 
This hypothesis has, of course, been challenged, but the work of Gardiner 
Means and his followers nevertheless has thrown considerable light upon the 
comparative role of small and large enterprise. 
Additional evidence of a different character is afforded by the body of 
accepted theory. So far as the small-firm sector of an industrial market is 
concerned, we may liken it in general to the structural features usually asso­
ciated with workably competitive markets. Each producer holds a very small 
proportion of the total market and is surrounded by close-substitute producers. 
The member of the small-firm segment will be likely to consider his own 
demand function to be relatively elastic. He is not likely to consider the effect 
of his individual, short-run profit-maximising decisions upon his smaller 
8 Edwards, Corwin, Maintaining Competition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949, p.  157. Edwards' 
coercive practices include, e.g., preemption of facilities which are necessary to competitors, including
bidding up of prices of materials to divert them from independents; exclusive-dealer contracts; exchange
of technology and patent rights to the exclusion of smaller enterprises; localized price cutting by large
concerns to drive out smaller producers; predatory price wars; squeezing the nonintegrated concern
(through greater proportionate control at one stage of an industry than at another); and tying arrange­
ments. 
7 E.g., trade association activities designed to control competition; price leadership systems; and
delivered price systems.
8 U.S., National Resources Committee, Part I, Wash.: June 1939, pp. 143 and Appendix 8. SUMMARY  105 
rivals. In many industries of the type under analysis the small-firm fringe is 
quite numerous, ".  .  .  the turnover of producing units is rapid, and .  .  . the 
rate of business mortality is high .  .  ." 9 
If it were possible to isolate the small-firm segment from the oligopoly 
core, we would expect its behavior to conform, therefore, to that appropriate 
to more or less atomistic markets. Such behavior would involve certain results, 
e.g., with respect to profits, rate of utilization of plant,1° prices, and so on. 
Perhaps more important, it would be anticipated that the relative shares of 
the total market would be continually shifting among the different competitors. 
"If first one firm and then another gets the greatest share of business or the 
highest rate of profit, it is plain that competition is active." 11 This process of 
perpetual sifting and winnowing of firms, in which some now forge ahead, 
now drop behind, so classically described by Marshall, is precisely the central 
characteristic of the small-firm sector that brings it into collision with those 
members of the industry which above all strive to prevent a redistribution 
of market shares between the two segments. The small firm behaves true to 
the form of its theoretical archetype when it strives to expand its business 
through its own independent actions. 
With respect to what has been said in the case studies regarding the 
interests of the leading oligopoly core in market security and stabilization, 
formal oligopoly theory has much of interest to say, much that can only 
briefly be referred to here. In general, the theory recognizes that a given 
member of an oligopolistic group will tend to shun a redistribution of market 
shares, because its fellow oligopolists will in all likelihood retaliate. In the 
case of differentiated oligopoly (differentiated with respect to product, not 
industrial structure and policy), the reference may be to either price or 
product differentiation. ".  .  .  advertising or product variation will be matched 
by rivals as surely as price cuts.  .  ." 12 Furthermore, ".  .  . to  avoid change is 
by all odds the simplest way of maintaining the oligopolistic entente to which 
the seller is a party  .  .  ."1' And, ".  .  .  the most elementary rule of behavior 
under oligopoly is to minimize the number of price changes and hence the 
number of times the understanding among oligopolists is put to a test  .  . 
Hence, the theory indicates that where producers are few and large, the 
tendency will be toward the attempt to stabilize relative market shares over 
time. Although most writers devote themselves largely to price policy, the 
analysis may be readily extended to other aspects of business behavior which 
affect comparative market shares. 
9 U.S., Temporary National Economic Committee, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry,
Monograph No. 21, Washington: 1940, p. 20.
10 If competition in the sector is less than perfect, there may be some degree of excess capacity,
but this question is unsettled. Cf. Kaldor, N., "Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity", Economica,
February, 1935.
11 Tucker, R. S., "Concentration and Competition", Journal of Marketing, April 1940, p. 358.
12 Bain, J. S., Pricing, Distribution and Employment, op. cit., p. 201. The writer adds that such
retaliation will take place ".  .  .  less easily, less quickly, and less certainly  .  .  .  ," however.
13 Galbraith, J. K., "Monopoly and the Concentration of Economic Power," in A Survey of Con­
temporary Economics, Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1948, p. 113.
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We are not concerned here, however, with markets where sellers are few 
and large, all of which implicitly have significant shares of the total volume 
of business. Our main interest is with markets in which there is an oligopo­
listic core, surrounded by a small-firm group more or less sharply differen­
tiated in size from the members of the core. Certainly the small-enterprise 
sector is not to be excluded from the theory, if for no other reason than its 
influence upon the interfirm relations of the oligopolists. 
What may be expected regarding the relations of the oligopoly core to 
the small-firm segment, if we draw upon the existing body of oligopoly 
theory? In general, the empirical study of industry suggests that the small-
company sector may be considered as a single bloc of potential competition 
by the oligopoly core taken as a group. As in the case of member oligopolists, 
the leading core therefore must estimate the effect of its formal or tacit 
collective policies upon the small-enterprise sector considered as a totality. 
The former have both a community of interest and often the necessary 
resources to reduce the competitive potential of the latter to comparative 
impotency and then to maintain it in such status.15 The oligopoly core may 
be expected to act in formal or tacit concert to keep the small-enterprise group 
individually and collectively subdued, for net shifts in the distribution of 
total output in favor of the small-firm sector are a threat to each and all of 
the members of the core. An illustration of the individualized attention that 
may be given to the smaller companies is found in the gasoline industry, 
where in 1935 and 1936 the leading core of majors adopted a plan to main­
tain gasoline spot prices in ten Midwestern states. "Each of them selected 
an independent refiner as a 'dancing partner' and assumed responsibility for 
his 'surplus' output .  .  ." 16 In the case of controls under the ethyl-compound 
contracts in the same industry, 11,000 jobbers were kept in line with respect 
to price policy.17 
However, the location of the equilibrium distribution of market shares 
between the leading core and the small-company group is in most cases inde­
terminate. It can only be in cases of an extreme development of controls by 
the former, such as in the glass container industry, that the equilibrium dis­
tribution may be fairly determinate and stable for a time. Otherwise, in the 
general case, there is likely to be continual sporadic outbreaks upsetting a 
given established pattern in the relations between the two groups. Further­
more, where entry is effectively open, there may always be new additions 
to the small-firm sector which disturb the status quo by virtue of their 
individual innovations or the resulting gradual increment to the small-firm 
share.18 
15 In the terminology of a recent writer, the oligopoly core attempts to "insulate" itself in this
manner so as to reduce the capacity of any member of the small-firm segment, or of the segment
as a whole to "penetrate" the share of the market held by the leading core (cf. Papandreou, A.G.,
"Market Structure and Monopoly Power", American Economic Review, Vol. XXXIX (Sept., 1949),
pp. 890 ff.).
16 TNEC Mon. No. 21, op. cit., p. 136.
17 Ibid., p. 161.
18 The rise of Sylvania Electric in the incandescent lamp industry is a good illustration. SUMMARY  107 
On the other hand, if we further extend present oligopoly doctrine to 
the relations between the two segments, the matter may be looked at from 
the perspective of the small-firm group." They must consider the effect of 
their actions upon the leading oligopoly group. If they do so, they act, through 
their consensus, as an oligopolist ; and hence they will tend to embrace the 
stabilization policies which may obtain in the industry. However, it has been 
argued above that they do not act as oligopolists typically. They are not 
basically inclined to collaborate because of a fear of retaliation, as in a single 
oligopoly enterprise. The reason for this has been suggested above as residing 
primarily in the condition that the members of this group are small in size 
and comparatively numerous. They must be forced, again and again, to 
recognize the retaliatory power of the industry leaders. They are, perhaps, 
deceiving themselves, because of their own individually negligible position 
in the market, into thinking their actions will be overlooked in the general 
competitive hustle and bustle. Hence they must be repeatedly "coordinated" 
and chastised into acceptance of more "cooperative forms of competition." 
To the extent that the small-firm group acts at times like a single oli­
gopolist, and cooperates, is due partly to the (apparently typical) presence 
of a minority which is in itself stabilization-minded. This element may be 
motivated by fear or the hope of gaining from the protective cover of a 
program of market control. But in any case, it is no doubt responsible to an 
important degree for the appearance of solidarity between the large- and the 
small-firm sectors. 
The extension of formal oligopoly doctrine to the present area of prob­
lems therefore indicates : 
(1) The leading core in industries of the type treated herein tends to 
embrace stabilization because the members of the core take into consideration 
the possible retaliatory actions of rivals, and are likely to be highly skeptical 
regarding possible gains from attempts to redistribute market shares among 
themselves. It has been suggested by one writer that the various types of 
nonprice competition are for the most part the necessary means of allowing 
some flexibility of response to changes in market circumstances in order that 
established prices and basic positions in the industry are not surrendered.' 
(2) The leading core may be expected to act collectively with respect 
to attempts from elements within the small-firm segment to reduce the rela­
tive share of any of their number. The leaders will retaliate. In the longer 
period it will behoove the oligopoly core, if possible, by vigorous price and 
by nonprice competition, by acquisition of smaller profitable concerns, by 
the buying up of idle plant, and by other means, to reduce the segment of 
lesser enterprises to what it considers manageable proportions. 
19 "Perspective of the small-firm group"conceived as a consensus of the bulk of the group.
20 Rothschild, K.W., "Price Theory and Oligopoly," Economic Journal,  vol. LVII, No. 227,
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(3) The object of this gradual reduction process is to put the small-firm 
segment into the position where it will itself behave like an oligopolist and 
develop a business consensus which considers first of all the possible retalia­
tion from the leaders (or absence of certain gains of stabilization) resultant 
from any serious effort by the members of the segment to redistribute 
market shares in its favor. Such is the result in some markets, where the 
power and cohesion of the leading core is great enough to bring about for 
protracted periods the incorporation of the small-firm segment into its pattern 
of stabilization for the industry. 
(4) In what is probably the majority of our industrial markets, however, 
the small size and considerable numbers of firms still to be found in the 
small-enterprise segments makes for centrifugal business  policies. The 
atomistic character of this sector of the total industry means that the objec­
tive conditions for oligopoly behavior are in general lacking. Thus, we adapt 
the basic classification suggested by Machlup : the small-firm sector tends to 
be heedless of rivals' reactions ;  the leading core tends to be conscious of 
rivals'  reactions.21 The former  is  consequently  anti-stabilization. Even 
though the small-enterprise sector does not account for a critical percentage 
of total output (capacity, assets, etc.), it may be able still to influence market 
results in a direction quite different from those designed by the stability-
minded forces in the industry. The cleavage in policy involved in this probably 
typical case makes for continual intergroup conflict. 
The main task of summarizing and briefly examining the central working 
hypothesis is almost completed. There remain only two comments. The first 
is that it is impossible to overemphasize the necessity to consider the stage of 
development of the given industry in order to assess properly the behavior of 
the two market segments. The second point is that the central hypothesis 
naturally requires various qualifications and acknowledgments of exceptions. 
Chief among these factors are the following four :  (1) a middle group of 
medium-sized firms and a blurring of the sharp bilateral cleavage regarding 
business policy which has been our central focus ;  (2) lack of homogeneity 
of size and policy within the small-firm sector ; (3) lack of complete homoge­
neity of policy regarding stabilization within the oligopoly leadership ; and 
(4) neglect of the influence on our problem of centralization of market con­
trols, through financial institutions and other indirect intercorporate devices 
(a factor which supports the central hypothesis). 
Summarizingthe review of the relations between the leading cores and 
the policy of industrial stabilization, the case studies, the stabilization move­
ment as an historic phenomenon, various typical patterns of behavior in oli­
gopolistic markets, and formal oligopoly doctrine, all seem to bear out, with 
21 Machlup, F., "Monopoly and Competition : A Classification of Market Positions", American
Economic Review, vol. XXVII (September, 1937), pp. 445-51. Cf. also, Abramovitz, M., "Monopolistic
Selling in a Changing Economy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. LII (February, 1938), pp.
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some exceptions, the hypothesis that oligopoly and industrial stabilization 
efforts go hand in hand. The same evidence also seems to indicate that such 
efforts bring the oligopoly cores into conflict with the non-oligopolistic sectors 
of their particular markets. This conflict gives us a variety of possible end-
result patterns which may however be broadly classified into three categories : 
(1) the most typical case, wherein the quasi-atomistic behavior of the small 
firms continues to disturb, undermine and divert the stabilization policies of 
the leaders ;  (2) the frequently-occurring but minority case, wherein the 
small-enterprise segment generally follows the leadership of the dominant 
core in pursuit of aims designed to stabilize competitive conditions ; and 
(3) the mixed case, wherein the policies of the lesser enterprises may be 
approximately equally divided between cooperation with the aims of stabiliza­
tion and resistance to such aims. 
2. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL BUSINESS 
It will be recalled that in the introductory chapter and throughout the 
case studies it was stated that a functional approach and not merely a size 
concept, would be used in the present investigation. The term "functional" 
in this context refers to the changing competitive status of the small-firm 
group with respect primarily to the leading core. It is concerned with answer­
ing the question : What economic role does the former execute in its relation 
with the latter, and how is a "problem" generated out of these relations ? As 
one group of writers has put the matter, "the important consideration is not 
the precise boundary that divides small companies from larger companies, 
but rather the comparative positions of smaller and larger companies .  .  "22 
Three major reasons for the superiority of the functional approach now 
seem to have emerged :  (1) it is quite meaningless to construct a category of 
small enterprise purely on an absolute size basis ; (2) consideration of func­
tional relations removes much of the arbitrariness of size classifications ; and 
(3) only such an approach can be adequately related to what is already known 
about business policy, and thus in turn related to problems of public policy. 
The contributions of the case studies to an understanding of the charac­
teristics of small enterprise through the use of a functional approach have 
been, we hope, substantial. It is these contributions, which at the same time 
also give shape to certain of the "problems" of small business. 
What are some of the major elements entering into a composite descrip­
tive picture which may be gleaned from the case studies ? A suggested list 
is, briefly, as follows : 
(1) Small enterprise may be differentiated from other enterprises in 
regard to its heavier reliance upon local sources of supplies of materials. It is 
therefore also relatively more limited in its techniques and channels of pro­
curement. (E.g., butter, flour.) 
22 Butters, J. K., and Lintner, J., The Effect of Federal Taxes on Growing Enterprises, Boston:
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(2) Small enterprise is differentiated from others in that it seems to 
have higher total unit costs of production, i.e., it is less efficient in terms of 
this criterion of efficiency. It is likely to have technically inferior equipment, 
a fact which may partly account for higher costs. (Such as the smallest 
creameries in the butter industry; the smallest millers in the flour industry.) 
(3) Small manufacturing enterprise must, because it is limited to per­
forming specialized fabrication work and also has limited resources, surrender 
the often very strategic function of marketing to other larger concerns, many 
of whom may at the same time be its competitors in the fabrication stage. 
(E.g., in butter and flour.) 
(4) Small enterprise is that type which, in an industry enjoying foreign 
business, either does not participate in such business, or receives a smaller 
share of it than it does of domestic sales. (E.g., as in flour and automobile.) 
(5) In industries where sales promotion is an important competitive 
factor, the small concern is that which must turn increasingly to more re­
stricted market areas, since national and regional markets tend to be more 
responsive to the selling efforts of the larger enterprises. (E.g., butter, except 
for cooperative selling organizations; and flour.) 
(6) The small firm is typically differentiated from the large in that it is 
(a) a one-plant firm (like butter, flour, glass container), and (b) a single-
product or few-product firm (all four industries studied). 
(7) Small enterprise has a smaller life-span than the leaders in an 
industry. It has higher mortality rates than the large-firm segment. (As seen 
in butter, flour, and glass container.) Discontinuance of firm identity through 
acquisition by large enterprises is a characteristic pattern of evolution in the 
case of small business. 
(8) Small enterprise in modern industry encounters special obstacles to 
entry, due in important degree to the existence of industrial oligopoly and 
the advantage of the large firms usually comprising such oligopoly. (E.g., in 
automobile and glass container.) 
(9) Small enterprise is often dependent enterprise, i.e.,  it surrenders 
part of its power to make independent decisions to large concerns, some of 
which may be its competitors. (All four industries studied.)23 
(10) On the other hand, small enterprise, as indicated at length above, 
is independent enterprise in the sense that it typically acts without allowance 
for the effect of its actions upon rivals ; it does not permit such considerations 
to prevent it from striving to increase its share of the market. (Butter, flour, 
and glass container.) Hence, 
(11) Small enterprise is that segment of the typical industrial market 
which actually or potentially disrupts policies of stabilization fostered by the 
23 In the case of the automobile, dependency was not found in the industry proper, but exists
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leading core.  (Flour and glass container.) Where nonprice competition 
prevails, small enterprise is the chief representative of price competition ; 
e.g., where there is price leadership, it is small enterprise which is "led." 
(12) Small businesses are, in the secular period and taken as a group, 
the least profitable firms as compared with the leading core taken as a group. 
This point was touched upon in the introductory chapter, and the case 
studies are consistent with such a conclusion. (Flour, automobile, and glass 
container.) 
These twelve relationships found in one or more of the case studies give 
concrete shape to the bare size concept of small business. All of them are of 
course not necessarily present in one industryit would be extraordinary if 
they were. But a substantial proportion of the points, taken collectively, should 
provide a helpful outline of the chief descriptive features of small enterprise. 
3.	  SURVIVAL OF TIIE SMALL MANUFACTURER 
The question may be raised at this juncture, in view of the great disad­
vantages suffered by the smaller manufacturers, as indicated in the present 
analysis, how is it that small enterprise continues to survive and to remain a 
more or less dynamic factor in our industrial markets ? A partial answer has 
been suggested in the points above on qualifications of the central hypothesis, 
as well as in the various mitigating influences noted at numerous points 
throughout the investigation. Certain other factors may be mentioned. 
Alfred Marshall forecast that economies of scale, if widely applicable 
to any given manufacturing field, were a powerful factor in favor of the 
large concern. In lines where specialized machinery and conveyor techniques 
may be used, the small capitalist is "threatened with extinction." This leaves 
certain related areas still open to the "strong man with slender means," how­
ever. And if, as Marshall assumed, affected industries are still expanding, 
then these related areas of small enterprise will themselves offer increasing 
opportunities. There are four such industries, but mainly two :  (1) produc­
tion of a single component of a complex commodity or at a single stage in 
the fabrication of such commodity. This allows for rationalization of the 
productive process to some extent by the small concern which manufactures 
the component, thus permitting internal economies. Marshall recognizes, 
however, that "such a man may indeed find that the markets in which he 
looks to buy his material or to sell his products, are controlled to his prejudice 
by a monopolistic combination in stages of production below his, or above
his  24 
This is an acknowledgment of a relation similar to what we have called 
"dependent enterprise." On the other hand, he is relieved of marketing 
expense "if the markets are free." (2) The second related area is preserved 
for the small firm by virtue of the fact that "although machinery may have 
24 Industry and Trade (3d ed.) London: MacMillan, 1921, p. 245. 112  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
been applied to what used to be the greater part of a process of production ; 
yet the remainder is still done in the old way  .  .  ." 25 So long as hand methods 
and the incomplete application of mechanized techniques still holds sway, the 
small producer may find a haven; and if the parent industry is expanding, 
investment opportunities there will even grow. 
But these conclusions do not apply generally to marketing, chiefly because 
of the growth of advertising, of branded articles, savings in purchasing, 
elimination of middleman expenses, and superior service to the consumer.26 
The other two "small-business industries" may be especially available to 
the lesser entrepreneur, according to Marshall. These are :  (3) various spe­
cialty lines requiring much skilled labor and often using semifinished mate­
rials bought from industries in which large concerns dominate, and (4) 
industries in process of taking over or competing directly with household 
work, e.g., dressmaking, baking, washing.27 
P. Sargent Florence has pointed to an important set of factors protecting 
the existence of the smaller manufacturer. These he subsumes under the 
general heading of "vagaries of free production for free consumption." The 
consumer demands variety of products, requiring production on small uneco­
nomical scales ; and the search for variety tends to feed on itself, leading the 
consumer "to turn from one sort to another, thus perpetuating the small scale 
of production." 25 
Florence also refers to certain restrictions on the size of markets or 
sources of supply which tend to perpetuate the small plant, or even the small 
firm. The restrictions include cases in which materials or markets are widely 
dispersed, and transport difficult or expensive; extraction or rendering of a 
service is direct at some fixed site ; or demand or supply are not uniform 
or continuous." 
These factors are quite similar to those pointed out by many other writers. 
Emphasis on non-homogeneity of the product has also been placed by 
Steindl in attempting to explain the survival of the small enterprise in man­
ufacturing.30 The presence of this and other elements making for market 
imperfection is mentioned as of major importance, in addition to (2) the 
pace of accumulation of capital (pressing for investment outlets) by the 
bigger firms in the same or closely-related industries,  (3) the desire of 
dominant oligopolies to maintain a fringe of small "competitors" as a facade, 
and (4) the desire of petty entrepreneurs to be their own master or to  use 
business as a means of employment for themselves and their families." 
20 Ibid., pp. 246-48. P. Sargent Florence reminds us that "many of the small plants that exist
at any one time have survived from days when small  plants were necessitated by the restrictions
of markets and sources of supply due to less efficient conditions of transport, communication, and
technique generally." (Logic of Industrial Organization, London: Kegan, Paul, 1933, p. 47).
26 Ibid., pp. 249; 297.99; 300-07. His discussion refers largely to the marketing of consumer goods.
27 ibid., pp. 246, 248.
28 Logic of Industrial Organization, op cit., p. 61.
29 Ibid., p. 44.
30 Op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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Steindl argues that imperfect competition tends at some points to coun­
terbalance the advantages of internal economies enjoyed by large concerns. 
The latter tend to encounter lower prices, greater sales cost per unit, greater 
unit cost due to a smaller degree of capacity use, and additional costs due to 
"the production of several lines in one plant or by one firm (multiproduct 
firm) ."32 
The matter of small business survival through enlisting the aid of the 
government has been referred to by some writers.33 However, adequate 
treatment of this question has been deliberately excluded from the scope of 
the present work. 
What does the study of small enterprise in butter, flour, automobiles, and 
glass containers reveal regarding factors working for survival ? What are the 
qualitative (competitive) aspects of the continued presence of varying num­
bers of small firms ? Are the survival factors obtaining in these four industries 
also the same ones generally found in other industries ? 
Although the creamery butter industry was the only one of the four 
analyzed which failed to show an absolute decline in numbers of firms in 
the secular period, it probably should not be inferred that numerical per­
sistence is unimportant in manufacturing. Why is this so ? 
The central requirement of the "new competition"stabilizationcan 
be met in either of two ways. The structure of the industry may be reshaped 
so that the end result is a leading core with a small number of lesser concerns 
whose tendency to disrupt established patterns is fairly readily controllable. 
Such is the condition in the well-known oligopolies. On the other hand, 
various factors may operate to sustain a large class of lesser enterprises 
alongside a group of leaders. 
Most discussions of survival power overlook the entry aspect. This is 
important nevertheless, for only where easy entry is possible can survival 
power be adequately discovered. This points to two different conditions in 
which it  is possible to speak of the persistence of small enterprise in an 
industry :  (1) where effective entry is closed but a number of small concerns 
continue for many years to occupy a place in the market, i.e., exhibit what 
has been called above "staying power." The independents in the glass con­
tainers industry illustrate this. (2) The second type of survival is that in 
which ownership in the small-firm segment is continually turning over, with 
new entrepreneurs entering with fresh capital, either constructing new plant 
facilities or taking over old capacity. This condition is found to varying 
degrees in the small-firm segment in creamery butter, cotton textiles, lumber 
products, cement, and a number of other industries. Obviously, although the 
conditions of business entry are not significant for the first type of survival 
power, they are important if there is to be turnover survival, for without 
32 Ibid., p.  18. On the last named point, he quoted P. Sargent Florence, Logic of Industrial Or­
ganization, op. cit., p. 26.
33 E.g., Kaplan, Small Business, op. cit., pp. 217-18. 114  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
relatively free entry the absence of staying power will result in a continued 
excess of egress over ingress. The flour milling industry illustrates the mixed 
case, in which entry conditions have not remained open enough to compensate 
for the weak staying power of smaller established concerns, so that there is a 
net reduction in the number of enterprises. 
With regard to the matter of market imperfection, it is apparent that 
as a factor strengthening the survival power of smaller business it is subject 
to serious qualification. Students of the problem appear to disagree among 
themselves. Whereas Thorp and Steindl argue that non-standardized products 
are a haven of the small firm, Clair Wilcox, along with much traditional 
theorizing, alleges that commodities which cannot be identified with their 
producers are likely to be produced by many sellers. 
One generalization, stressed by Steindl, seems entirely valid. This is that 
imperfect mobility in the labor market does typically contribute to the survival 
of the small enterprise. It is known that small business enjoys less labor 
organization even in urban centers, and cheaper labor in rural areas where 
such enterprise is very often located. The latter was shown to be a factor 
in the case of flour milling. It has been a major element protecting the exist­
ence of the smaller Southern cotton textile mill." Of course, the potency 
of this factor is a function of the relative importance of labor costs in the total. 
As for product differentiation due to location factors, and/or transport 
costs, this is probably on balance a positive force for survival, particularly 
where the product is so heavy that the industry becomes semiregionalized, as 
in steel, cement or petroleum. However, ownership and control spread without 
any of the serious impedimenta affecting the movement of commodities from 
producer to consumer ; the multiplant concern is able to carry competition to 
the remote corners of markets thought to be regionally segregated. Such type 
of expansion has been notable in the case of the growth of National Dairy 
Products Corp., and the Borden Co.35 It is also found, e.g., in the spread of 
U. S. Steel's interests in the cement industry." Such was the evolution in 
flour milling, and this is true to some degree in the butter industry. 
It is undeniable that this process requires time, as the persistence of the 
soft winter wheat mill in the Southeast attests. Hence, market imperfections 
due to location and transportation factors may for a time shield the smaller 
competitor. In the petroleum industry smaller refineries, typically located far 
from the larger consuming centers, have a definite advantage in many local 
markets, although this advantage limits their ultimate expansion and is 
greatly dependent upon the source of supply of crude. 
Product differentiation due to sales promotion, on the other hand,  can 
be a vital competitive weapon making for a distinctive superiority on the part 
34 On the other hand, in some industries the largest concerns have deliberately located in small
communities, notably rayon.
35 U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Summary Report on the Merger Movement, Washington: 1948,
pp. 37.38.
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of the larger enterprises. It is doubtful that the small seller can hide behind a 
relatively small sales promotion outlay (directed perhaps at a local or regional 
market), and expect to affix his customers to him in the face of the compe­
tition of national advertisers in the same market. 
These conditions are modified favorably to the small firm, however, to 
the extent that it may secure some segregation of its own product-market by 
sales promotion rather than by completely foregoing the expenditure of any 
funds on differentiation of its product. Within this range of the problem it 
may be said to receive some gains from differentiation, plus the comparative 
advantage of a smaller unit outlay for sales promotion than is indulged in 
by its larger competitor. Thus it "splits the difference" and gives itself to 
some extent a sheltered market. 
It may be concluded, therefore, that product differentiation is a com­
petitive weapon which is probably at least as useful to the large as to the 
small firm. However, a more exact appraisal of the advantages and disad­
vantages of product differentiation, to large as contrasted with small enter­
prise, does not seem possible at present on the basis of the information 
available. 
A further general point in the theory of small-firm survival is mentioned 
by Steindl. He argues that in industries having a leading oligopolistic group 
there is (1) no competitive compulsion to eliminate all the small firms, since 
if stabilization is desired it can be attained as well with a comparatively 
negligible small-firm fringe as without it ;  and (2)  for political reasons, 
especially in the hostile legal setting within which American industry operates, 
it is judicious to maintain the fringe.37 
Evidence on such a point is difficult to secure, but it would be hard to 
take issue with the point. Strategy in maintaining a group of smaller producers 
was made explicit in the glass container case study. As a general policy in 
industry it is referred to by J. M. Clark.38 More recent trends in the thinking 
of the Supreme Court, as represented in the Alcoa case,39 are likely to rein­
force the consciousness of business policy makers that too-high concen­
tration may be legally dangerous. This conclusion is strengthened by the 
apparent continuing hostility of the public toward the concentration of 
economic power. 
It may be concluded that where the small-firm fringe has been reduced 
to a comparatively negligible market influence it may survive for extended 
periods of time, and indeed that the leading concerns are likely to desire such 
continuance provided that the lesser enterprises refrain from competitive 
excesses. This is therefore a condition for small-firm survival. 
37 Op. cit., p. 60.
38 Economics of Overhead Costs, op. cit., p. 440.
39 U.S. vs Aluminum Co. of America, 322 U.S. 716, 1945. 116  SMALL ENTERPRISE AND OLIGOPOLY 
4.  CONCLUSION 
Our purpose in this chapter has been to synthesize and generalize the 
results of the case studies, and to test these results in the light of other avail­
able industrial evidence and theory, in order to appraise the significance and 
validity of the central hypothesis regarding the competitive problems of small 
enterprise. It has been found that this evidence does provide an empirical 
foundation for the working hypothesis. By pointing the direction to be taken 
in laying a basis for the theory of small enterprise, the case studies justified 
themselves ; and by suggesting that certain relationships were strategic, the 
case studies also pointed to specific major problem areas of small business 
in the manufacturing industries. 
It is not to be inferred that the theory posited here makes any attempt 
to be either exhaustive or final ; this has been reiterated in the course of the 
discussion. Moreover, the generalizations arrived at, like all such in social 
and economic theorizing, are subject to modification and correction to allow 
for the numerous cases which fall outside their province. Given the infinite 
complexity and variety of our industrial life, this could not be otherwise. 
Nevertheless, as tentative generalizations they appear to have sufficient 
validity to warrant further investigation along the lines which they suggest. 
The burden of the results achieved in the study may be stated simply 
enough. The theory of small business needs to be integrated with the theory 
of oligopoly. In markets of the type treated, the small enterprise appears to 
carry with it certain competitive drawbacks which ordinary conditions in 
such markets tend to accentuate rather than alleviate. The well-recognized 
market type, oligopolistic core with a fringe of smaller competitors, is thus 
much more than a mere structural classification. The small firm operates in a 
context such that its market opportunity is rather rigorously proscribed, 
largely by virtue of the superior competitive positions typically enjoyed by 
its larger rivals. Its access to the market, as well as to a range of alternatives 
within the market, is inhibited by the latter condition. Its problems are in a 
sense unique because of this differential status. The major endeavor of the 
present investigation, aside from the vital task of definition, has been to 
establish, first, the fact of this differential status ; second, the nature of it ; 
and third, some of the various forms assumed by such differentiation. Any 
measures of public or private policy designed to protect the small enterprise 
against the adverse effects of its differential disadvantages will have to take 
into consideration all three of these matters. 
Finally, attention should be called to the fact that many of the problems 
emanating from the group interrelationships between large and small rivals 
tend to be accentuated under conditions of constant or declining total market 
demand. Much progress might therefore be made toward alleviation of such 
problems if it were possible to maintain a civilian economy with a high and 
rising level of total national output. OREGON STATE MONOGRAPHS
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